The Mountain War (), also known as the War of the Mountain, was a subconflict between the 1982–83 and the 1984–89 phase of the Lebanese Civil War, which occurred mainly at the mountainous Chouf District located south-east of the Lebanese Capital Beirut. It pitted the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia and the official Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against a coalition of the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) led by the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), allied with the Amal Movement and the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF), and backed by Syria. Hostilities began when the LF and the LAF entered the predominantly Druze Chouf District to bring the region back under government control, only to be met with fierce resistance from local Druze militias and their allies. The PSP leader Walid Jumblatt's persistence to refuse join the central government and his instigation of a wider opposition faction led to disintegration of the already fragile LAF and the eventual collapse of the government under President Amine Gemayel.
Background
In the wake of the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the main Maronite Christian ally of Israel, the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia of the Kataeb Party commanded by Bashir Gemayel sought to expand its area of influence in Lebanon. The LF tried to take advantage of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) advances to begin deploying troops in areas where they had not been present before. This territorial expansion policy was focused on regions known to harbor a large Christian rural population, such as the mountainous Chouf District, located south-east of Beirut. Following the assassination of their leader – and President-elected of Lebanon – Bashir Gemayel in September 1982, the LF command council decided late that month to enter the Chouf. The head of LF intelligence, Elie Hobeika, voiced his opposition to the entry, but was overruled by his fellow senior commanders of the council, Fadi Frem and Fouad Abou Nader. With the tacit backing of the IDF, Lebanese Forces' units under the command of Samir Geagea (appointed Commander of all LF forces in the Chouf-Aley sector of Mount Lebanon in January 1983) moved into the Christian-populated areas of the western Chouf. By early 1983, the Lebanese Forces' managed to establish garrisons at a number of key towns in the Chouf, namely Aley, Deir el-Qamar, Souk El Gharb, Bhamdoun, Kabr Chmoun and others.Gordon, The Gemayels (1988), pp. 70–71. However, this brought them into confrontation with the local Druze community, who viewed the LF as intruders on their territory.
Historically the relationship between the Druze and Maronite Christians in the Chouf Mountains has been characterized by harmony and peaceful coexistence, with amicable relations between the two groups prevailing throughout history, with the exception of some periods, including the 1860 Mount Lebanon civil war. The Maronites and the Druze were long-standing enemies since the 1860s – when a bloody civil war tore apart the Mount Lebanon Emirate, on which thousands of Christians were massacred by the Druzes – and old enmities were rearoused when Geagea's Maronite troops tried to pay old historic debts by imposing their authority on the Chouf by force. As a result, sporadic fighting soon broke out between the LF and the main Druze militia, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP).
Re-organization of the LAF
The new Lebanese President Amin Gemayel – brother of the late Bashir, elected as his successor on 21 September – requested that a second U.S., French and Italian (soon joined by a small British contingent) peacekeeping Multinational Force (MNF II) be deployed in and around the Greater Beirut area to maintain order, although the political objectives of this deployment were not clearly defined.Guest, Lebanon (1994), p. 109. President Amin Gemayel and Lieutenant general Ibrahim Tannous, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), also succeeded in persuading the United States Government to assist Lebanon in rebuilding its depleted army.Kechichian, The Lebanese Army: Capabilities and Challenges in the 1980s (1985), p. 26.Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), pp. 123-125. As early as October 1978,Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), pp. 117-118. plans were drawn to create a system of light mechanized infantry brigades, and although the nuclei of eight brigades, plus a Headquarters' Brigade and a Republican Guard Brigade had been created by mid-1982, most were well below strength. Under the auspices of the U.S.-funded Lebanese Army Modernization Program (LAMP), the Lebanese Government proceeded to re-organize the LAF brigades – combined with the manpower provided by conscription, which allowed their rapid expansion – with material help from Jordan, the United States and France, whose MNF contingents (U.S. Marines and French Foreign Legion Paratroopers) began training Lebanese soldiers, followed by the end of the year of the arrival of arms shipments. This stance however, eroded the neutrality of the MNF at the eyes of the Lebanese Muslims, since they did not perceive the LAF as a true national defense force that would protect the interests of all factions.Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 123. Indeed, the LAF was almost wholly controlled by the Christians.Guest, Lebanon (1994), pp. 102; 109.
The Lebanese Army re-enters west Beirut Between 2 and 15 October 1982, the newly-raised 6th Defence Brigade under the command of Colonel Michel Aoun re-entered west Beirut alongside other Lebanese Army units and the Internal Security Forces (ISF), ostensibly to carry out the pacification of the Muslim-populated districts of the Capital city. Acting in collusion with the Lebanese Forces, they arrested 1,441 Muslims (other sources indicate a higher number, some 2,000) who were either members or supporters of Leftist political groups and subsequently disappeared; none was heard of again.Hokayem, L'armée libanaise pendant la guerre: un instrument du pouvoir du président de la République (1975-1985) (2012), p. 78.Sex & Abi-Chahine, Modern Conflicts 2 – The Lebanese Civil War, From 1975 to 1991 and Beyond (2021), p. 101.
After the Lebanese Army regained control of west Beirut,Barak, The Lebanese Army – A National institution in a divided society (2009), p. 124. Lt. Gen. Tannous turned his attention to the Chouf District and on 18 October, his troops began to reassert their presence in the region. However, they were unable to stop the ongoing Christian-Druze clashes, mostly due to Israeli presence in the area, which tended to restrict Lebanese government' forces activity.O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), pp. 120–121.
In November, fighting in the Chouf spread into the south-western suburbs of Beirut and friction in the Lebanese Capital increased after 1 December, when the Druze PSP leader Walid Jumblatt was injured in an assassination attempt by a car-bomb explosion outside his residence.O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 121. On 20 December fighting broke out again between the Christian LF and the Druze PSP/PLA militias at the town of Aley which rumbled on until 7 February 1983, when the Druze overrun the town and drove out the Christian garrison.O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 122.
On 18 April a suicide bomber drove a delivery van packed with explosives into the lobby of the U.S. Embassy at west Beirut, killing 63 people – among the dead were Robert Ames, a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, and six personnel from the CIA station in Lebanon. Responsibility was claimed by the hitherto unknown Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), a Lebanese Shi'ite militia supported by Iran and based near Baalbek in the Syrian-controlled Beqaa Valley. This attack inaugurated the saga of suicide car- and truck-bombings in Lebanon.Katz, Russel, and Volstad, Armies in Lebanon (1985), p. 34.O'Ballance, Civil War in Lebanon (1998), p. 123.
On 28 April, the fighting between Christian LF and Druze PSP/PLA militias resumed in the Chouf and in the northern part of the Matn District, spilling over into the southern suburbs of east Beirut, which were bombarded by Druze artillery batteries positioned at Dhour El Choueir, Arbaniyeh, Salimeh and Maaroufiyeh in the Baabda District. Fighting in the Chouf spilled over again into Beirut, this time in the form of further artillery shelling by the Druze PLA between 5 and 8 May.
17 May Agreement After six months of prolonged U.S.-mediated secret negotiations, representatives of the Lebanese, Israeli, and American governments signed a withdrawal agreement on 17 May 1983, which became known as the 'May 17 Agreement', that provided for the evacuation of all foreign armed forces from Lebanon. However, implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement depended entirely upon the cooperation of Syria who, incensed for being neither invited to the negotiations nor consulted prior to the signature of the agreement, rejected it by refusing to withdraw its 30,000 troops stationed in Lebanon. Many Lebanese, both Christian and Muslim, were not in favour of a U.S.-sponsored agreement either, which included severe security terms imposed by the Israelis and practically treated Lebanon as a defeated country. Although the agreement was approved by the Lebanese Parliament, President Amin Gemayel refused to ratify it, a decision that irritated the Israeli Prime-Minister Menahem Begin.Ménargues, Les Secrets de la guerre du Liban (2004), p. 498. Lebanese Sunni and Shia Muslims also felt both threatened and marginalized when their President, confident of U.S. political and military support, avoided implementing the much-needed political reforms to which the mainly Muslim Political Parties and militias felt entitled.
Increasing tensions
As a result, internal political and armed opposition to the weak Gemayel administration grew intensively throughout the country. On 22 May, a number of clashes occurred in the Chouf Mountains, as the Druze PSP/PLA militia moved to expel the Lebanese Forces from their remaining positions in the area. Despite the heavy presence of IDF units in the region, the Israelis had little interest at getting involved in the Lebanese inter-sectarian strife, and made no attempt to intervene on behalf of their LF allies.
During the summer of 1983 the situation in Lebanon degenerated into a vicious power struggle between Lebanese rival factions, with the MNF caught in the middle. Both the Israelis and Syrians withdrew to more defensive positions and tried to outmaneuver each other by playing their local proxies, with mixed results. Seemingly oblivious to the deteriorating political and military situation, the U.S. government did nothing to demonstrate its neutrality. In June, rather than cancelling or descaling the training and arming of the LAF ground forces, the U.S. Marines began joint patrols with them,Guest, Lebanon (1994), p. 110. whilst the French, Italian and British contingents of the Multinational Force refrained from doing so, fearing that such a partisan move would compromise the neutrality of the MNF.