The 1943 Argentine Revolution (also known as the 1943 Argentine coup d'état, the June Revolution or the Revolution of '43) was a coup d'état on 4 June 1943 that ended the government of Ramón Castillo, who had been fraudulently elected to the office of vice-president before succeeding to the presidency in 1942Rock, David. Authoritarian Argentina. University of California Press, 1993. as part of the period known as the Infamous Decade. The coup d'état was launched by the lodge "United Officers' Group" (GOU), a secret military organization of nationalist nature. Although its soldiers shared different views of nationalism: there were Catholic nationalists, Radicals, military with a more pragmatic approach, and even fascists. The military was opposed to Governor Robustiano Patrón Costas, Castillo's hand-picked successor, a major landowner in Salta Province and a primary stockholder in the sugar industry. The only serious resistance to the military coup came from the Argentine Navy, which confronted the advancing army columns at the Navy Petty-Officers School of Mechanics.
It was the military government that "incubated" Peronism. The coup of June 4, 1943 is considered by some historians as the true date of the birth of the movement created by Juan Perón. Perón in 1946 chose June 4 to take office to honor the 1943 coup.
Background Two primary factors influenced the coup of 4 June 1943: The Infamous Decade that preceded it and World War II.
The Infamous Decade (1930–1943)
What is known as the Infamous Decade began on 6 September 1930 with a military coup led by the corporatist, Catholic-nationalist General Jose Felix Uriburu. The coup overthrew President Hipólito Yrigoyen, a member of the Radical Civic Union party, who had been democratically elected in 1928 to serve his second term. On 10 September 1930, Uriburu was recognized as de facto president of the nation by the Supreme Court. This court order laid the foundation for the doctrine of de facto governments and would be used to legitimize all other military coups.Historia Integral Argentina, Partidos, ideologías e intereses. Buenos Aires: CEAL, pp. 88–89 The de facto government of Uriburu outlawed the Radical Civic Union.
The local elections of Buenos Aires on 5 April 1931 had an unexpected result for the government. The radical candidate, Honorio Pueyrredón, won the election despite the national party's confidence of their own victory and despite the radical party's lack of leadership. Although the radical party still lacked a few votes in the electoral college and the national party could still negotiate with the socialists to prevent the radicals from winning the governorship, the government began to panic. Uriburu reorganized the cabinet and appointed ministers from the "liberal" sector. He cancelled the local government elections for the provinces of Córdoba and Santa Fe. On 8 May 1931 he cancelled the appeal to the provincial electoral college, and on 12 May, he named Manuel Ramón AlvaradoBéjar (1983): 33–36. as de facto governor of Buenos Aires.
A few weeks later, a revolt led by Lieutenant Colonel Gregorio Pomar broke out in the province of Corrientes. Although the revolt was rapidly brought under control, it gave Uriburu the excuse he was looking for. He closed all the premises of the Radical Civic Union, arrested dozens of its leaders, and prohibited the electoral colleges from electing politicians that were directly or indirectly related to Yrigoyen. Because Pueyrredón had been one of Yrigoyen's ministers, this meant that he could not be elected. Uriburu also exiled Pueyrredón from the country along with Alvear, a prominent leader of the radical party. In September Uriburu called for November elections and shortly after, he annulled the elections in Buenos Aires.Cattaruzza (2012): 118–119.
After the failure of the corporatist effort, Argentina was governed by the Concordancia, a political alliance formed between the conservative National Democratic Party, the Antipersonalists, the Radical Civic Union, and the Independent Socialist Party. The Concordancia governed Argentina during the remainder of the Infamous Decade, throughout the presidencies of Agustín Pedro Justo (1932–1938), Roberto María Ortiz (1938–1940), and Ramón Castillo (1940–1943). This period was characterized by the beginning of a new economic model known as import substitution industrialization.
In 1943, elections for a new president had to be held, and an attempt to fraudulently award the presidency to the sugar entrepreneur Robustiano Patrón Costas, a powerful figure in Salta Province during the previous four decades, was evaded. Patrón Costas's assumption of the presidency would have secured the continuation and deepening of the fraudulent regime.
The Second World War
The Second World War (1939–1945) had a decisive and complex influence on Argentinian political events, particularly on the coup of 4 June 1943.
At the time when World War II began, Great Britain had a pervading economic influence in Argentina. Argentina had a long tradition of neutrality regarding European wars, which had been sustained and defended by every political party since the 19th century. The reasons for Argentinian neutrality are complex, but one of the most important is connected with its position of food supplier to Britain and to Europe in general. In both world wars, Great Britain needed to guarantee the provision of food (grain and meat) for its population and its troops, and this would have been impossible if Argentina had not maintained neutrality, since the cargo ships would have been the first to be attacked, thus interrupting the supply. At the same time, Argentina had traditionally maintained a skeptical stance toward the hegemonic vision of Pan-Americanism that had driven the United States since the 19th century.
In December 1939, the Argentine government consulted with Britain on the possibility of abandoning neutrality and joining the Allies. The British government flatly rejected the proposition, reiterating the principle that the main contribution of Argentina was its supplies and in order to guarantee them it was necessary to maintain neutrality. At that time the United States also held a neutral position strengthened by the Neutrality Acts and its traditional isolationism, although that would change radically when Japan attacked its military bases in the Pacific.
In the wake of Pearl Harbor, at the Rio Conference of 1942, the United States called upon all Latin American countries to enter the war en bloc. For the United States, which was not affected by the interruption of trade between Argentina and Europe, World War II was presented as an excellent opportunity to finish imposing its continental hegemony, both politically and economically, and permanently displace Great Britain from its stronghold in Latin America. But Argentina, through its chancellor, Enrique Ruiz Guiñazú, opposed entering the war, curtailing the U.S. proposal. From this point on, the American pressure would not stop growing until it became unbearable.
Faced with war, the Argentine population divided into two large groups: "pro-allies" (aliadófilos) and "pro-neutral" (neutralistas). The first group was in favor of Argentina entering the war on the side of the Allies, while the latter argued that the country should remain neutral. A third group of "pro-Germans" (germanófilos) remained a minority; because it was extremely unlikely that Argentina would enter the war on the side of the Axis, they tended to support neutrality.
The two previous presidents, Radical-Antipersonalist Roberto María Ortiz (1938–1942) and National Democrat Ramón Castillo (1942–1943), had maintained neutrality, but it was clear that Patrón Costas, the official presidential candidate, would declare war on the Axis. This circumstance had an enormous influence on the armed forces, above all the army, where the majority favored neutrality.
Economic and social situation
One of the direct consequences of the Second World War on the Argentine state of affairs was the economic boost that resulted from industrialization. In 1943, for the first time, the index of industrial production surpassed that of agricultural production.Troncoso (1976), p. 20 Spearheaded by the textile industry, industrial exports increased from 2.9% of the total in 1939 to 19.4% in 1943.Gerchunoff et al., p. 159; Schvarzer, p. 190
The number of industrial workers grew by 38%, from 677,517 in 1941 to 938,387 in 1946. The factories were concentrated mostly in the urban area of Greater Buenos Aires, which in 1946 comprised 56% of industrial establishments and 61% of all workers in the country.Diego Dávila: «El 17 de octubre de 1945», in Historia integral argentina; El Peronismo en el poder. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1976, p. 88.
On the other hand, the Great Depression had limited the influx of European immigrants, so that a new influx of migrants due to rural flight was completely transforming the working class, both in terms of numbers and in terms of culture. In 1936, 36% of the population of Buenos Aires were foreigners and only 12% were migrants from elsewhere in Argentina (rural areas and small cities). By 1947, foreigners had fallen to 26% and domestic migrants had more than doubled to 29%.Samuel L. Baily (1985): Movimiento obrero, nacionalismo y política en Argentina. Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica, p. 90 Between 1896 and 1936 the average annual number of provincials arriving in Buenos Aires was 8,000; that average amounted to 72,000 between 1936 and 1943 and 117,000 between 1943 and 1947.Baily, p. 90
The new socioeconomic conditions and the geographical concentration anticipated great sociopolitical changes with their epicenter in Buenos Aires.
Coup of 4 June 1943
Although the Argentine military had been one of the pillars that sustained the successive governments of the Infamous Decade, its relationship with power had deteriorated over the last few years because of the change in its generational makeup and, above all, the progress of the industrialization process that began in that decade. The development of industry in Argentina (and in many parts of the world) was intimately related to the armed forces and the needs of national defense.
President Ramón Castillo had faced several military conspiracies and failed coups, and at that time several civic-military conspiracies were taking place (such as the United Officers' Group, led by the radical Ernesto Sammartino and General Arturo Rawson,Potash (1981), p. 275 and the operations carried out by the radical unionist Emilio Ravignani).
Nevertheless, the coup of 4 June 1943 was not foreseen by anyone and was carried out with a great deal of improvisation and, unlike the other coups that had occurred in the country, almost without civil participation. According to historian José Romero, it was a "rescue maneuver of the group committed to the Nazi infiltration, complicated by its preventing Castillo from turning toward the United States.
The concrete event that triggered the military coup was President Castillo's demand on 3 June that his minister of War, General Pedro Pablo Ramírez, resign for having met with a group of leaders from the Radical Civic Union, who offered to nominate him for president in the upcoming election. General Ramírez was to be the presidential candidate of the Democratic Union, an alliance that the moderate wing of the Radical Civic Union was trying to form with the Socialist Party and the Democratic Progressive Party, with the help of the Communist Party.Félix Luna (1975): Alvear, las luchas populares en la década del 30. Buenos Aires: Schapire, pp. 318–319; Potash (pp. 274–275) relates that on 26 May 1943 Ramírez met with seven radical leaders in the house of Colonel Enrique González of the United Officers' Group.