Social classes in Iran have been divided up into upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, independent farmers, and rural wage earners.Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, (Princeton University Press, 1982) p.432-435 A more recent source divides Iranian classes into upper, middle class (about 32% of the population in 2000), working class (about 45% of the labor force), and lower class. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says 60 percent of his country's wealth is controlled by just 300 people in Iran.Ahmadinejad slams corrupt hoarders of wealth: "The Iranian 1%" . Radio Zamaneh, December 15, 2012. Retrieved March 16, 2014. The gini coefficient was 0.38 in 2010Central bank: Income equality improved in Iran . Tehran Times, May 1, 2012. Retrieved May 2, 2012. and the Human Development Index at 0.749 in 2013.
One of the main objectives of the Iranian Revolution was to have no social classes. In the post-revolutionary era, access to political power, an important basis for measuring influence and elite status in pre-revolutionary Iran, has continued to be important for ascribing status, even though the composition of the political elite has changed. For a decade after 1979, gaining entry to the political elite at the national or provincial level depended on having revolutionary credentials. These credentials depended on being able to provide evidence of having participated in the demonstrations and other revolutionary activities during 1978–79, and having a reputation for being a good Muslim. The necessary Muslim reputation was acquired by attending public prayers and observing Islamic codes of conduct in one's private life. Revolutionary credentials became less significant for the generation that matured after the early 1990s. Education, especially a college degree, became an informal substitute for revolutionary credentials.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Iran.pdf
Upper class
In Iranian society, the top ten percent earners pay 3% of all income taxes, while in the United States the top 10% pay more than 70% of the total income taxes (US billionaires are collectively richer than their Iranian counterparts, however). The postrevolutionary upper class consisted of some of the same social groups as the old elite, such as large landowners, industrialists, financiers, and large-scale merchants. A sizable amount of this demographic, especially those of non-Shia backgrounds, have migrated out of Iran to places like the United States and had their assets confiscated by the state. A minority of the pre-revolutionary upper class, especially those who were more religious or sympathetic with the revolution, continue to work and live within Iran. For the most part, however, such persons did not occupy positions of political influence pre-revolution. As of 2025, Iran’s upper class—roughly the top 5% or 4 million people—consists of those with a net worth above 60 billion tomans (≈$750k USD), but true elites often control $2M+ in shared assets, placing them among Iran’s high-net-worth individuals and next to ~246,000 multimillionaires (2023). Despite being the 17th most populous country in the world, the UBS ranked Iran 14th in the world in terms of the number of millionaires. Due to the lack of readily-available mortgages or lines of credit (akin to those in developed countries) many Iranians grow up with an entrepreneurial spirit, this is exacerbated by the historical roots of most of the Iranian bourgeoisie (urban-dwellers) in the Bazaar. These individuals typically derive wealth from Iran's biggest industries (oil, manufacturing, banks), monopolized imports, or control of bonyads, which manage up to 20% of Iran’s GDP. Many are also part of old merchant families with connected networks for medium-to-large scale manufacturing often defined as having 30+ full-time workers. Manufacturing is huge in Iran and its beneficiaries make a fortune from Iranian brands (packaged food, clothing, etc.). Medium-to-large-scale Manufacturures profit upwards of several hundred thousand USD. Owning shops in Tehran's Grand Bazaar is a status symbol in Iran as prices go up to $50 thousand USD per square meter. A 20 square meter shop sells for $1M USD in the Bazaar.
Additionally, in recent years, especially during the JCPOA, Tehran has seen a booming finance sector with the Tehran Stock Exchange going green, start-ups propping up, and many banks entering investment banking.
In contrast, Iran’s upper middle class includes salaried professionals like specialist physicians, engineers, lawyers, professors, and retail owners with monthly incomes of 80–400 million Tomans ($1,000–$5,000 USD). They enjoy relative comfort—owning apartments, cars, and affording some travel—but have far less access to inherited capital, overseas assets, or systemic privilege. The gap between the two groups is wide: the upper class is shielded from inflation and sanctions by offshore holdings and state contracts, while the upper middle class remains vulnerable to economic shocks and currency devaluation. In recent years, after experiencing huge economic losses in the hyper-inflationary period of 2018-2020, this group has experienced a massive shift to immigration especially to countries like Turkey, Sweden, Germany, and Canada. Because of these losses- politically and socially this group tends to be more Liberal. They often organize anti-government rallies outside of the country.
Those with political influence comprise senior clergy, high-ranking bureaucrats, executive officers of public and private corporations and charitable foundations, and wealthy entrepreneurs; small number of which had been part of the pre-revolutionary economic and social elite. Although a reputation for piety and loyalty to the ideals of the Revolution initially was a more important attribute than family or wealth for participation in the post-revolutionary political elite, those who attained politically powerful positions received generous salaries that elevated them to the top income brackets and opened access to multiple legitimate opportunities for acquiring more wealth. The children of the new elite generally have been encouraged to get college educations, and postgraduate degrees from foreign universities have become status symbols since the mid-1990s. These social trends have gradually but informally altered the criteria for recruitment into the political elite: Possessing a university degree and having ties to a prominent religious or revolutionary family have become advantageous in the competition for politically influential positions.
In terms of lifestyle, the Iranian upper class enjoys owning properties in districts with more privacy. These areas frequently have less police since they are less busy than the central areas of the city. Though, a sizable portion of the Iranian upper class come from religious or politically-connected families, their children are often found flaunting a free and Western lifestyle online. This phenomenon led to Instagram pages like the Rich Kids of Tehran propping up back in the 2010s. After the 2022 protests, an expansion of Western culture particularly in wealthy areas has risen especially in bigger cities like Isfahan, and Shiraz.
Then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says 60 percent of his country's wealth is controlled by 300 people in Iran (out of a population of 80 million in 2016). Rich Iranians, companies, and state-backed buyers will spend up to $8.5 billion on overseas real estate over the next five-to-10 years (2016).
Politically, the Iranian upper class is closer to Iranian principlists, while the middle class (including the upper middle class) is closer to the Iranian reformists. The principlists advocate for crony capitalism, and rent-seeking behaviour. This is especially true for power holders in the Chamber of Commerce (ICCIMA). Big business, and even medium-to-large entrepreneurs in Iran are connected to the Chamber and receive benefits like sanction evasion, exclusive rights to import or export, and "Government currency-rates". This leads to a massive competitive advantage in the market leading to very desirable profit margins. The new Iranian leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is very well-connected to these circles.Hassan Rouhani hoped to modernize Iran's economy by getting sanctions lifted and removing government subsidies. When Trump pulled out of the Iranian nuclear deal, and the subsidized price of gas raised anyways many lower class Iranians were angry hence the 2019 protests.
Despite amassing good wealth, Iranian entrepreneurs still have a hard time doing international business and scaling up across the region. This issue along with loosening hijab laws gave rise to some upper class Iranians, especially those from Azerbaijani Iran, rooting for the Pezeshkian government. This would also explain why he was ratified for office, as the regime still welcomes some lifting of sanctions. Pezeshkian also supports making the education system more fair by improving public schools, hence he also has a base with the lower class. The Nouveau riche, far from the bazaar includes: Instagram influencers, YouTubers, investment bankers, and crypto traders. Iranian actor/actresses, footballers, and TV hosts are also part of the Iranian upper class who mostly reside in Northern Tehran.
Middle class
After the revolution, the composition of the middle class remained largely the same, but its size grew significantly—rising from about 15 percent of the population in 1979 to over 32 percent by 2000. A major factor behind this expansion was unprecedented access to education. Prior to the revolution, universities were primarily located in major cities, and much of Iran’s educated middle class was brought in from the West to fill workforce gaps. While cities like Tehran and Esfahan did have established universities with a fair amount of local enrollment, these students were often cosmopolitan leftists who opposed the Shah and ultimately supported the 1979 revolution. The cultural divide between Iran’s secular and religious middle class did not disappear after the revolution; however, the political dynamics between the two groups shifted dramatically. Before 1979, the secular middle class had more influence, and the state sought to limit religion to the private sphere. After the revolution, however, the Islamic Republic promoted religion as a central part of public life. This shift has had a significant impact on the economic divide: while religious Iranians, especially those in the bazaar, security forces, and government, became more politically and economically powerful, the secular middle class found itself marginalized, with many of its members experiencing economic decline. This reversal of fortunes has been a source of tension, as secular individuals often resent the religious dominance in political and social life, particularly in laws they feel encroach on their personal freedoms. Several prerevolutionary social groups still were identifiable, including bazaar salesman, physicians, engineers, university teachers, managers of private and public concerns, civil servants, teachers, medium-scale landowners, junior military officers, and the middle ranks of the Shia clergy. New groups also emerged, including technicians in specialized fields such as communications, computers, electronics, and medical services; owners of small-scale factories employing fewer than 30 workers; owners of construction firms and transport companies; and professional staff of broadcast and print media. Merchants, especially those with ties to bazaar-based organizations even though their stores were physically located outside the traditional covered bazaars, gained access to political power that they had lacked before the Revolution.