The Bombing of Singapore (1944–1945) was a military campaign conducted by the Allied air forces during World War II. United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) long-range bomber units conducted 11 air raids on Japanese-occupied Singapore between November 1944 and March 1945. Most of these raids targeted the island's naval base and dockyard facilities, and minelaying missions were conducted in nearby waters. After the American bombers were redeployed, the British Royal Air Force assumed responsibility for minelaying operations near Singapore, which continued until 24 May 1945.
The raids had mixed results. While significant damage was inflicted on Singapore's important naval base and commercial port, some raids on these targets were not successful and other attacks on oil storage facilities on islands near Singapore were ineffective. The minelaying campaign disrupted Japanese shipping in the Singapore area and resulted in the loss of three vessels and damage to a further ten, but was not decisive. The Allied air attacks were successful in raising the morale of Singapore's civilian population, who believed that the raids marked the impending liberation of the city. The overall number of civilian casualties from the bombings was low, though civilian workers were killed during attacks on military facilities; one attack rendered hundreds of people homeless.
Background
In the decades after World War I, Britain expanded Singapore Naval Base at Sembawang on Singapore's north coast as part of plans to deter Japanese expansionism in the region (the Singapore strategy).Toh (2009), pp. 908–909 The resulting facility was among the most important in the British Empire and included the large King George VI graving dock and Admiralty No.IX floating dry dock.Bayly and Harper (2004), p. 106Hack and Blackburn (2004), pp. 22–23 The Commonwealth forces allocated to Malaya and Singapore were swiftly defeated in the months after the outbreak of the Pacific War, however, and the island was surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February 1942.Toh (2009), p. 909 Singapore was bombed by Japanese aircraft on a number of occasions during the Battle of Malaya and subsequent fighting on the island itself; these raids caused many civilian deaths.Bayly and Harper (2004), pp. 117, 136–137, 139
Singapore Naval Base suffered little damage during the fighting in 1941 and 1942, and became the most important facility of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) outside the Japanese home islands.Cate (1953), p. 156 As was the case under British rule, many locally recruited civilians worked in the base, though the Japanese Navy subjected them to harsh discipline which included physical beatings for minor mistakes as well as imprisonment or execution for theft and leaks of information.Liew (2006), p. 429. The Japanese Second Fleet and Third Fleet were transferred from the central Pacific to Singapore and the nearby Lingga Islands between February and April 1944 to be closer to their sources of fuel oil. These two fleets comprised the main body of the IJN, and operated most of its remaining battleships and aircraft carriers.Royal Navy (1995a), pp. 85–87
The forces allocated to the defence of Singapore were not strong. In early 1945, Japanese air defences for the island included only two Army companies equipped with automatic cannon, some IJN anti-aircraft units, and a small number of fighter aircraft. Some of the anti-aircraft guns were crewed by Malay auxiliaries.Frei (2008), p. 220Toh (2009), p. 915 The effectiveness of what was already an inadequate air defence force was hindered by a lack of coordination between the Army and Navy, shortages of fire control equipment for the guns, and no fire-control radar or barrage balloons being available. Defence against night raids was particularly weak as no night fighters were stationed near Singapore and coordination between the anti-aircraft guns and searchlight units was poor.
In June 1944, the USAAF's XX Bomber Command began flying combat operations with B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers from air bases near Kharagpur in northeastern India.Polmar (2004), p. 6 Although the Command's primary role was to attack industrial targets in the Japanese home islands, approximately 50 percent of its missions were undertaken to support other Allied operations in the Pacific.Wolk (2010), pp. 97–98 The XX Bomber Command reported to the USAAF's Twentieth Air Force, which was personally directed from Washington, D.C., by the commander of the USAAF General Henry H. Arnold, rather than the Allied theatre commanders in India and China.Wolk (2010), pp. 99–100 Major General Curtis LeMay assumed command of XX Bomber Command on 29 August after Arnold relieved its first commander.Cate (1953), pp. 103, 115
Following the Japanese defeat in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in late October 1944, the remnants of the IJN were concentrated into two groups of ships. One group returned to bases in the Inland Sea, while the other was stationed at the Lingga Islands.Dull (2007), pp. 313, 315 On 27 October, Arnold suggested to LeMay that the Japanese defeat at Leyte might have increased the importance of Singapore's naval facilities and asked whether XX Bomber Command could attack targets on the island. Little recent intelligence on Singapore was available, and on 30 October a photo-reconnaissance B-29 overflew Singapore for the first time and took good photos of the island. Despite this success, LeMay's staff believed that a daylight attack on Singapore—which required a round trip from Kharagpur—could not be successful. Regardless, Arnold ordered that XX Bomber Command attack Singapore.
Raids
Initial attack The first raid on Singapore took place on 5 November 1944. XX Bomber Command dispatched 76 B-29s from their bases around Kharagpur. Because of the extreme range to the target, the aircraft were each armed with only two 1,000 pound bombs; pilots were also instructed to bomb from the lower-than-normal altitude of , and to maintain a loose formation. The raid's primary target was the King George VI Graving Dock, and the Pangkalanbrandan refinery in northern Sumatra was assigned as the secondary target.
The first B-29s arrived over Singapore Naval Base at 06:44. Bombing was highly accurate, with the lead aircraft putting a bomb within of the graving dock's caisson gate. The third B-29's bombs landed nearby and other aircraft also scored direct hits on the graving dock, rendering it unserviceable for three months. The bombs which landed in and near the King George VI Graving Dock also damaged the freighter that was under repair in it at the time. Many of the civilian workers in and around the dock were unable to escape and were killed. The raiders also inflicted damage on other facilities in the naval base. Overall, 53 Superfortresses bombed Singapore Naval Base while seven attacked Pangkalanbrandan refinery. Few Japanese anti-aircraft guns or aircraft fired on the raiders, but two B-29s were lost in accidents.Toh (2009), p. 917 This raid was the longest daylight bombing operation to have been conducted up to that time.Toh (2009), pp. 905–906 Following the attack, Japanese soldiers murdered a group of injured Indonesian workers. The damage to the King George VI Graving Dock meant that it could not be used to repair the Japanese battleships damaged at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.Royal Navy (1995c), p. 127
Later bombing raids The next raid on Singapore took place in January 1945. Following reports that Japanese warships damaged during the Philippines Campaign were being repaired at Singapore, a force of 47 Superfortresses was dispatched from India to attack the Admiralty IX Floating Dock as well as the King's Dock on the island's south coast. These aircraft took off at about midnight on 10 January and began to arrive over Singapore at 08:20 on 11 January. Only 27 of the attackers struck the docks, and due to heavy anti-aircraft fire from Japanese warships in the Straits of Johor the bombers did not cause any damage. The other aircraft bombed Penang in Malaya, Mergui in Burma and several targets of opportunity, generally without success. Two B-29s were lost during this operation.Toh (2009), p. 914Cate (1953), p. 157Huff (1997), pp. 245–246
In January 1945, XX Bomber Command began preparations to redeploy to the Mariana Islands. The Command ceased its attacks on Japan and East Asia, for which it used bases in China to refuel the B-29s en route to their targets, and instead focused on targets in Southeast Asia that could be reached from Kharagpur. As there were few industrial targets within range of Kharagpur, the highest priority was given to attacking shipping in major ports such as Rangoon, Bangkok and Singapore as well as smaller harbours. Attacks were conducted through both conventional bombing and laying naval mines. As part of the transition, LeMay departed for the Mariana Islands on 18 January and was replaced by Brigadier General Roger M. Ramsey.Cate (1953), pp. 157–158
XX Bomber Command conducted a major conventional bombing raid on Singapore Naval Base on 1 February. On that day, 112 B-29s were dispatched, each armed with four bombs. The raid's primary target, the Admiralty IX Floating Dock, was bombed by 67 of the 88 aircraft that reached Singapore. This attack sank the dry dock and destroyed the ship berthed inside it. The other 21 aircraft that attacked Singapore bombed the West Wall area of the naval base and destroyed many buildings and some heavy equipment; this area housed the base's main offices. Of the remaining aircraft, 20 diverted and attacked targets in Penang and Martaban. A Japanese fighter shot down one of the B-29s and another Superfortress was destroyed on landing after suffering damage from air attack.Cate (1953), p. 160Middlebrook and Mahoney (1979), p. 58
Although XX Bomber Command began preparations to attack on Singapore Naval Base again on 6 February, this raid was cancelled on the third of the month by Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Allied forces in the Southeast Asian theatre. Mountbatten ordered that the naval installations at Singapore and Penang not be targeted as they would be needed by Allied forces following the projected liberation of Malaya and Singapore later in 1945.Kirby (1965), p. 405 After requesting clarification of this order, Ramsey met with Mountbatten at Kandy. In this meeting Mountbatten assigned targets in the Kuala Lumpur area as XX Bomber Command's first priority, while second priority was given to carefully selected areas of Singapore. These areas excluded the King George VI Graving Dock and several other docks and areas with heavy machinery, but allowed attacks on the West Wall area of Singapore Naval Base, naval oil stores and commercial dock facilities. Saigon was assigned as XX Bomber Command's third priority and fourth priority was given to oil storage dumps on islands near Singapore.Cate (1953), pp. 160–161