The Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order (, JRTN), also known as the Naqshbandi Army, is an Iraqi Ba'athist militant group which fought against occupying U.S.-led Coalition forces as part of the Iraqi insurgency during the Iraq War, and then continued to fight following the withdrawal of American troops. Media outlets frequently refer to the group by the initials JRTN, a romanization of its Arabic name. Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation, technically the name of the umbrella organization to which JRTN belongs, is also often used to refer to JRTN specifically.

It was named after the Naqshbandi Sufi order. The JRTN's ideology has been described as "a mix of Islamic and pan-Arab nationalistic ideas", and "under the influence of Ba'athist and Islamist political ideals" with Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri being described as "the hidden sheikh of the Men of the Naqshbandis".

History The precise details about the emergence of the JRTN are unclear, although it is generally assumed that the group was established in the summer of 2003 and consists of former members of Saddam Hussein's army, including ex-members of Republican Guard, former Ba‘ath Party officials, former security and military intelligence agents (with connections to Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri) who seek to fight and eject Coalition forces from Iraq and to restore the old order under Ba'athist ideology.

Although JRTN would only emerge as a group in 2006, JRTN members had been involved in anti-coalition actions earlier in the war, such as the 2003 attack on the Al Rasheed Baghdad Hotel, and the 2004 First Battle of Fallujah, where several Naqshbandi clerics associated with the JRTN were among the casualties.

JRTN originally emerged as a militant group in December 2006, following the execution of Saddam Hussein. The group's original focus was on protecting Naqshbandis and Sunni Sufis in Iraq from the oppression they were facing from radical Salafi Islamist insurgent groups, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq, whose tactics were opposed by JRTN's Sufi ideology.

Between its founding in 2006 and the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, JRTN planned, financed, and facilitated militant attacks against U.S. forces and military bases. JRTN's last attack on U.S. forces would occur on November 3, 2011 when 1st Lt. Dustin D. Vincent was shot dead by JRTN sniper fire in Kirkuk Governorate. His killing – one of the last U.S. casualties in Iraq war – was captured on video by Naqshbandi Army and posted online.

On April 25, 2013, insurgents from the Naqshbandi Army completely captured the town of Sulaiman Bek, about 170 km (106 mi) north of Baghdad, after heavy fighting with security forces, only to relinquish control of it a day later, while escaping with weapons and vehicles.

Following the Hawija clashes, JRTN units in Nineveh began to mobilize, emerging as a force that could potentially play a role in a new low-level Sunni uprising. Immediately after the Hawija clashes, JRTN units were able to take temporary control of a neighborhood in the 17 July area of western Mosul.

On January 18, 2014, Reuters reported that after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and its tribal Sunni allies overran Fallujah and parts of the nearby city Ramadi on January 1, the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order was one of the Sunni rebel groups present in the city. JRTN has not claimed any attacks since 2016 with this leading some to believe that the group had at some point disbanded.

Focus and methods The group operates in Kirkuk Province and other parts of northern Iraq, and is linked to Saddam Hussein's former aide Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, an adherent of the Naqshbandi order, and is thought to be the largest militant group of former Ba'athists.Sam Dagher, "Crash in Iraq Kills 4 U.S. Soldiers" , The New York Times, January 26, 2009. Outside of Kirkuk, the group has carried out operations in Baghdad, Al Anbar, Nineveh, Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces.

The Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order frequently filmed and distributed footage of themselves on their websites showing the group attacking American depots and ambushing Iraqi government and American forces with mortars, IEDs and homemade missiles, as well as light machine guns and sniper rifles.

The group avoided direct confrontation with U.S. forces, relying instead on guerrilla tactics. The group's main focus was on a two-pronged strategy. The first phase was focused on defense, where the group attacked soft targets while building up its power and training and cooperating with other groups to widen the armed opposition. Local emirs, each responsible for 7–10 fighters, were set up in every province. The emirs were in turn led by an Emir al-Jihad, a Grand Sheikh of Tariqah al-Naqshbandiyya.

Media The group also used the web and print media to expand its membership and influence. Online the group links to videos showing attacks on Coalition forces, whereas its magazine publishes articles describing Sufism and Jihad, whilst trying to promote its ideology and requesting donations.

Ideology

The JRTN was originally composed mainly of groups wishing to restore the old order under the Ba'athist ideology. The JRTN is predominantly composed of Iraqi Sunnis of the Sufi Naqshbandi order trying to force foreign troops out of Iraq until the withdrawal of the US in 2011. Since the JRTN is led by Saddam's former deputy Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri and contains many former Iraqi regime elements, Ba'athism and Iraqi nationalism have become important parts of its ideology. The JRTN often emphasizes and appeals to different ideologies in different circumstances, appealing to both traditional Arab nationalism as well as Islamic unity in order to achieve its goals.

The group's practice of both Sufism and embrace of violence is controversial, and Sufism had been tolerated under the Ba'athist government of Saddam Hussein due to its peaceful and relatively apolitical nature. Government tolerance for Sufism even resulted in its adoption by several members of the ruling Ba'ath party. However, despite its roots in a desire to protect Sufis, the group has declared itself to be fighting to maintain Iraq's unity along with its Arab and Islamic character. As such, the group can be seen as pursuing a nationalistic as opposed to the religious line. The group's main desire is to return the former Ba'ath Party to power in part due to the many freedoms Naqshbandi enjoyed under the Ba'ath party. Others have accused the group of merely acquiring the Naqshbandi name in order to increase its popularity. Although the group recognizes a direct return to Baathist control is impossible, they focus instead on infiltrating former Ba'athists into positions of power to hopefully dominate a future nationalist government. The group then wishes to portray itself and the wider Baath party as a technocratic alternative to a currently incompetent Shia Islamist government that is incapable of delivering services. Maintaining chaos in Iraq is a key part of this plan as the JRTN must ensure living standards do not improve under the current government so as to make the group appear more attractive.

The group was strongly anti-Coalition and supported the targeting of Coalition forces in Iraq, believing that coalition forces including individuals, equipment and supplies, were legitimate targets at any time or place in Iraq. Iraqis are not considered valid targets unless fighting with Coalition forces. The group is opposed to fighting other insurgent groups and will cooperate if they are committed to the same agenda.

People such as Ibrahim al-Sumadaie of the Iraqi Constitutional Party fear that JRTN could become increasingly attractive to Sunnis either aggrieved by a Shiite-dominated government or those such as the Awakening Councils who left the insurgency and switched sides to the Coalition forces to fight al Qaeda who now feel abandoned. Security officials contend that thousands of Sunni insurgents who are upset by Maliki's failure to absorb them into the military are being recruited by JRTN and will pose a threat to stability. This is in turn helped by the fact that JRTN survived as the popularity of more fundamentalist groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq waned, leaving them as one of the last few major opposition groups. The JRTN platform is attractive to Sunnis due less to an explicitly Baathist or Arab nationalist socialist platform than to the idea of the creation of an area where Sunnis can be Sunnis.

According to a US intelligence officer, members of JRTN can often be respected figures within local government or influential figures within their communities. These figures don't necessarily act violently, allowing them to blend in and making it difficult to obtain warrants issued by the Iraqi court to arrest them. JRTN cells have also been characterized as a familial organization, with members often being part of the same family or tied to the Sheikh Maqsud sub-tribe of the Al-Douris, meaning that at its most fundamental level, JRTN is an Al-Douri family business. The group also relies on tribal loyalties of Sunni Arabs for support in Kirkuk province, where many Sunni Arabs were located to from Tikrit during Saddam Hussein's tenure.

Politics

JRTN was strongly opposed to any involvement in the political process during the occupation of Iraq and now works to overthrow the government of Nouri al-Maliki. The group believes the Shiite-dominated government is unfit to govern Sunnis, contending that the government is an Iranian puppet and persecutes Sunnis. Douri claimed in 2009 that JRTN would soon gain power and "invite Obama to negotiations".

Relationship with the Ba'ath Party

JRTN is linked to the "New Baath Party" led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, an adherent of the Naqshbandi Order. Many members of both the New Baath Party and the JRTN are former officials and soldiers who served under Saddam Hussein. US military officers contend that many JRTN members are believed to be former Iraqi military officers, due in part to JRTN statements often being infused with military terminology as well as their vetting procedures of new recruits involving putting new members in a 90-day trial period in which they are required to carry out low-level attacks, endure physical abuse, and background checks to ensure they are not affiliated with the Islamic State.

Other factions within the New Baath Party oppose a strong connection with JRTN. Senior Baath Party member Mohammed Younis al-Ahmed and his followers are politically divided with al-Douri's wing of the party, with the Yunis faction aiming to return to the political process and re-legitimize the political party while al-Douri advocates the creation of a separate Sunni Arab Iraq. Several New Baath Party members have opposed affiliation with JRTN as the party becomes reduced to a militant movement that overshadows political efforts.

Relationship with other insurgent groups JRTN has called for the unification of insurgent groups in order to fight against Coalition forces and has, in turn, worked with several anti-Coalition groups. JRTN often facilitates money, weapons, information, and safe-houses for other groups, such as Ansar al-Sunna, the Islamic Army in Iraq, 1920 Revolution Brigades, and the Islamic State of Iraq. JRTN then in turn often acts as a public face for these groups, with other insurgent groups giving JRTN videotapes of attacks to be placed on the Internet and TV. Although initially founded as a reaction against Sunni fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda, which consider Sufi groups transgressors, there has been an instance of cooperation between JRTN and such groups, including al-Qaeda in Iraq.