The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values is a 2010 book by Sam Harris, in which he promotes a science of morality and argues that many thinkers have long confused the relationship between morality, facts, and science. He aims to carve a third path between secularists who say morality is subjective (moral relativists) and religionists who say that morality is dictated by God and scripture.
Harris contends that the only viable moral framework is one where "morally good" things pertain to increases in the "well-being of conscious creatures". He then argues that, problems with philosophy of science and reason in general notwithstanding, moral questions have objectively right and wrong answers grounded in empirical facts about what causes people to flourish. Challenging the traditional philosophical notion that an "ought" cannot follow from an "is" (Hume's law), Harris argues that moral questions are best pursued using not just philosophy, but the methods of science, because science can tell us which values lead to human flourishing. It is in this sense that Harris advocates that scientists begin conversations about a normative science of morality.
Publication of the book followed Harris's 2009 receipt of a Ph.D. in cognitive neuroscience from the University of California, Los Angeles with a similarly titled thesis: The Moral Landscape: How Science Could Determine Human Values.
Synopsis
Harris's case starts with two premises: "(1) some people have better lives than others, and (2) these differences are related, in some lawful and not entirely arbitrary way, to states of the human brain and to states of the world".The Moral Landscape, pg. 15 The idea is that a person is simply describing material facts (many about their brain) when they describe possible "better" and "worse" lives for themselves. Granting this, Harris says we must conclude that there are facts about which courses of action will allow one to pursue a better life.
Harris emphasizes the importance of admitting that such facts exist, because he says this logic also applies to groups of people. He suggests there are better and worse ways for societies to pursue better lives. Just as for an individual, there may be multiple different paths and "peaks" to flourishing for societies—and many more ways to fail.
Harris then makes a case that science can usefully define morality using facts about people's well-being. His arguments acknowledge that problems with this scientific definition of morality seem to be problems shared by all science, or reason and words in general. Harris also spends some time describing how science might engage nuances and challenges of identifying the best ways for individuals and groups to improve their lives. Many of these issues are covered below.
Philosophical case Although Harris's book discusses the challenges that a science of morality must face, he also mentions that his scientific argument is indeed philosophical. Furthermore, he says that this is the case for almost all scientific investigation. He mentions that modern science amounts to careful practice of accepted first philosophical principles like empiricism and physicalism.The Moral Landscape, pg. 180 He also suggests that science has already very much settled on values in answering the question "what should I believe, and why should I believe it?".The Moral Landscape, pg. 144 Harris says it should not be surprising that normative ethical sciences are, or would be, similarly founded on bedrock assumptions (basic norms). Harris says:
The way he thinks science might engage moral issues draws on various philosophical positions like ethical realism (there are moral facts), and ethical naturalism (these facts relate to the physical world). Harris says a science of morality may resemble utilitarianism, but that the science is, importantly, more open-ended because it involves an evolving definition of well-being. Rather than committing to reductive materialism, then, Harris recognizes the arguments of revisionists that psychological definitions themselves are contingent on research and discoveries. Harris adds that any science of morality must consider everything from emotions and thoughts to the actual actions and their consequences.
For Harris, moral propositions, and explicit values in general, are concerned with the flourishing of conscious creatures in a society. He argues, "Social morality exists to sustain cooperative social relationships, and morality can be objectively evaluated by that standard." Harris sees some philosophers' talk of strictly private morality as akin to unproductive discussion of a private, personal physics. "If philosophers want to only talk about some bizarrely unnatural private morality, they are just changing the subject".The Moral Landscape, pg. 147
Harris also discusses how interchangeability of perspective might emerge as an important part of moral reasoning. He alludes to an "unpleasant surprise principle", where someone realizes they have been supporting an ineffective moral norm (e.g. reported cases of Jew-hunting Nazis discovering that they themselves were of Jewish descent).The Moral Landscape, pg. 81
Science and moral truths Harris identifies three projects for science as it relates to morality: (1) explaining why humans do what they do in the name of morality (e.g., traditional evolutionary psychology), (2) determining which patterns of thought and behavior humans should follow (the science of morality), and (3) generally persuading humans to change their ways.The Moral Landscape, pg. 49 Harris says the first project focuses only on describing what is, whereas (2) and (3) focus on what should and could be, respectively. His point is that this second, prescriptive project should be the focus of a science of morality.The Moral Landscape, pg. 42 He also says we should not fear an "Orwellian future" with scientists at every door: vital progress in the science of morality could be shared in much the same way as advances in medicine.
Harris says it is important to delineate project (1) from project (2), lest we commit a moralistic fallacy.The Moral Landscape, pg. 101 He also highlights the importance of distinguishing between (2)—asking what is right—from (3)—trying to change behavior. He says we must realize that the nuances of human motivation are a challenge in themselves; people often fail to do what they "ought" to do, even to be successfully selfish: there is every reason to believe that discovering what is best for society would not change every member's habits overnight.The Moral Landscape, pg. 92
Harris does not imagine that people, even scientists, have always made the right moral decisions; indeed it is precisely his argument that many of them are wrong about moral facts.The Moral Landscape, pg. 42–44 This is due to the many real challenges of good science in general, including human cognitive limitations and biases (e.g., loss aversion can sway human decisions on important issues like medicine). He mentions the research of Paul Slovic and others to describe just a few of these mental heuristics that can keep us from reasoning properly.The Moral Landscape, pg. 69 Although he mentions that training might temper the influence of these biases, Harris worries about research showing that incompetence and ignorance in a domain leads to confidence (the Dunning–Kruger effect).The Moral Landscape, pg. 123
Harris explains that debates and disagreement are a part of the scientific method, and that one side can be wrong.The Moral Landscape, pg. 88 He also says that the debates still available to science illustrate how much work can still be done, and how much conversation must continue.The Moral Landscape, pg. 67
Harris's positive beliefs The book is full of issues Harris thinks are far from being morally gray areas. For instance, he references one poll that found that 36% of British Muslims think apostates should be put to death for their unbelief, and says that these people are "morally confused".The Moral Landscape, pg. 90 He also suggests it is obvious that loneliness, helplessness, and poverty are bad, but that that is by no means as far as positive psychology has taken and will take us.The Moral Landscape, pg. 183
In one section, "The illusion of free will", Harris argues that there is a wealth of evidence in psychology (e.g. the illusion of introspection) or specifically related to the neuroscience of free will that suggests that metaphysically free will does not exist. This, he thinks, is intuitive; "trains of thought...convey the apparent reality of choices, freely made. But from a deeper perspective...thoughts simply arise (what else could they do?)".The Moral Landscape, pg. 105 He adds, "The illusion of free will is itself an illusion".The Moral Landscape, pg. 112 The implications of free will's nonexistence may be a working determinism, and Harris warns us not to confuse this with fatalism.
One implication of a determined will, Harris says, is that it becomes unreasonable to punish people out of retribution—only behaviour modification and the deterrence of others still seem to be potentially valid reasons to punish.The Moral Landscape, pg. 109 This, especially because behaviour modification is a sort of cure for the evil behaviours; Harris provides a thought experiment:
Harris acknowledges a hierarchy of moral consideration (e.g., humans are more important than bacteria or mice). He says it follows that there could, in principle, be a species compared to which we are relatively unimportant (although he doubts such a species exists).The Moral Landscape, pg. 210
Harris supports the development of lie detection technology and believes it would be, on the whole, beneficial for humanity.
Religion: good or bad? Consistent with Harris's definition of morality, he says we must ask whether religion increases human flourishing today (regardless of whether it increased it in the distant past).The Moral Landscape, pg. 148 He argues that religions may be practiced largely because they fit well with human cognitive tendencies (e.g. animism).The Moral Landscape, pg. 150 In Harris's view, religion and religious dogma is an impediment to reason, and he takes Francis Collins as an example.
Harris criticizes the tactics of secularists like Chris Mooney, who argue that science is not fundamentally (and certainly not superficially) in conflict with religion. Harris sees this as a patronizing attempt to pacify more devout theists.The Moral Landscape, pg. 175 He claims that society can move away from deep dependence on religion just as it has from witchcraft, which he says was once just as deeply ingrained.
Promotion
In advance of publication, four personal and professional acquaintances of the author offered their praise for the book,See, for example, Krauss, "God and Science Don't Mix", The Wall Street Journal (describing Harris and Dawkins as his "friends") (accessed on Harris's personal website, Nov. 7, 2010) including biologist and science popularizer Richard Dawkins, novelist Ian McEwan, psycholinguist Steven Pinker, and theoretical physicist Lawrence Krauss. They each serve on the Advisory Board of Harris's Project Reason, and their praise appears as blurbs (released by the book's publisher on Harris's website and reproduced on the book's dust jacket). Dawkins said,