The Anzac class (also identified as the ANZAC class and the MEKO 200 ANZ type) is a ship class of ten frigates; eight operated by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and two operated by the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).
During the 1980s, the RAN began plans to replace the s (based on the British ) with a mid-capability patrol frigate and settled on the idea of modifying a proven German design for Australian conditions. Around the same time, the RNZN was seeking to replace their Leander-class frigates while maintaining blue-water capabilities. A souring of relations between New Zealand and the United States in relation to New Zealand's nuclear-free zone and the ANZUS security treaty prompted New Zealand to seek improved ties with other nations, particularly Australia. As both nations were seeking warships of similar capabilities, the decision was made in 1987 to collaborate on their acquisition.
The project name (and later, the class name) is taken from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps of the First World War.
Twelve ship designs were tendered in 1986. By 1989, the project had selected a proposal by Germany's Blohm + Voss, based on their MEKO 200 design, to be built in Australia by AMECON at Williamstown, Victoria. The modular design of the frigates allowed sections to be constructed at Whangārei, New Zealand and Newcastle, New South Wales in addition to Williamstown. The RAN ordered eight ships, while the RNZN ordered two and had the option to add two more. The frigate acquisition was controversial and widely opposed in New Zealand, and as a result, the additional ships were not ordered.
In 1992, work started on the frigates; ships capable of a top speed, and a range of at . The armament initially consisted of a single 5-inch gun and a point-defence missile system, supported by a missile-armed helicopter. In addition, the ships were fitted for but not with a torpedo system, anti-ship missiles, and a close-in weapons system. The last ship of the class entered service in 2006; by this point, the RAN and RNZN had embarked on separate projects to improve the frigates' capabilities by fitting the additional weapons, along with updates to other systems and equipment.
Since entering service, Anzac-class frigates have made multiple deployments outside local waters, including involvement in the INTERFET multi-national deployment to East Timor, and multiple operational periods in the Persian Gulf. , nine ships are in service following HMAS Anzacs decommissioning in May 2024. The RAN intends to start replacing its frigates in 2024, while the RNZN ships will remain active until the mid-2030s.
Planning and development The Anzac class originated from the RAN's New Surface Combatant (NSC) project, which began in the mid-1980s to find a replacement for the RAN's six s.Jones, in Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy, p. 244Fairall-Lee, Miller, & Murphy, in Forbes, Sea Power, p. 336 By 1985, various design briefs ranging from displacement were under consideration, with the RAN emphasising anti-ship missile defence, damage control, and ship survivability based on Royal Navy experiences during the Falklands War. Eventually, the project settled on a ship of approximately displacement. At this time, it was also believed that Australia did not have the capability to design a major warship from scratch, so the decision was made to select a proven foreign design and fit it with an Australian-developed combat system. In early 1986, a review of policy regarding surface combatants saw the NSC classified into the middle of three tiers: a patrol frigate designed to operate on low- to mid-intensity operations in Australia's economic exclusion zone.
Around the same time, the need to replace the RNZN's force with new warships was under consideration.Greener, Timing is everything, pp. 23–5 The government saw maintaining a blue-water capable force built around three or four frigates as important, but the cost of acquiring and maintaining such a force was prohibitive, once it became clear on the basis of RN and RAN studies that the generally favored Type 21 design lacked the space and volume for the required range and development.A.Preston.' Type 21 A/S frigate' in the World's Worst Warship. Conway Maritime (2002)pp 171–75 & A. Briggs. DDL the Australian Light Destroyer Project in Warship 2017.Conway. London, p 54-8 , A joint Anzac project offered the RNZN the first chance in 20 years for new deepwater warships.Greener, Timing is everything, pp. 25–6 The NZ 1983 Defence Review on the basis of RN theoretical study and enthusiasm for the 2400 Vicker sub-project, saw a submarine force as the only way of maintaining an RNZN as a combat force, and the Muldoon government actually entered into a memo of understanding with Australia for the joint development of what became the s and assigned staff to the Australian project. However, it became clear that surface vessels were also required and the cost risk was too high. Alternate suggestions, such as reducing the RNZN to a coast guard-type force responsible for coastal and fisheries protection, replacing the frigates with smaller offshore patrol vessels, or reorienting the navy to primarily operate submarines, were made in several venues, but were seen as an unacceptable loss in capability. Around the same time, the 1984-elected Fourth Labour Government of New Zealand implemented a nuclear-free zone, which incensed the United States and led to a deterioration of relations between the two nations, including the American withdrawal of support for New Zealand under the ANZUS security treaty.Greener, Timing is everything, p. 26 In response, the New Zealand government sought to improve ties with Australia; one such avenue was to promote military interoperability between the countries by standardising equipment and procedures where possible.Greener, Timing is everything, pp. 26–7 The Australian NSC project was seen to have "virtually identical" requirements to the RNZN's proposed Replacement Combat Ship concept, and the need to replace the warships dovetailed with the need to improve relations with Australia.Greener, Timing is everything, pp. 27–9
On 6 March 1987, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the two nations and RNZN representatives were invited to collaborate on the project.Jones, in Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy, p. 245 To recognise their involvement, the project was renamed the Anzac Ship Project, taking the name from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps of World War I. The New Zealanders' involvement was structured to allow their involvement in the selection of the design and shipyard and explore options for New Zealand industry involvement. When the time came to commit, they could either continue cooperating into the construction stage of the project, independently order the ships from the designer or abandon the project entirely.Greener, Timing is everything, p. 29
The proposed baseline characteristics called for a vessel capable of reaching speeds of and a range of at based on a combined diesel or gas (CODOG) propulsion system, able to operate in Sea State 5, and capable of operating a Seahawk-size helicopter.Greener, Timing is everything, p. 159 The ship was to be fitted with a main gun and an eight-cell launcher for a point-defence missile system, and fitted for but not with a torpedo system, anti-ship missiles, and a close-in weapons system.Greener, Timing is everything, pp. 159–60 Tenders were requested by the project at the end of 1986, and 19 submissions were made, 12 of which included ship designs: the Netherlands' M-class (later ) frigate, a design based on the German MEKO 200 multipurpose frigate design, Italy's frigate, the French F2000 design, the Canadian frigate, the German Type 122 (later frigate), Norway's offshore patrol vessel, the British Type 23 frigate (which was proposed by two different shipyards), South Korea's frigate, and an airship design proposed by Airship Industries.Greener, Timing is everything, p. 30 By August 1987, a cost ceiling of A$3.5 billion (1986 terms) was established, and the submitted proposals were narrowed down in October to Blohm + Voss's MEKO design, the M class offered by Royal Schelde, and a scaled-down version of the British Type 23 proposed by Yarrow Shipbuilders.Greener, Timing is everything, p. 31 The Type 23 proposal was eliminated in November 1987, with the other two going into a development phase where the designer partnered with an Australian shipbuilder: Blohm + Voss with AMECON, and Royal Schelde with Australian Warship Systems.
On 14 August 1989, the Australian government announced that AMECON had been awarded the tender for construction of the Anzac class based on modified MEKO 200 design. Although both the MEKO 200 and M-class designs met the design requirements, the MEKO design was selected as more ships could be purchased for the budget cost. The A$5 billion contract was, at the time, the largest defence contract awarded in Australia.Grazebrook, Anzac frigates sail diverging courses The decision was made despite ongoing debate in New Zealand over the project.Greener, Timing is everything, p. 42 New Zealand committed in principle to the purchase of two frigates plus the option for two more on 7 September, and the contract for the first two ships was signed on 10 November.Greener, Timing is everything, pp. 43–4
In 1992, the Australian Force Structure Review contained plans to replace the three guided-missile destroyers and four of the six guided-missile frigates with air defence vessels.Gulber, Growth in Strength, p. 4 The initial proposal – to build an additional six Anzac-class frigates configured for wide-area anti-aircraft warfare – did not go ahead as the Anzac design was too small to effectively host all the required equipment and weapons. Instead, the RAN began to upgrade the Adelaides in 1999 to fill the anti-aircraft capability that would be lost when the Perths left service between 1999 and 2001, and began work on a long-term replacement of the destroyers with what became the air warfare destroyer.Gulber, Growth in Strength, p. 5
New Zealand controversy
Due to the late 1960s decision of the UK government to withdraw the Royal Navy from East of Suez in the early 1970s, considerable doubt existed within the RNZN, the government, and community about the continuing relevance, viability, and usefulness of an RNZN force of three to four frigates. The option of the United States Coast Guard's (USCG) s was seriously considered as an alternative to the order of HMNZS Canterbury in 1968, which was approved under the understanding that New Zealand would hold continued access to the UK market after Britain entered the European Economic Community and was affordable only because it was part of a British deal with the Yarrow shipyard to build seven RN, Chilean and RNZN Leanders at less than the cost to save shipyard jobs in Scotland.