Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, specifically Article 14(1), guarantees to Singapore citizens the rights to freedom of speech and expression, association, and peaceful assembly without arms. However, the enjoyment of these rights may be restricted by laws imposed by the Parliament of Singapore on the grounds stated in Article 14(2) of the Constitution.
There are two types of grounds. For the first type, it must be shown that restricting the rights is "necessary or expedient in the interest" of the grounds. The grounds are the security of Singapore and public order (applicable to all three rights protected by Article 14(1)), morality (freedom of speech and freedom of association), and friendly relations with other countries (freedom of speech only). In a 2005 judgement, the High Court expressed the view that the phrase necessary or expedient confers upon Parliament "an extremely wide discretionary power and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach towards achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of the Constitution". It is unnecessary for the courts to determine whether a legislative restriction of a right is reasonable. All that is required is a nexus between the objective underlying the restrictive law and one of the grounds specified in Article 14(2) that Parliament is entitled to restrict the right on.
The right to free speech is limited on the ground of the security of Singapore by the , and on the ground of public order by the and . Public order also justifies restrictions on both free speech and assembly imposed by the , and ; and restrictions on the right to freedom of association imposed by the . Freedom of speech has also been limited on the basis of morality by the , which establishes film censorship and classification regimes; and the , under which obscene or otherwise objectionable publications may be banned.
No necessity or expedience requirement applies to the second type of grounds, which appear in Articles 14(2)(a) (restrictions "designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence") and 14(3) (laws relating to labour or education). At present, it appears that Parliament may restrict Article 14(1) rights on these grounds simply by enacting legislation, and that the courts are not entitled to assess if the restrictions are appropriate. The privileges of Parliament are set out in the , and the Singapore courts have held that the common law offence of scandalizing the court (a form of contempt of court) does not violate Article 14(1)(a). The courts have also determined that the traditional common law rules of the tort of defamation strike a proper balance between free speech and the protection of reputation, and have declined to apply a public figure doctrine or responsible journalism as additional defences to the tort.
Text of Article 14 Article 14(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. was designed to protect the rights to freedom of speech and expression, peaceful assembly without arms, and association. It is subject to Article 14(2) which qualifies these rights. Judicial and statutory limits have been read into the Article, a process which is deemed necessary because the rights to free speech, assembly and association do not exist in a vacuum but jostle with competing interests and counter-values.. As was said in Chee Siok Chin v. Ministry of Home Affairs (2005),. "[f]reedom of action invariably ends where conflicting rights and/or interests collide".Chee Siok Chin, p. 632, para. 136.
The text of Article 14, which is entitled "Freedom of speech, assembly and association", is as follows:
Articles 14(1) to (3) are in pari materia with Articles 10(1) to (3) of the Constitution of Malaysia, from which they were adopted following Singapore's independence from Malaysia in 1965., s. 6(1). Articles 14(1) and (2) are also somewhat similar to Articles 19(1) to (4) of the Constitution of India.
There is no constitutional right to bear arms in Singapore, as Article 14(1)(b) provides Singapore citizens with "the right to assemble peaceably and without arms". Under the Arms and Explosives Act,. no person may possess, import, export, manufacture or deal in any arms or explosives without a licence. It may be that the words and without arms were included in Article 14(1)(b) to ensure that arguments based on the clause in the English Bill of Rights 1689Bill of Rights 1689 (1 Will. & Mary, sess. 2, c. 2) (UK). stating that "the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law", which inspired the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."), cannot be raised in Singapore.
The freedoms of speech, assembly and association guaranteed by the Constitution are enjoyed only by Singapore citizens. In Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong (2009),Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong 1 S.L.R. 52, Court of Appeal (Singapore). it was held that the appellant newspaper company did not have the requisite locus standi to rely on the constitutional right of free speech and expression as it was not a Singapore citizen, and Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution expressly provides that only Singapore citizens are entitled to the right.Review Publishing, p. 171, para. 257.
Restrictions on the rights The rights guaranteed to the citizens of Singapore by Article 14(1) are subject to restrictions set out in subsection (2) of the same Article. In Chee Siok Chin, Justice V.K. Rajah elucidated the justification for these qualifications:
In 1993 in a statement delivered at the World Conference on Human Rights, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Wong Kan Seng took the position that "order and stability are essential for development" as economic growth requires a stable legal environment protective of contractual and property rights.. The statement was also published as . Excessive focus on civil-political liberties during the early stages of national development would impair this. However, the Government appears to have loosened restrictions on political liberties like free speech over time to manage demands for a more participatory political culture.See, for example, . In fact, citizens were urged by Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong not to be "passive bystanders in their own fate" but to debate issues "with reason, passion and conviction". Wrestling with "honest differences" was to be preferred over being "an apathetic society with no view"..
Parliament may impose restrictions on the rights guaranteed by Article 14(1) on two types of grounds. For the first type, it must be shown that restricting the rights is "necessary or expedient in the interest" of the grounds. No such requirement applies to the second type of grounds, which appear in Articles 14(2)(a) and 14(3). At present, it appears that Parliament may restrict Article 14(1) rights on these grounds simply by enacting legislation, and that the courts are not entitled to assess if the restrictions are appropriate.Chee Siok Chin, pp. 602–603, para. 49.Compare Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor 3 S.L.R. 489 at 526–527, para. 80, C.A. (Singapore), in which the Court of Appeal declined to hold that any procedural law must be "fair, just and reasonable" to fall within the meaning of the word law in Article 9(1) of the Constitution: "Such a test hinges on the court's view of the reasonableness of the law in question, and requires the court to intrude into the legislative sphere of Parliament as well as engage in policy making."
Meaning of Parliament may by law impose Article 14(2) of the Constitution states that "Parliament may by law impose" restrictions on the rights referred to in Article 14(1). This is arguably in line with Singapore's adoption of the Westminster system of government that rests upon parliamentary supremacy, the rule of law and common law principles.. The terms law and written law are defined in Article 2(1) of the Constitution as follows:
One reading of Article 14(2) is that in order to restrict the rights to freedom of speech, assembly and association, Parliament must impose the restrictions by passing written laws, that is, Acts of Parliament, since it exercises the legislative power of Singapore by passing bills that are assented to by the President.Constitution, Art. 58(1). However, in Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew (1990),Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew 1 S.L.R.(R.) 337, C.A. (Singapore). a case involving defamation law, the Court of Appeal took a much broader approach. The Court noted that according to Article 2(1), law in Article 14(2) includes the common law in so far as it is in operation in Singapore. In May 1963, the Parliament of Malaysia had enacted the Malaysia Act 1963,Malaysia Act 1963 (No. 26 of 1963) (Malaysia). which extended the Defamation Act 1957Defamation Act 1957 (No. 20 of 1957) (Malaysia). to Singapore, then a state in the Federation of Malaysia. Since the Act, now the , was premised on common law rules of the tort of defamation, the Court held that the Legislature had "clearly intended that the common law relating to defamation, as modified by the Act, should continue to apply in Singapore". Thus, it is "manifestly beyond argument that Art 14(1)(a) is subject to the common law of defamation as modified by the Act".Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin, p. 339, para. 5, cited in the later decision Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew 1 S.L.R.(R.) 791 at 817, para. 59, C.A. (Singapore).
It has been said that this argument "suffers from two fatal flaws".. There is no evidence that the constitutionality of the existing rules of defamation was considered by either the Malaysian or Singapore Parliaments. More significantly, even if the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore had believed these rules to be constitutional, this should not have been treated by the Court of Appeal as decisive as it is the courts' duty to independently determine whether the assumption is justified. Otherwise, a similar argument might be extended to all legislation passed by Parliament, and "[i]t is not difficult to see that this would spell the end of constitutional law itself".Hor, "Freedom of Speech and Defamation", pp. 550–551.
Restrictions premised on necessity or expediency Parliament may restrict the rights to free speech, assembly and association on the grounds set out in the table below if it is "necessary or expedient in the interest" of them: