The Battle of Lowestoft took place on during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. A fleet of more than a hundred ships of the United Provinces commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Jacob van Wassenaer, Lord Obdam, attacked an English fleet of equal size commanded by James, Duke of York, forty miles east of the port of Lowestoft in Suffolk.
Although it was a substantial English victory, the escape of the bulk of the Dutch fleet deprived England of the chance of ending the war quickly with a single decisive victory. As a result, the Dutch were able to make good their losses by building new and better-armed ships and improving their organisation and discipline. Their Dutch fleets would not be so badly organised or ill-disciplined in the remaining battles of this war and, in Obdam's replacement, Michiel de Ruyter, the Dutch had gained a superb tactician and leader for the remainder of the war.
Background The Second Anglo-Dutch War resulted from long-standing commercial tensions between England and the Netherlands.Rommelse, The Second Anglo-Dutch War, p.73 Despite diplomatic negotiations to avoid the outbreak of war, each country refused to compromise, and hostile acts by each side continued.Rommelse, The Second Anglo-Dutch War, pp.95, 98-9 The English ambassador in France reported that Louis XIV would probably evade his treaty obligations and refuse to be drawn into war with England if the Dutch could be provoked into declaring war: following English attacks on Dutch convoys, one off Cadiz and the other in the English Channel, the Dutch Republic did declare war on England on 4 March 1665.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.67-9 At the start of the war, both sides considered an early decisive battle was desirable, as English government finances could not sustain a long war, and as an English blockade of Dutch ports and attacks on their merchant and fishing fleets would soon bring about the ruin of the Dutch economy.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.69-70 After an early English blockade which took place in April and May was broken off through its ships' lack of supplies, the Dutch were desperate to prevent a second blockade. The Grand Pensionary and leading Dutch politician, Johan de Witt and other members of the States-General, formed a commission to supervise Obdam,Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, p.70 which gave him detailed instructions comprising 26 articles, ordering him to attack the English aggressively when and where he could do them most damage. However, these instructions gave Obdam little guidance on how he should do so.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.79, 83Warnsinck, Van Vloot Voogden en Zeeslagen, p.287
Although the Dutch had ordered the construction of many new warships, during and after the First Anglo-Dutch War, including several comparable to the all but the largest English ships to augment the existing fleet, not all of these were completed or fitted out by 1665.Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, pp.64-6 To complete Obdam's fleet, eighteen older warships that had been laid up after the First Anglo-Dutch War were reactivated, and several very large Dutch East India Company built hybrid ships were added. These could be used for carrying cargo, as convoy escorts or in battle, although they were not as strongly built as pure warships.Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, p.74 Perhaps realising that his fleet was still too inferior in organisation, training, discipline and firepower to challenge the English successfully in a decisive battle, Obdam prepared to postpone the fight until the wind turned favourable in order to seek a limited confrontation, with his fleet in a defensive leeward position from which it could disengage quickly and return to its ports without openly disobeying orders.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.83-5 However, this opportunistic attitude and lack of a clear strategic plan was a significant cause of his defeat and death.Rommelse, The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667). p.131 The instructions issued by the commission headed by de Witt insisted on specifying that the Dutch fleet's order of battle should involve its division into a seven squadrons with a total of 21 flag officers for political reasons.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, p.79 Each of the five Dutch admiralties had its own set of flag officers, including many recently appointed ones. Each of the three smaller admiralties insisted on having its own squadron, so the larger Admiralties of Amsterdam and the Maas (i.e. Rotterdam) then split their forces in two squadrons, each of similar size to those of the smaller admiralties. This resulted in seven squadrons, each with three flag officers; several were led by Lieutenant Admirals of equal rank to Obdam, who commanded his own squadron as well as the whole fleet.
As the seven squadrons were not subdivided, the 14 subordinate flag officers had no clear function, except as potential replacements for their leaders.Warnsinck, Van Vloot Voogden en Zeeslagen, p.288 In addition, several squadrons had ships or flag officers from more than one admiralty, complicating their chain of command.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.79-80 Both national fleets could only be made as large as they were by employing armed merchants: the English used 24 of these,Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.43-4 the Dutch twelve.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.46-7 On 11 June, a ship detached from the English fleet sighted the Dutch fleet sailing from the east with a light following breeze, and the fleet tried to close in on the Dutch against an adverse wind. At 4pm, the strength of the turning tide and a near calm forced the English fleet to anchor, and the Dutch did not make use of the favourable current to attack them, but also anchored, so avoiding battle that day.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.83-4 Obdam certainly wished to fight and had clear orders to do so, but an easterly breeze would prevent the Dutch fleet from retreating if it were outfought, and his waiting for a westerly breeze may have saved the bulk of the Dutch fleet from destruction by allowing it to withdraw after the resulting battle.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, p.85 On 12 June the wind again blew from the east, and again Obdam declined to attack, despite holding the weather gage. The two fleets sailed westward for most of the day, until the wind veered to a southerly, then a southwesterly, direction overnight. By dawn, the wind had strengthened and was from a direction between southwest and south, which slightly favoured the English fleet. Obdam decided to attack and he now approached the enemy, possibly fearing that if the wind became more westerly, it would favour the English fleet even more.Warnsinck, Van Vloot Voogden en Zeeslagen, pp.300-1
The English fleet of 109 ships carried 4,542 guns and 22,055 men; it consisted of three squadrons:Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.318-20 Prince Rupert of the Rhine commanded the van, the White Squadron James himself commanded the centre, the Red Squadron, and Edward Montagu, 1st Earl of Sandwich, commanded the rearguard, the Blue Squadron
The Dutch fleet of 103 ships carrying 4,869 guns and 21,613 men had no fewer than seven squadrons:Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.324-6 First squadron, from the Admiralty of Amsterdam, commanded by van Wassenaer himself in Second squadron, mainly from the Admiralties of Zeeland and the Maas, commanded by Lieutenant Admiral Johan Evertsen on Hof van Zeeland Third squadron from the Admiralty of Amsterdam, commanded by Lieutenant Admiral Egbert Bartholomeusz Kortenaer on Groot Hollandia Fourth squadron, mainly from the Frisian fleet with some East Indies Company ships, commanded by Lieutenant Admiral Auke Stellingwerf on Sevenwolden Fifth squadron from the Admiralty of Amsterdam, commanded by Vice Admiral Cornelis Tromp on Liefde Sixth squadron, mainly from the Admiralties of Zeeland and the Maas, commanded by Vice Admiral Cornelis Evertsen the Elder on Vlissingen and Seventh squadron from the Admiralty of the Northern Quarter commanded by Vice Admiral Volckert Schram on Wapen van Nassau
Battle
Morning
It is difficult to give a fully coherent account of the battle, and more so to recover the intentions of the commanders, particularly those of Obdam who did not survive the battle. He had, on 12 June, sent all of his silverware and other valuables home, which perhaps shows his state of mind.Warnsinck, Van Vloot Voogden en Zeeslagen, p.299 Although Obdam has been accused of lack both of leadership and tactical insight, masked in earlier battles where Egbert Bartholomeusz Kortenaer, who had been promoted to be a lieutenant-admiral at Lowestoft, had been his flag captain.Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, p.73 Although the English found Obdam's behaviour puzzling, his tactical decisions may relate to his appreciation that his out-gunned, poorly organised fleet could only succeed in battle under ideal conditions and needed to be able to disengage if it risked defeat.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.83, 85 After their defeat, the surviving Dutch flag officers, in order to exonerate themselves, pretended their fleet had followed the original written orders, blaming misfortune and cowardice among the merchant captains for the disaster.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, p.124 In the early morning of the 13th, both fleets were about 40 miles southeast of Lowestoft, with the Dutch fleet southeast of the English fleet. The wind was described as a "fine chasing gale", implying a strong but not excessive wind, from a direction between southwest and south. Just before dawn, at around 4am, Obdam made a sudden westward dash to regain the weather gage, trying to pass to the south of the English fleet. In Sandwich's account, Sir Christopher Myngs, leading the English van, immediately moved southeast to prevent this, and was able to retain the weather gage, forcing the leading Dutch ships to steer northwest, the two fleets passing in opposite directions but at some distance. As Obdam's move surprised his own fleet, it was left in some confusion.Fox, The Four Days Battle of 1666, pp.85-6Warnsinck, Van Vloot Voogden en Zeeslagen, p.302 An alternative interpretation was that the wind was blowing from the northwest and van Wassenaer tried to engage the English from a defensive leeward position. However, Warnsinck's detailed account from a Dutch perspective confirms a southwest wind was blowing.Warnsinck, Van Vloot Voogden en Zeeslagen, pp.302-3