The White Paper of 1939Occasionally also known as the MacDonald White Paper (e.g. Caplan, 2015, p.117) after Malcolm MacDonald, the British Colonial Secretary, who presided over its creation. was a policy paper issued by the British government, led by Neville Chamberlain, in response to the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine.Hershel Edelheit, History Of Zionism: A Handbook And Dictionary, Routledge 2000 p.366. After its formal approval in the House of Commons on 23 May 1939,Hansard, HC Deb 22 May 1939 vol 347 cc1937-2056 and HC Deb 23 May 1939 vol 347 cc2129-97; "Resolved, That this House approves the policy of His Majesty's Government relating to Palestine as set out in Command Paper No. 6019."by 268 votes to 179. it acted as the governing policy for Mandatory Palestine from 1939 to the 1948 British departure. After the war, the Mandate was referred to the United Nations.Hansard, HC Deb 18 February 1947 vol 433 cc985-94: "We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations ... Mr. Janner Pending the remitting of this question to the United Nations, are we to understand that the Mandate stands. and that we shall deal with the situation of immigration and land restrictions on the basis of the terms of the Mandate, and that the White Paper of 1939 will be abolished?... Mr. Bevin No, Sir. We have not found a substitute yet for that White Paper, and up to the moment, whether it is right or wrong, the House is committed to it. That is the legal position. We did, by arrangement and agreement, extend the period of immigration which would have terminated in December, 1945. Whether there will be any further change, my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, who, of course, is responsible for the administration of the policy, will be considering later."
The policy, first drafted in March 1939, was prepared by the British government unilaterally as a result of the failure of the Arab–Zionist London Conference. Rejecting the Peel Commission's idea of partitioning Palestine, the paper called for the establishment of an independent Palestine State within 10 years that would share power between Jews and Arabs. It asserted that this would satisfy Britain's obligation to establish a Jewish National Home. The paper also limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 for five years and ruled that further immigration would then be determined by the Arab majority (section II). The High Commissioner was given the authority to establish regulations on the sale of land to non-Arabs (section III). The latter regulations were introduced in 1940 and imposed severe restrictions in all but 5% of Palestine.
The proposal did not meet the political demands proposed by Arab representatives during the London Conference and was officially rejected by the representatives of Palestine Arab parties, who were acting under the influence of Haj Amin Effendi al-Husseini. But the National Defence Party represented a more moderate opinion and was prepared to accept the White Paper.
Zionist groups in Palestine immediately rejected the White Paper and led a campaign of attacks on government property that lasted for several months. On 18 May, a Jewish general strike was called.A Survey of Palestine – prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Reprinted 1991 by The Institute of Palestine Studies, Washington. Volumes One: . p.54.
Regulations on land transfers and clauses restricting immigration were implemented, but at the end of the five years in 1944, only 51,000 of the 75,000 immigration certificates provided for had been used. In light of this, the British offered to allow immigration to continue beyond the cutoff date of 1944, at a rate of 1,500 per month, until the remaining quota was filled.Study (30 June 1978): The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem Part I: 1917-1947 – Study (30 June 1978) , access-date: 10 November 2018 From December 1945 to the 1948 end of the Mandate, 1,500 additional certificates for Jewish immigrants were allocated each month. Key provisions were ultimately never to be implemented, initially because of cabinet opposition after the change in government and later because of preoccupation with World War II.
Background
During World War I, the British had made two promises regarding territory in the Middle East. Britain had promised the Hashemite governors of Arabia, through Lawrence of Arabia and the McMahon–Hussein correspondence, independence for a united Arab country in Syria in exchange for supporting the British against the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Caliphate had declared a military jihad for the Germans, and the British hoped that an alliance with the Arabs would quell chances of a general Muslim uprising in British-held territories in Africa, India and the Far East.King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz, Randall Baker, Oleander Press, 1979, , page 54 Britain had also negotiated the Sykes–Picot Agreement to partition the Middle East between Britain and France.
A variety of strategic factors, such as securing Jewish support in Eastern Europe while the Russian front collapsed, culminated in the 1917 Balfour Declaration in which Britain promised to create and foster a Jewish national home in Palestine. The broad delineations of territory and goals for both the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine and Arab self-determination were approved in the San Remo Conference.
In June 1922, the League of Nations approved the Palestine Mandate, effective September 1923, an explicit document on Britain's responsibilities and powers of administration in Palestine, including 'secur[ing] the establishment of the Jewish national home', and 'safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine'. In September 1922, the British government presented the Trans-Jordan memorandum to the League of Nations that stated that the Emirate of Transjordan would be excluded from all the provisions dealing with Jewish settlement, in accordance with Article 25 of the Mandate. The memorandum was approved on 23 September. Stiff Arab opposition and pressure against Jewish immigration made Britain redefine Jewish immigration by restricting its flow according to the country's economic capacity to absorb the immigrants. In effect, annual quotas were put in place as to how many Jews could immigrate, but Jews possessing a large sum of money (£500) were allowed to enter the country freely.
Following Adolf Hitler's rise to power, European Jews were increasingly prepared to spend the money necessary to enter Palestine. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws stripped the 500,000 German Jews of their citizenship. Jewish migration was impeded by Nazi restrictions on the transfer of finances abroad (departing Jews had to abandon their property), but the Jewish Agency for Israel was able to negotiate an agreement that allowed Jews resident in Germany to buy German goods for export to Palestine, thus circumventing the restrictions.
The large numbers of Jews entering Palestine was a cause of the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Britain responded to the revolt by appointing a royal commission, the Peel Commission, which went to Palestine and undertook a thorough study of the issues. The Peel Commission recommended in 1937 for Palestine to be partitioned into two states: one Arab the other Jewish. The proposal was rejected by the Arabs while the Zionist response was "neither positive nor negative" and the Peel Commission failed to stem the violence.Elie Podeh, Chances for Peace: Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, University of Texas Press 2015 pp.28ff. In January 1938, the Woodhead Commission explored the practicalities of partition and considered three different plans, one of which was based on the Peel Plan. Reporting in 1938, the Woodhead Commission rejected the plan, primarily on the grounds that it could not be implemented without a massive forced transfer of Arabs, an option that the British government had already ruled out. With dissent from some of its members, the Commission instead recommended a plan that would leave the Galilee under British mandate, but it emphasised serious problems with it such as a lack of financial self-sufficiency of the proposed Arab state. The British government accompanied the publication of the Woodhead Report by a statement of policy rejecting partition as impracticable for "political, administrative and financial difficulties".Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty November 1938. It proposed a substantially smaller Jewish state, including the coastal plain only. The Évian Conference, convened by the United States in July 1938, failed to find any agreement to deal with the rapidly growing number of Jewish refugees, increasing pressure on the British to find a solution to the problem of Jewish immigration to Palestine.
London Conference In February 1939, the British called the London Conference to negotiate an agreement between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The Arab delegates attended on the condition that they would not meet directly with the Jewish representatives, which would constitute recognition of Jewish claims over Palestine. The British government, therefore, held separate meetings with the two sides. The conference ended in failure on 17 March.Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry – Appendix IV Palestine: Historical Background
In the wake of World War II, the British believed that Jewish support was either guaranteed or unimportant. However, the government feared hostility from the Arab world. That geopolitical consideration was, in Raul Hilberg's word, "decisive"Hilberg, Raul, The Destruction of the European Jews, (1961) New Viewpoints, New York 1973 p.716 to British policies since Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were independent and allied with Britain.
Content
These were the main points of the White Paper: Section I. The Constitution It stated that with over 450,000 Jews having now settled in the mandate, the Balfour Declaration about "a national home for the Jewish people" had been met, and it also called for an independent Palestine to be established within 10 years and to be governed jointly by Arabs and Jews:
His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. [ ... ] His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.
The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. [..] The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.
Section II. Immigration Jewish immigration to Palestine under the British Mandate was to be limited to 75,000 over the next five years and then would depend on Arab consent: