Narco-state, also called narco-capitalism or narco-economy, is a political and economic term applied to countries where all legitimate institutions become penetrated by the power and wealth of the illegal drug trade. The term was first used to describe Bolivia following the 1980 coup of Luis García Meza which was seen to be primarily financed with the help of narcotics traffickers.
The term is often seen by critics as ambiguous because of the differentiation between narco-states. The overall description would consist of illegal organisations that either produce, ship or sell drugs and hold a grip on the legitimate institutions through force, bribery or blackmail. This situation can arise in different forms. For instance, Colombia, where drug lord Pablo Escobar ran the Medellín Cartel (named after his birthplace) during most of the 1970s and 1980s, producing and trafficking cocaine to the United States of America. Escobar managed to take over control of most of the police forces in Medellín and surrounding areas through bribery and coercion, allowing him to expand his drug trafficking business.
Currently, scholars argue that the term "narco-state" is oversimplified because of the underlying networks running the drug trafficking organisations. For example, the Guadalajara Cartel in Mexico, led by Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, who managed to combine several small drug trafficking families into one overarching cartel, controlling the marijuana production in the rural areas of Mexico, while trafficking Colombian cocaine to the US at the same time.
Over time, the cocaine market expanded to Europe, leading to new routes being discovered from Colombia through Brazil or Venezuela and Western Africa. These new routes proved to be more profitable and successful than shipping from North America and turned African states such as Nigeria, Ghana, and later on Guinea-Bissau into actual narco-states. While cocaine was transported through Western Africa, the Taliban produced opium in the rural areas of Afghanistan using the revenues to fund their guerrilla war. Despite American and NATO efforts to impose laws on the Afghan opium production, the early 2000s incumbent Afghan governments shielded the opium trade from foreign policies as much as possible. As of 2024, Syria's Assad regime was regarded as the world's largest narco-state, with an estimated global Captagon export worth $30–57 billion annually. Revenue from the illicit drug exports accounted for around 90% of the revenue of the Assad regime. Since its fall, drug manufacturing has been reduced, but significant transit of drugs still exists through Syria.
Ongoing discussions divide scholars into separate groups either claiming or disclaiming the resemblance between narco-states and failed states. Depending on which properties are assigned to the definition of a failed state, the definition is in accordance with the narco-state. While most narco-states show signs of high rates of corruption, violence and murder, properties that are also assigned to failed states, it is not always clear if violence can be traced back to drug trafficking.
Usage It has been argued that narco-states can be divided into five categories depending on their level of dependence on the narcotics trade and the threat the narcotics trade in said country poses to domestic and international stability. These five categories are (in ascending order): incipient, developing, serious, critical, and advanced; however, use of the term narco-state has been questioned by some for being too widely and uncritically applied, particularly following the widespread media attention given to Guinea-Bissau as "the world's first narco-state" in 2008, and should instead refer only to those countries in which the narcotics trade is state-sponsored and constitutes the majority of a country's overall GDP.
Examples United Kingdom Historians and authors describe the British Empire in the 19th century and the East India Company as history's first major narco-state because of the opium wars and the state-backed drug dealing of opium in China
Afghanistan
Afghanistan was very well known for its opium production. As of 2021, Afghanistan's harvest produces more than 90% of illicit heroin globally, and more than 95% of the European supply.Felbab-Brown p. 113 Most of the opium was smuggled through Herat and Faizabad to the Golden Crescent countries such as Iran and Pakistan. Opium production and trafficking are known to have funded the Taliban's military activities and insurgency.
Belize Belize has been described as a narco-state in Mexican media owing to close links between Belizean authorities and Mexican drug cartels. The country was a base of operations for Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán and Ismael Zambada García with his Sinaloa Cartel, along with Mexico and Honduras. Johnny Briceño, elected prime minister of Belize in 2020, is the son of Elijio "Don Joe" Briceño, who in 1985 was convicted of trafficking marijuana and cocaine into the United States. Two others members of the Briceño family were also indicted, with prosecutors describing the clan as operating a "family marijuana business".
Bolivia The drug trade in Bolivia gained its prominence in 1980s, when the demand for cocaine was booming across Latin America. Bolivia's most lucrative crop and economic activity in the 1980s was coca, whose leaves were processed clandestinely into cocaine.. The country was the second largest grower of coca in the world, supplying approximately fifteen percent of the US cocaine market in the late 1980s. Analysts believed that exports of coca paste and cocaine generated between US$600 million and US$1 billion annually in the 1980s (depending on prices and output).
In 1980, General Luis García Meza overthrew President Lidia Gueiler in a bloody coup d'état allegedly aided by drug cartels. The dictatorship of García Meza was very well known for its state sponsored drug trafficking activities. García Meza's regime oversaw Bolivia's 13-month period of isolation. The Reagan administration distanced themselves from García Meza's regime and halted some aid to Bolivia due to the regime's relationship with drug cartels. García Meza's time in office was short-lived as he was overthrown and replaced by General Celso Torrelio. García Meza was convicted in absentia for his human rights violations in Bolivia, and he was later extradited from Brazil in 1995 and sentenced to serve 30 years in a Bolivian prison. His collaborator, Colonel Luis Arce Gómez, was extradited to the United States to serve his sentence for drug trafficking in a United States federal prison. The 1980s coup was said to have been financed by Bolivia's most notorious drug baron, Roberto Suárez Gómez. Suárez Gómez was the founder of La Corporación, a Bolivian drug cartel tied to Pablo Escobar's Medellín Cartel. The organization was founded in the 1970s and mainly focused in Santa Cruz de la Sierra; it amassed $400 million annually. The cocaine shipped from the Bolivian Amazon to Colombia was valued at $9,000 per kilogram. In 1988, Suárez Gómez was arrested by the Bolivian National Police and sentenced to 15 years in prison; his nephew Jorge Roca Suárez continued his business until his arrest in 1990.
Brazil
Since 1990, the phenomenon of urban violence has intensified. There are currently more than fifty criminal factions in Brazil. Since the 1990s, Brazil has seen a significant increase in urban violence, often linked to drug trafficking and organized crime. The presence of over fifty criminal factions indicates a deeply entrenched network of illicit activities. These groups are involved in various illegal operations, including the local drug trade and international drug trafficking. The power and influence of these factions, such as the First Capital Command (PCC) and the Red Command (CV), extend beyond prisons into various urban areas, contributing to the issue. Brazil's extensive borders with major cocaine-producing countries like Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia make it a key transit country for drug trafficking. This geographic situation, combined with socio-economic factors and challenges in law enforcement and judicial systems, creates an environment conducive to the growth of organized crime and drug trafficking.
Former president Jair Bolsonaro's family has been linked to so called "milícias", composed of police officers and other government officials engaged in narcotrafic. One of aides, who has been charged a 2 million euro fine over cocaine transportation, is being investigated for using an official airplane and the president's credit card for drug-trafficking. During the presidential election of 2022, Bolsonaro supporters made claims regarding Lula's alleged links to criminal factions. Other politicians, such as former president Fernando Collor de Mello, have been investigated for mobster relations.
Colombia
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Colombian drug cartels became major producers, processors and exporters of illegal drugs, primarily marijuana and cocaine. The drug trade in Colombia was monopolized by four drug trafficking cartels: Medellín, Cali, Norte del Valle, and North Coast.International Crisis Group. "Dismantling Colombia's New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender", CrisisGroup.org. 8 June 2012. Retrieved 31 July 2014. However some guerilla warlords in the Colombian conflict were also said to be involved in drug trafficking in the country.
The Medellín Cartel was once the largest drug cartel operating in Colombia, led by Pablo Escobar which focused its operations in the city of Medellín. Most of the imported drugs are originated from countries like Bolivia and Peru which were later processed in Colombia. The Medellín Cartel gained prominence in the 1980s when the cartel amassed $60 million worth of fortune from drug trade to the United States, mainly focused on Florida, New York, and California. This caused the United States government to sign an extradition treaty with Colombia. Escobar's business empire was known for its "reign of terror" as the cartel staged numerous kidnappings, assassinations and bombings around Colombia to ensure its business continuity. Pablo Escobar was shot to death by police in 1993; after the death of Pablo Escobar, the Medellín Cartel began to decline which eventually led to its disbandment. The disbandment of the Medellín Cartel has led to the other three major cartels, especially the Cali Cartel, to seize the opportunity to expand their trade routes.
During the drug war, major Colombian cartels were known to be influencing Colombian politicians and warlords alike. In order to flex his muscle, Escobar went to politics and ran as candidate for the Chamber of Representatives under the banner of the Liberal Alternative; however, Escobar's ambition in politics was later thwarted after knowledge of his criminal activity was exposed to the representatives, which forced him to resign. This event become the root cause of the assassination of justice minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. In contrast to the Medellín Cartel, the Cali Cartel adopted a more subtle approach on influencing local politicians. In 1994, the outgoing president Ernesto Samper was involved in the Proceso 8000 scandal in which he was accused of being funded by drug money, allegedly from the Cali Cartel for his campaign in the 1994 Colombian presidential election. The scandal caused then US president Bill Clinton to cut Colombian aid and later revoke Samper's visa.
In 2023, Nicolas Petro, son of Colombian President Gustavo Petro was arrested for a money laundering case. Petro was accused of taking money from drug traffickers to fund his peace effort and presidential campaign which he would later deny. Nicolas Petro later told Semana that he and his father were not aware about the money he received was coming from drug traffickers.
Guinea-Bissau