Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimentel, 1st Duke of Sanlúcar, 3rd Count of Olivares, , known as the Count-Duke of Olivares (taken by joining both his countship and subsequent dukedom) (6 January 1587Elliot 1986, p. 7. – 22 July 1645), was a Spanish royal favourite () of Philip IV and minister. He was appointed as Grandee on 10 April 1621, a day after the ending of the Twelve Years' Truce, and was a key figure that shaped state policy in Spain until January 1643. During his rule, he over-exerted Spain in foreign affairs and unsuccessfully attempted domestic reform. His policy of committing Spain to recapture Holland led to a renewal of the Eighty Years' War while Spain was also embroiled in the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). In addition, his attempts to centralise power and increase wartime taxation led to revolts in Catalonia and in Portugal, which brought about his downfall.
Rise to power
Olivares was born in Rome in 1587, where his father, Enrique de Guzmán, 2nd Count of Olivares, from one of Spain's oldest noble families,Elliot, 1991, p. 8. was the Spanish ambassador. His mother died young, and his father brought him up under a strict parental regime.Elliot, 1991, p. 21. While in Rome, Olivares appointed Tomás Fernández de Medrano to serve in his service from 1582 to 1590. He returned to Spain in 1599, and became student rector at Salamanca University.Parker, 1984, p. 232. By background, he was both a man of letters and well trained in arms.Aercke, p. 141. During the reign of King Philip III, he was appointed to a post in the household of the heir apparent, Philip, by his maternal uncle Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, a key foreign policy advisor to Phillip III,Parker, 1984, p. 165. who himself had already established a significant influence over the young prince.Munck, p. 52. Olivares in turn rapidly became the young prince's most trusted advisor.
When Philip IV ascended the throne in 1621, at the age of sixteen, he showed his confidence in Olivares by ordering that all papers requiring the royal signature should first be sent to the count-duke; despite this, Olivares, then aged 34, had no real experience of administration.Elliot, 1984, p. 193.
Olivares told his uncle de Zúñiga, who was to die the following year, that he was now the dominant force at court;Kamen, p. 214. he had become what is known in Spain as a , something more than a prime minister, the favourite and alter ego of the king. His compound title is explained by the fact that he inherited the title of Count of Olivares, but was created Duke of Sanlúcar la Mayor by King Philip IV of Spain. He begged the King to allow him to preserve his inherited title in combination with the new honour — according to a practice almost unique in Spanish history. Accordingly, he was commonly spoken of as the count-duke.
Olivares' personality and appearance have attracted much comment, especially by 17th-century writers, who were generally critical of them. He possessed a strikingly 'big, heavy body and florid face'.Zagorin, p. 33. Contemporaries described an 'extravagant, out-size personality with a gift for endless self-dramatisation',Elliot, 1986, p. 293. others, more positively, have outlined a 'determined, perceptive and ambitious' personality. Olivares' enemies saw in him a desire to acquire excessive wealth and power.Elliot, 1970, p. 122. He disliked sports and light-hearted entertainment,Wedgewood, p. 145. but was a good horseman, albeit hampered by his weight in later life.Elliot, 1984, p. 195.
Olivares did not share the King's taste for personally acquiring art and literature, although he may have helped assemble the King's own collection,Elliot, 1991, p. 19. and it was he who brought to Philip's attention the young artist Diego Velázquez, in 1623.Brown, 1998, p. 42. For himself he formed a vast collection of state papers, ancient and contemporary, which he endeavoured to protect from destruction by entailing them as an heirloom. He also formed a splendid aviary for the Buen Retiro Palace, which lent him comfort after the death of his daughter but which opened the door for his enemies to nickname the entire Retiro the Gallinero, or the hencoop.Brown, 2004, p. 59-60.
Velázquez painted at least three portraits of his friend and original patron, producing the baroque equestrian portrait along with the standing portraits now at the Hermitage and São Paulo. It is possible that other portraits by Velázquez commissioned by the King were destroyed after Olivares' fallArmstrong, p. 31. — in a copy of Prince Baltasar Carlos in the Riding School, his figure was painted overElliott, 1986, p. 676. — though a few minor portraits made in the conde-duque's last years of power remain.Armstrong, pp. 63–64.
Style of government The royal favourite, who also was Sumiller de Corps and Caballerizo mayor to the King, came to power with a desire to commit the monarchy to a 'crusade of reform',Corteguera, p. 134. with his early recommendations being extremely radical.Elliot, 1970, p. 126. The heart of the problem, Olivares felt, was Spain's moral and spiritual decline.Elliot, 1970, p. 129.
De Zúñiga and Olivares had both presented Philip IV with the concept of restoring the kingdoms to their condition under Philip II, undoing the alleged decline that had occurred under the King's father, Philip III,Parker, 1984, p. 233. and in particular his royal favourite, the Francisco Gómez de Sandoval, 1st Duke of Lerma.Parker, 1984, p. 164. Olivares was concerned that Spain was too attached to the idea of limpieza de sangre, 'purity of blood', and worried about Castilians' disinclination for manual work.Elliot, 1970, p. 134. For Olivares, the concept of Spain was centred on the monarchy and Philip IV as a person; unlike his French contemporary Cardinal Richelieu, Olivares did not elaborate a concept of the 'state' as separate from the person of the king.Elliot, 1970, p. 132.
Olivares was inclined to see domestic policy as a tool in support of foreign policy – a common view amongst contemporary arbitristas, such as Sancho de Moncada and Jeronimo Zeballos. Like many other contemporaries, he had a keen interest in astrology, and its potential impact on the world around him.Aercke, p. 140. Naturally, he incorporated that interest into political expression: he promoted Philip as "The Planet King" — the Sun, traditionally the fourth planet, was a fitting emblem for the fourth Philip of Spain — taking for his own symbol the sunflower.Elliott, 1986, pp. 177–178. Whilst displaying huge confidence in his own capabilities and judgment, he also felt considerable 'doubt and uneasiness' over his position as chief minister to the king.Elliot, 1970, p. 121.
Olivares was well known for his passion for work. Olivares would rise early, go to confession, wake Philip IV and discuss the day's events with him, before then working throughout the rest of the day, often until 11 o'clock at night.Parker, 1984, pp. 232–233. Initially, Olivares would meet with the King three times a day, although this declined over time until he met with him only once a day.Elliot, 1984, p. 194. Whilst living a private life of "Spartan austerity" himself, Olivares was skillful in using the formal and elaborate protocol of the court as a way of controlling the ambitions of Philip's enemies and rivals.Elliot, 1991, p. 47.
Determined to attempt to improve the bureaucratic Polysynodial System of Castilian government, during the 1620s Olivares began to create juntas, smaller governmental committees, to increase the speed of decision making. By the 1630s, these were increasingly packed with Olivares' own placemen, tasked to implement his policies.Munck, p. 53. He placed tight controls on the use of special royal favours to circumvent tight spending controls.Munck, pp. 52–53. The result was a very particular combination of centralised power in the form of Olivares, and loose government executed by small committees.Mackay, p. 25.
Over time, Olivares began to suffer under his tremendous workload, developing sleeping disorders and, later in life, clearly suffering from mental illness. He became increasingly impatient with those who disagreed with him, flying into rages, and refusing to listen to advice proffered by his own advisers.Elliot, 1984, p. 196. His behaviour may also have been exacerbated by the severe bloodletting and excessive purging he received from his doctors at key moments in his career.Parker, 1984, p. 235. Olivares wrote extensively, although there are differences of opinion amongst modern scholars on his work: some find them 'forceful, incisive and persuasive',Parker, 1984, p. 234. others consider them 'inflated and tortuous prose', wandering down 'interminable labyrinths'.Elliot, p. 293.
Foreign policies
For twenty-two years Olivares directed Spain's foreign policy. It was a period of constant war, and finally of disaster abroad and of rebellion at home. Olivares' foreign policy was based around his assessment that Philip IV was surrounded by jealous rivals across Europe, who wished to attack his position as a champion of the Catholic Church; in particular, Olivares saw the rebellious Dutch as a key enemy.Elliot, 1970, p. 127. Although Olivares made much of religion as a facet of Spain's foreign policy, in practice he often overruled that principle.Elliot, 1970, p. 128. It has also been argued that Olivares' dislike of flamboyant spending may have influenced his views of the Dutch Republic, known for its relatively open show of wealth.Schama, p. 259.
Olivares' first key decision came in 1621. Under Philip III, Spain had successfully intervened in the Electoral Palatinate in combination with the forces of Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor, a fellow Habsburg, during 1618–20, surrounding the Dutch provinces that had rebelled against Spanish rule some forty years before.Parker, 1984, p. 169.
An armistice had successfully held since April 1609, but in his role as foreign policy advisor, Olivares' uncle Baltasar de Zúñiga had brought Spain closer and closer to recommencing hostilities as a means of improving Spain's negotiating position with the Dutch.Parker, 1985, p. 264. Olivares' new influence was central to the decision to finally abandon the armistice in favour of renewed military action using the Army of Flanders and economic warfare – ending the Twelve Years Truce and attacking Dutch fleets and applying trading embargoes.Schama, p. 251. This policy would ultimately fail over the next thirty years; to some the Spanish recommencement of the war has appeared 'surprising', whilst it can also be explained as a misreading of internal Dutch politics. Whilst the strategy itself was a failure, Olivares' tactics – his attempt to combine military and economic warfare – have since been praised as a 'shrewd policy'.
For the remainder of the Eighty Years' War, Olivares would pursue a 'Netherlands first' strategy,Parker, 2004, p. 219. focusing his resources and attention on delivering success in the Netherlands first, with the hope of dealing with the other challenges facing the Spanish across Europe once this key Spanish possession had been secured. For the first fifteen years of the war, this strategy proved largely successful. Spain made considerable early advances against the Dutch, finally retaking the key city of Breda in 1624, albeit at huge expense.Anderson, p. 42.
In 1634, against the backdrop of Swedish successes across northern Europe, Olivares was crucial to the creation of a fresh Spanish army in northern Italy, and the projection of that force under the leadership of Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand along the Spanish Road into Germany, where the 'almost miraculous appearance' of the army defeated the Protestant alliance at the Battle of Nördlingen (1634). The scene had been set, Olivares believed, for a renewed attack on the Dutch.