The Rivadavia class consisted of two battleships designed by the American Fore River Shipbuilding Company for the Argentine Navy. Named and after important figures in Argentine history, they were Argentina's entry in the South American dreadnought race and a counter to Brazil's two s.
In 1904, Brazil scrapped a previous naval building program in favor of an order that included three warships of the new "dreadnought" type, despite signs that such an action would spark a South American naval arms race. To counter this acquisition by a major rival, Argentina began seeking bids for at least two dreadnoughts in 1908. Over the next two years, shipbuilders from five countries vied for the contracts, complemented by efforts from their respective governments. Argentina was able to play this hyper-competitive environment to its own advantage by rejecting all of the initial proposals and calling for new ones that required the best aspects of each. They then repeated this process, despite complaints from shipbuilders that their trade secrets were being given away. The contracts were awarded to the lowest bidder, Fore River, in early 1910. This move shocked the European bidders, but could partly be explained by the American steel trust's ability to produce steel at a lower cost than any other country.
With increasing tensions in Europe that would eventually lead to the First World War, newspapers speculated that the Argentine dreadnoughts would be sold to another country. Under diplomatic pressure, Argentina kept the ships. Throughout their careers, Rivadavia and Moreno were based in Puerto Belgrano and served principally as training ships and diplomatic envoys. They were modernized in the United States in 1924 and 1925 and were inactive for much of the Second World War due to Argentina's neutrality. Struck from the navy lists on 1 February 1957, Rivadavia was scrapped in Italy beginning in 1959. Moreno was struck on 1 October 1956 and was towed to Japan in 1957 for scrapping.
Background
The raison d'être for the Rivadavia class can be traced back to Argentine–Chilean territorial disputes over the boundary of Patagonia and control of the Beagle Channel going back to the 1840s. It nearly led to war in 1878 and kindled a naval arms race from 1887 to 1902 which was only settled via British mediation. As part of the three pacts which ended the dispute, restrictions were placed on the navies of both countries. The British Royal Navy bought two pre-dreadnought battleships that were being built for Chile, and Argentina sold its two Rivadavia-class armored cruisers under construction in Italy to Japan.Scheina, Naval History, 45–52; Garrett, "Beagle Channel Dispute," 86–88. Meanwhile, beginning in the late 1880s, Brazil's navy fell into obsolescence after an 1889 revolution, which deposed Emperor Dom Pedro II, and a 1893 civil war.Topliss, "The Brazilian Dreadnoughts," 240; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 32. By the turn of the 20th century it was lagging behind the Chilean and Argentine navies in quality and total tonnage, despite Brazil having nearly three times the population of Argentina and almost five times the population of Chile.Scheina, "Brazil," 403; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 32.
By 1904, however, Brazil began to seriously consider upgrading its navy to compete with Argentina and Chile. Soaring demand for coffee and rubber brought the Brazilian economy an influx of revenue,Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 216; Scheina, "Brazil," 403. which paid for a US$31.25 million naval repair scheme, a substantial amount for the time period. The bill authorized 28 ships, including three battleships and three armored cruisers.Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 216 It was not possible to lay down the battleships until 1906, the same year the trend-setting was constructed. This ship prompted the Brazilians to cancel their battleship plans in favor of two dreadnoughts. The ordering of these powerful ships—designed to carry the heaviest armament in the world at the time—shocked Argentina and Chile. Historian Robert Scheina comments that the dreadnoughts alone "outclassed the entire [elderly] Argentinian fleet."Scheina, "Argentina," 400; "Germany may buy English warships," The New York Times, 1 August 1908, C8.
Debates raged in Argentina over the wisdom of acquiring dreadnoughts to counter Brazil's. The National Autonomist Party cabinet was in favor, despite a probable cost of nearly $10 million, but a specific plan for two battleships and ten destroyers was not popular with the public. Alarmed, the American ambassador to Brazil sent a cablegram to his Department of State, warning them of the destabilizing effects that would occur if the situation devolved into a full naval arms race.Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 32–33.
Despite American entreaties to preclude the naval arms race, Brazil continued development on the ships. This, combined with renewed border disputes, particularly in the River Plate (Río de la Plata, literally "Silver River") area, spurred Argentina to move forward with plans for their own battleships. Inflamed by newspaper editors, opinion had swung towards supporting a naval building program. While an early plan called for $35 million to be invested—$7 million from foreign loans—a $55 million plan was adopted in August 1908. Hoping to end the arms race, Argentina made an offer to purchase one of the two Brazilian ships, but the refusal prompted the dispatch of an Argentine naval commission to Europe to acquire dreadnoughts.Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 33.
Bidding
Proposals from shipbuilders for two dreadnoughts (along with a possible third, to match Brazil should a third ship be ordered) and twelve destroyers were solicited in 1908 by open tender.Scheina, "Argentina," 401; Scheina, Latin America, 82; Whitley, Battleships, 18. In order to ensure that the designs reflected the most modern practices, the requirements were intentionally vague.Scheina, "Argentina," 401; Scheina, Latin America, 83.
Fifteen shipyards from the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy began bidding on the battleships.Scheina, "Argentina," 401; Scheina, Latin America, 83; Whitley, Battleships, 18. Diplomatic pressure to give the contracts was brought to bear from all these countries, especially the first three.Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 34. Even with this assistance, industry leaders in the United States believed that they had no chance in the bidding without active cooperation from their government, as Europe was the traditional arms supplier to Argentina (and to all of South America).Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 35–36. Even when this was given, including the removal of import tariffs on hides from Argentina, promises for additional concessions if American shipbuilders were selected,Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 36. and an offer to include the most technologically advanced fire-control system and torpedo tubes available on the Argentine battleships, the United States was widely viewed as a non-contender.Scheina, Latin America, 83. Historian Seward W. Livermore remarked that "opposition to the United States was formidable. The naval commission was pro-British; the vice-president of the republic, Roque Sáenz Peña, favored Italy, where he had been the Argentine envoy for many years; and the minister of war wanted the contracts to go to Germany, so as to standardize the military and naval equipment of the country."
The president of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company believed that the United States would not receive contracts due to what he saw as a large amount of European meddling in Argentina:
The United States, however, found an ally in Buenos Aires' main daily newspaper, La Prensa. The owner, editor, and naval editor were all in favor of acquiring American-designed dreadnoughts. In addition, the paper found evidence of British wrongdoing in a related naval contract. Under public pressure, the naval commission was forced to reconsider its original list, which had placed Italy first and Britain second. It now featured the United States first, Britain second, and Italy last.
In a surprise move, the Argentine naval commission then threw out all of the opening tenders and called for another round of bidding; they simultaneously updated the specifications to include what were judged to be the best aspects of all the plans.Scheina, Latin America, 83; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 37. The competitors were given three weeks to come up with new designs and cost estimates. After diplomatic protests, this was modified slightly; the original bids were kept, but alterations to attempt to conform to the new desired characteristics were allowed.Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 37.
The commission found that the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company bid was lowest on one battleship, and the Fore River Shipbuilding Company was lowest on the other. Despite a British attempt to allow the Armstrong Whitworth-Vickers team to lower their price by $570,000, prompt American diplomacy granting various assurances regarding recent events between the United States and Brazil, the upcoming 1910 Pan-American Conference, and a guarantee of American participation in the Argentine centennial celebrations secured the battleship contracts for Fore River on 21 January 1910.Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 38. The maximum price Fore River tendered, $10.7 million, underbid the British by more than $973,000, but their ship's displacement was smaller, the belt armor was thinner, and the top speed was slightly lower.Alger, "Professional Notes," 595. Orders for the twelve destroyers were divided among Britain, France, and Germany.Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 38; "America to Build Argentine Ships," The New York Times, 23 January 1910, C4.
Rivadavia was built by Fore River at its shipyard in Massachusetts, but they were contractually obligated to subcontract the second ship to a different shipyard in the hope that both would be completed faster, so Moreno was constructed by the New York Shipbuilding Corporation of Camden, New Jersey.Scheina, Latin America, 83; Sarcone and Rines, A History of Shipbuilding. The steel for the ships was largely supplied by the Bethlehem Steel Company of Pennsylvania,"Argentine Navy; Dreadnought Orders," Evening Post, 23 March 1910, 4. which, due to their ability to produce steel at a lower price than other nations, was an integral cost-saving measure. The Secretary of the Argentine Naval Commission, the body which chose the final design, said the reason the American tender was lower than that of the English was that "steel for construction work and armor-plating is a great deal cheaper in the United States than in England. Wages are higher there, but the contractors ... are able to obtain it more cheaply owing to the manipulations of the Steel Trust."