A naval arms race between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—the wealthiest and most powerful countries in South America—began in the early twentieth century when the Brazilian government ordered three dreadnoughts, formidable battleships whose capabilities far outstripped older vessels in the world's navies.
In 1904, the Brazilian legislature allocated substantial funds to improve the country's naval forces. Proponents of this plan believed that they needed a strong navy to become an international power and counter recent expansions of the Argentine and Chilean navies. The revolutionary design of the 1906 British warship prompted the Brazilians to alter these plans and redirect their money into constructing three Minas Geraes-class dreadnoughts. These warships, the most powerful in the world, entered service at a time when dreadnoughts were an important factor in a nation's international prestige and therefore brought global attention to Brazil.
Although the first two dreadnoughts were completed and delivered, the third faced a different fate. Preliminarily named Rio de Janeiro, the incomplete vessel was sold to the Ottoman Empire in 1913 in the face of a slowing economy, significant political opposition after a 1910 naval revolt, and because the ship was outclassed by ever-larger super-dreadnoughts.
To counter the Brazilian acquisitions, the Argentine and Chilean governments ordered two dreadnoughts each: the in 1910 and in 1911, respectively. Each were larger and more powerful than preceding dreadnoughts ordered during the arms race. The Argentine ships were particularly controversial, facing both political opposition and shipbuilder outrage from the multi-round bidding process used to select the design of their new ships.
The First World War marked the end of the South American naval arms race, as the countries involved found themselves effectively unable to purchase additional capital ships abroad. The conflict forced the cancellation of a Brazilian super-dreadnought, , before construction began, while the two Chilean dreadnoughts were purchased by the British; one was re-acquired by Chile after the war. Argentina's two dreadnoughts avoided this fate by being built in the then-neutral United States, and they were commissioned in 1914 and 1915.
Although Brazil and Chile's post-war naval expansion plans called for acquiring additional dreadnought-type warships, none were ever constructed. The five dreadnoughts that made it to South American navies would be scrapped in the 1950s.
Background
Argentine–Chilean arms race
+ Major Argentine and Chilean warship purchases and orders, 1887–1902 Year Ships (type) Year Ships (type) 1887 (BB) (PC)Presidente Pinto (PC) 1896 (AC) 1888 (BB) (BB) 1896 (AC) 1890 (PC) 1897 (AC) 1891 (PC) 1898 (AC) 1892 (PC) 1901 Rivadavia (AC)Mariano Moreno (AC) 1894 (PC) 1901 Constitución (BB)Libertad (BB) 1895 (AC) (PC) 1901 Two battleships,possibly ordered 1895 (AC) 1901 (PC) Key: Chile ArgentinaBB: pre-dreadnought battleship; PC: protected cruiser; AC: armored cruiser. The dates refer to when ships were ordered from the constructors. Information compiled from Scheina, Naval History, 46–51, 297–99.
A dispute over conflicting Argentine and Chilean claims to Patagonia, the southernmost region in South America, began in the mid-19th century. When the two nations nearly went to war over it in the late 1870s, three major new warships were ordered by both nations: the Chileans added the world's first protected cruiser, , and the Argentines contracted for the central battery ironclad and protected cruiser Patagonia.Scheina, Naval History, 42–46, 347.
A decade later, the Chilean government significantly increased their naval budget and ordered the battleship , two protected cruisers, and two torpedo boats. These ships would be added to two central battery ironclads, and (1870s), and Esmeralda.Scheina, Naval History, 45–46, 46n8.
These naval acquisitions were a major cause for concern for the Argentine government, which still had overlapping claims to Patagonia and had just watched the Chileans decisively win the War of the Pacific. Furthermore, while the country did possess more warships than the Chileans, their vessels were smaller and their crews less experienced than the battle-tested Chileans.
Facing these challenges, Argentine government quickly moved to order two battleships. This began a naval arms race between the two countries which continued through the 1890s, surviving even the expensive Chilean Civil War (1891). The two countries alternated cruiser orders over the next few years, with each order featuring an increase in capabilities; the race escalated in the middle of the decade when both countries instead began ordering powerful armored cruisers.Scheina, Naval History, 46–49, 297–98.
Tensions briefly cooled beginning in 1898 with the successful American arbitration of a boundary dispute in the northern Puna de Atacama region and the submission of the Patagonia dispute to British arbitration. However, this detente broke down just three years later when the Argentine Navy bought two armored cruisers from Italy and the Chilean Navy ordered two pre-dreadnought battleships from British shipyards. The Argentines reacted by signing letters of intent to buy two larger battleships.Scheina, Naval History, 49–51.
The growing dispute disturbed the British government, as an armed conflict would disrupt the country's extensive commercial interests in the region.Scheina, Naval History, 52 The British mediated negotiations between Argentina and Chile, and the resulting Pacts of May were signed on 28 May 1902. The third pact limited the naval armaments of both countries; both were barred from acquiring any further warships for five years without giving the other eighteen month's notice. The warships ordered in 1901 were sold: Chile's battleships became the United Kingdom's , and Argentina's armored cruisers became Japan's ; plans for Argentina's larger battleships were discarded. In addition, Capitán Prat and two Argentine armored cruisers were disarmed with the exception of their main batteries, as there was no crane in Argentina that was capable of removing the cruisers' gun turrets.Scheina, Naval History, 49–52; Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 146.
Brazilian decline and re-emergence
+ Major Brazilian warships, 1880–1906 Year Ships (type) Year Ships (type) 1883 (BB) 1892 (PC) (PC) 1885 (BB) 1896 (PC) 1890 (PC) 1898 (BB) (BB) Key: Empire of Brazil First Brazilian RepublicBB: Small ironclad or coast-defense ship – PC: protected cruiser The dates refer to when they were launched, still incomplete. Information compiled from Scheina, "Brazil", in Gardiner and Gray, Conway's 1906–21, 403–04.
In the aftermath of an 1889 army-led coup d'etat, large portions of Brazil's navy took up arms against the new government in 1891 and 1893–94.Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 148; Martins, A marinha brasileira, 56, 67; Brook, Warships for Export, 133; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy", 32; Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts", 240. The navy's opposition cost it dearly. Despite the naval expansions in Argentina and Chile and the era's rapidly advancing naval technology,Martins, A marinha brasileira, 50–51; Martins, "Colossos do mares", 75; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy", 32. in 1896 the navy had just forty-five percent of its authorized personnel.Love, Revolt, 16. Moreover, by the end of the century its only modern armored ships were two small coast-defense vessels.Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 216; Scheina, "Brazil", 403. With such dilapidated defenses, José Paranhos Jr., the Baron of Rio Branco and Foreign Minister of Brazil, opined that Brazil's only remaining protection was "the moral force and old prestige still left" from Brazil's imperial era.Viana Filho, A vida do Barão do Rio Branco, 445.
As the twentieth century began, increasing global demand for coffee and rubber led to Brazil's coffee economy and rubber boom. The resulting profits gave politicians Pinheiro Machado and Rio Branco the opportunity to construct a strong navy to achieve their goal of being recognized as an international power.Love, Revolt, 14; Scheina, Naval History, 80.
The National Congress of Brazil passed a large naval acquisition program on 14 December 1904, but the navy divided itself into two factions over what ships should be purchased.Scheina, Naval History, 80; Martins, A marinha brasileira, 156–58; Scheina, "Brazil", 403; Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts", 240. One, supported by the British armament company Armstrong Whitworth (which eventually received the order), favored a fleet centered around a small number of large warships. The other, supported by Rio Branco, preferred a larger navy composed of smaller warships.Scheina, Naval History, 80; Martins, A marinha brasileira, 80, 128, 158.
At first, the smaller warships faction prevailed. After Law no. 1452 was passed on 30 December 1905, which authorized £4,214,550 for new warship construction (£1,685,820 in 1906), three small battleships, three armored cruisers, six destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, three submarines, a collier, and a training ship were ordered.English, Armed Forces, 108; Scheina, Naval History, 80; Brook, Warships for Export, 133; Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 147; Martins, A marinha brasileira, 75, 78; Alger, "Professional Notes", 1051–52. Though the Brazilian government later eliminated the armored cruisers for monetary reasons, the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Júlio César de Noronha, signed a contract with Armstrong Whitworth for the planned battleships on 23 July 1906.Martins, A marinha brasileira, 80; Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts", 240–46. The acquisition was supported by the incoming Brazilian president Afonso Pena, who told the National Congress of Brazil in November 1906 that the ships were necessary to replace the antiquated vessels composing the current navy and the battleship , which had unexpectedly blown up earlier that year.Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 152; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy", 33; "New Era in the Americas", Boston Evening Transcript, 17 November 1906, 1.
British industrial interests welcomed the lucrative contracts. Much of the British Admiralty and establishment argued in favour of exports, especially to nations unlikely to become hostile to the U.K., since they would allow Great Britain to expand her own shipbuilding capacity at essentially no cost to the British government. However, the British ambassador to Brazil was opposed to the planned naval expansion due to its large cost and negative impact on relations between Brazil and Argentina. He saw it as "an embodiment of national vanity, combined with personal motives of a pecuniary character."Foreign Office, British National Archives 371/201, General Report on Brazil for the Year 1906, W.H.D. Haggard, in Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money, 149. The US ambassador to Brazil also spoke out against the purchase and warned his Department of State of the regional destabilization that could occur if the situation devolved into a full naval arms race. The US government attempted to diplomatically coerce the Brazilians into canceling their ships, but these attempts were dismissed; the Baron of Rio Branco remarked that caving to the American demands would render Brazil as powerless as Cuba, whose new constitution allowed the American government to intervene in Cuban affairs.Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy", 33.
First Brazilian battleships