The Nicaraguan National Guard (, otherwise known as ) was the military created in 1925 during the occupation of Nicaragua by the United States as a militia and gendarmerie. It became notorious for human rights abuses and corruption under the regime of the Somoza family (1936–1979). The National Guard was disbanded when the Sandinistas came to power in 1979.
Creation
Prior to the U.S. occupation, the long period of civil strife had encouraged the development of a variety of private armies. The freshly elected government of President Carlos José Solórzano requested that the U.S. Marines (equally interested in central control) remain in Nicaragua until an indigenous internal security force could be trained; to that effect, the Nicaraguan government hired in 1925 a retired U.S. general to help set up a new paramilitary gendarmerie force, titled the (National Guard of Nicaragua).. That same year, U.S. forces left the country, but after a civil war broke out, they returned in 1926 and took over the command (and training) of the National Guard from 1927 to 1933, when it was returned to Nicaraguan control under the government of President Juan Bautista Sacasa.
President Sacasa, under political pressure from José María Moncada, who had been the leader of a rebel faction which later joined the government after U.S. mediation efforts, appointed Anastasio Somoza García as Chief Director of the National Guard in 1925. Besides being a nephew of Sacasa, Somoza García was a trusted friend of Moncada and a supporter of the liberal revolt. He was trusted by the Americans due to his service as a translator to Henry Stimson during the 1927 peace conference, schooling in the U.S., and training under the U.S. Marines (apparently, as an officer in the National Guard).
After the departure of U.S. troops in 1933 (at the height of the Great Depression), the Sacasa government opened negotiations with the National Sovereignty Defense Army (EDSN) rebel guerrilla faction led by Augusto César Sandino, which had fought both the National Guard and the U.S. occupation forces. During the negotiations, Sandino insisted on the disbandment of the National Guard as a pre-condition for any peace agreement, leading Somoza García to react ruthlessly by arresting and executing Sandino, in violation of a safe passage agreement Sacasa had given to the rebel leader. The National Guard then swiftly crushed Sandino's EDSN, further weakening the Sacasa government. By this time, the National Guard had grown to some 3,000 troops.
After using the influence of the National Guard to support Sacasa's re-election in 1936, Somoza García flouted civilian power, installing military cronies in key civilian posts and then deposed Sacasa in a coup d'état held in June that same year. With an ally appointed interim president, Somoza García then resigned from the position of Chief Director of the National Guard in order to meet the constitutional requirements to run for the presidency himself. Breaking with the Liberal party, he established the Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN, National Liberal Party) and Somoza was elected president in December with a reported margin of 64,000 of the 80,663 votes cast."Nicaragua Elects Gen. Somoza President— Commander of National Army Receives Nearly 3/4 Of Votes Cast in Election", Baltimore Sun, December 9, 1936, p.3Another source says that Somoza won the 1936 election "by the remarkable margin of 107,201 votes to 100." On 1 January 1937, President Somoza García reappointed himself again chief director of the National Guard, installing a corrupt military dictatorship linked to U.S. business interests that would last four decades.
Somoza regime Somoza García rapidly took complete control of Nicaraguan institutions including the National Guard, promoting allies and purging enemies. The National Guard was the backbone of a growing network of control, eventually including telecommunications, railroads, and key civilian agencies from customs to hospitals to tax collection. In 1938, Somoza García appointed a civilian assembly that rubber-stamped constitutional changes allowing him to stay in office; his personal fortune expanded as he and his family took over key areas of the private economy. An increasingly pervasive corruption comparable to a gangland mob, with bribery, kickbacks, and sometimes violent enforcement, protected the power of the Somoza family at all levels. The U.S. supported the National Guard through the World War II Lend-Lease act and under the terms of the Rio Treaty, but did not publicly approve of Somoza García's extraconstitutional governance. The National Guard, which had been until then a predominately light infantry force composed largely of rifle companies equipped with World War I-vintage U.S. small arms, began to acquire surplus heavy equipment such as armoured cars, light tanks, transport vehicles and artillery.
The regime permitted nominal political dissent, and, in 1947, agreed to elections, hoping to mollify both the United States and local opponents, but quickly deposed the winning candidate in a coup d'état that brought strong disapproval from the U.S. Government. Under a new constitution, an assembly-appointed president, and a strong anti-communist stance relations improved. Nevertheless, Somoza García was the true power behind the curtain and an increasing target of attempted coups and assassination; he even raised a personal bodyguard separated from the rest of the National Guard and had the constitution amended to allow him to run for yet another term in 1955. In January of that same year, Somoza García, in collusion with the dictator of the Dominican Republic Rafael Trujillo, supported an unsuccessful invasion of Costa Rica from Nicaragua by exiled supporters of former President Rafael Calderón Guardia, with the Nicaraguan National guard providing air cover to the operation..
In September 1956, Somoza García was fatally shot by a young dissident poet, Rigoberto López Pérez, and was succeeded in the presidency by his elder son, Luis Somoza Debayle, while his youngest son Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point became the Chief Director of the National Guard. Brutal repression of the internal political opposition followed suit. In 1957, the National Guard was involved in the only external military action of its existence, a brief border skirmish with Honduras. In 1961, the National Guard cooperated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation for the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba, permitting its bases to be used for training and staging areas. From May 1965 to September 1966, one infantry company of the National Guard participated in a peacekeeping operation in the Dominican Republic alongside U.S., Brazilian, Paraguayan, Honduran and Costa Rican troops as part of the Interamerican Pacification Force (FIP), deployed under the aegis of the Organization of American States (OAS).. The guard's domestic power, however, gradually broadened to embrace not only its original internal security and police functions but also control over customs, telecommunications, port facilities, radio broadcasting, the merchant marine, and civil aviation..
Even as trusted friends of the family succeeded Luis in the presidency, his brother remained firmly in control of the National Guard. Eventually, in 1967, Anastasio himself was elected president; Luis soon died of a heart attack, leaving Anastasio in sole control. Without his brother's technocratic influence, Anastasio's corrupt ways were unrestrained. The 1972 Nicaragua earthquake, which severely damaged the capital of Managua, brought further evidence of corruption, as members of the National Guard openly looted damaged businesses and misappropriated international aid, and Somoza Debayle's personal wealth soared during the reconstruction period. In 1974, the growing Sandinista movement FSLN (named after the assassinated Sandino) succeeded in forcing the government to accept an amnesty, after which Somoza Debayle declared a state of siege and the National Guard launched a violent and repressive reaction in the period 1975–76.. Though the FSLN was weakened, so was the regime.
Collapse Direct U.S. military aid ended in November 1978 although the U.S. still attempted to pursue a policy of "Somocismo sin Somoza," effectively allowing the power structure of the National Guard to prevent a Sandinista victory while removing the increasingly unpopular Somoza from power. The Carter Administration even sent Somoza a congratulatory note from Carter after his disputed victory in the 1978 elections.
After the assassination of opposition leader among the business elites Pedro Chamorro in January 1978, the Nicaraguan public reacted with a series of nationwide strikes and increasing political unrest against the regime. The National Guard was re-organized and expanded, growing to a force of more than 10,000 officers and enlisted men, with localized security companies dispersed throughout the country and modern specialized units such as mechanized and engineer battalions, a Presidential Guard, and a reinforced tactical battalion. The strengthened National Guard continued to tighten its grip but opposition only grew broader and fiercer. A humiliating hostage crisis ensued on 22 August 1978 when 25 Sandinista rebels disguised as National Guard soldiers led by "Comandante Cero" (Commander Zero), future Contra leader Edén Pastora, occupied the National Assembly Palace in Managua, took 2,000 hostages, and escaped to Panama with 50 released political prisoners. The seizure of the National Palace was the second major action launched by the Sandinistas..
By March 1979, the Somoza regime faced an open civil war as well as being cut off from all aid by the United States, including blocking of an emergency shipment of weapons and ammunition coming from Israel. With ammunition, spare parts, fuel, and medical supplies running dangerously low,. the increasingly hard-pressed National Guard could no longer sustain a prolonged fight against the rebels. Already plagued by shaky morale, and weakened by casualties and desertions after seven weeks of battle, GN units were gradually forced to fall back to Managua.
At this point, on 17 July 1979 Somoza Debayle resigned from office and fled the country by plane to Miami, Florida, followed by almost all of the senior military officers of the National Guard's General Staff. Somoza's successor as head of state, interim President Francisco Urcuyo Maliaños opened negotiations for a cease-fire but at the same time tried to strengthen his political position by filling with younger colonels and lieutenant-colonels the depleted National Guard's General Staff, now headed by the new Chief Director Lt. Col. (later General) Federico Mejía González. The 12,000 Guardsmen still under his command, now besieged in the government quarter of Tiscapa hill at Managua and Managua International Airport, and at the remaining holdouts throughout the country were exhorted to continue the fight.
After negotiations with the Sandinistas broke down due to his refusal to resign on 18 July, President Urcuyo fled to Guatemala, leaving in charge GN Chief Director General Mejía who tried unsuccessfully to pursue conversations for the cease-fire. Faced with the rejection by the Sandinistas of his list of demands – which included retention of all property belonging to individual officers – in exchange for a surrender, on the dawn of 19 July 1979, General Mejía and most of the high-ranking officers of the General Staff left Nicaragua by plane, leaving their men leaderless.