The 54th Ohio Infantry Regiment was an infantry regiment in the Union Army during the American Civil War. They wore Zouave uniforms that were identical to those of the 34th Ohio Infantry Regiment (Piatts Zouaves.)
Service The 54th Ohio Infantry Regiment was organized at Camp Dennison near Cincinnati, Ohio, in October 1861 and mustered in for three years service under the command of Colonel Thomas Kilby Smith as a Zouave regiment. The regiment was recruited in Allen, Auglaize, Champaign, Clinton, Cuyahoga, Fayette, Greene, Highland, Lake, Logan, Morgan, and Preble counties.
While Col. Smith and his staff were still training the regiment, an army led by Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant won two battles that were the most significant Union victories, at that time, of the American Civil War, the battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers respectively. These victories shut off the rivers to the Confederacy as transportation routes, and opened the way to restore federal authority at Nashville, an ironworks center, a major producer of gunpowder, a major supply depot, a major agricultural crop collection point, and a converging point for railroads. The Department of the Missouri's commander, Maj. Gen. Hallek had three field armies under his command now, (now Maj. Gen. Grant's Army of the Tennessee (AoT), Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio (AoO), and Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of the Mississippi (AoM). In mid-February, he sent Pope's AoM to reduce the threat on the Mississippi by attacking Island Number 10. He had Grant's AoT continue its movement up the Tennessee River into Confederate territory where his troops arrived at the Tennessee River town of Savannah, TN, on March 11. Within a week, a significant force was there and at landings further south. Meanwhile, Buell's AoO had gone up the Cumberland River and taken Nashville and was moving southwest to join Grant on the Tennessee.
The Confederacy's defeats at Fort Henry and Donelson made it abandon Kentucky and parts of Tennessee. Their last troops in Nashville left on February 23. Their Western Theater commander, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, made the controversial decision to quit the region, and despite political unhappiness in Richmond, his consolidation of troops further south precluded being could cut off in Kentucky and major portions of Tennessee. He planned to consolidate forces in Corinth, MS just over the state line. By the end of March, Johnston had over 40,000 Confederate troops at Corinth.
Realizing that his troops were too spread out, the theater commander, Maj. Gen. Hallek decided to concentrate troops at Pittsburg Landing, upriver (south) of Savannah, where the armies could advance on a good road to Corinth, Mississippi. The town was a junction of two vital railroad lines, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad (M&ORR) and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad (M&CRR), called by some "the vertebrae of the Confederacy." Halleck argued Richmond and Corinth were the great strategic points of the war, and all efforts should be made to take Corinth and thereby make rebel control of railroads west of the East Tennessee bastion of Chattanooga meaningless.
Shiloh
On Monday, February 17, 1862, the 850 men of the 54th Ohio Zouaves left Cincinnati via the Ohio River and sailed downriver reaching Paducah, KY, three days later, February 20. There, Col. Smith and his regiment were assigned to Col Stuart's 2nd Brigade in Brig. Gen. Sherman's 5th Division. Two weeks later, March 6, the 54th Ohio boarded river steamers and sailed up the Tennessee River. After joining the AoT at Savannah from Wednesday through Friday, March 12–14, the 54th and its division disembarked at Pittsburg Landing Monday, March 17. After organizing itself at the landing, Sherman's division marched west , and camped near Shiloh Church. The men noted the army's position was somewhat shaped like a triangle, with the sides formed by various creeks and the river. The land was mostly wooded, with scattered cotton fields, peach orchards, and a few small structures. They camped with their brigade to the east and left of the main Corinth road. The 54th as part of Stuart's brigade shifted camp closer on Wednesday nearly closer to the Tennessee at Bell Field at the junction of the Savannah and Hamburg roads to guard the ford over Lick Creek.The regiment spent the next fortnight in camp training, drilling, preparing for the expected advance, and patrolling south in the woods towards Corinth.
In between the 54th Ohio and Sherman's three other brigades was Brig. Gen Prentiss' 6th Division, and between the Shiloh Church area and the river were Maj. Gen. McClernand's 1st Division and Brig. Gen. Hurlbut's 4th Division. Behind the 54th Ohio in Stuart's brigade and closest to the landing was Brig. Gen. W.H.L. Wallace's 2nd Division.
The Union plan was to combine Grant's and Buell's armies and continue south and capture Corinth, which would be a springboard to take Memphis, Vicksburg, and large portions of Confederate territory. While most of the AoT was near Pittsburg Landing in early April, one division was downstream (north) at Crump's Landing, and the army headquarters remained further north in Savannah. Buell's army was on the way from Nashville to Savannah. Hallek ordered Grant to avoid an engagement until "properly fortified" and ordered to do so. Wet weather meanwhile was hampering Grant's efforts to keep his artillery and supplies with his infantry as the roads were in terrible condition.
Johnston realized he could soon be outnumbered with 42,000 men at Corinth, and 15,000 more on the way, while the not–yet–combined Union force could number 75,000 men. Seizing the initiative, Johnston decided to surprise Grant on April 4 before Buell arrived from Nashville. Inexperience and bad weather caused the march north to take longer than he expected, and his troops were not in position until Saturday afternoon, April 5. On Friday, April 4, pickets under Col. Ralph P. Buckland made contact with some of Johnston's cavalry who drove them back to about a in advance of his center, on the 54th Ohio's right on the main Corinth road. Sherman sent his cavalry at them in pursuit driving them back about . The cavalry did not see the rest of Johnston's army, and Sherman and Grant were not concerned by their presence, with Sherman writing, "yet I did not believe that he designed anything but a strong demonstration." This may have been fueled by lack of contact by other patrols such as the six companies Stuart sent out on the Hamburg road, with a squadron of cavalry sent forward by General McClernand, to reconnoiter beyond Hamburg on Saturday.
The Confederates spent Saturday night, April 5 in the woods south of the Union campsites. Johnston's plan was to attack the Union left, pushing it northwest against the swampy land adjacent to Snake and Owl creeks. Confederate troops along the Tennessee River would prevent Union reinforcements and resupply. Despite the cavalry skirmish on Friday, the AoT did not expect a fight at that location and did not form a defensive line nor make any entrenchments. Sherman dismissed the April 4 contact as a reconnaissance. Grant had ordered all his commanders to be careful to avoid a battle before Buell arrived. Further sightings and incidents throughout Saturday were likewise dismissed. After hearing of sightings of Confederates at Seay Field, Col. Everett Peabody, commanding Prentiss' 1st Brigade, grew concerned, and around midnight Saturday, sent a five company patrol to investigate. Prentiss was not informed, and the patrol advanced from their camp on the 54th Ohio's right southwest down a farm road leading to Pittsburg-Corinth Road.
First Day's Battle Around 5:00a.m., Sunday, April 6, Confederate pickets from a battalion in Brig. Gen. Wood's 3rd Brigade of Maj. Gen. Hardee's 3rd Corps opened fire on Powell's men in the southeast corner of James J. Fraley's 40-acre (16 ha) cotton field before withdrawing. Unaware that rebel skirmish lines were already behind his left and right rear, Powell advanced within from of the battalion, where the Confederates opened fireleading to a fiece fight between these two small forces fighting for over an hour.
By 5:30a.m., Johnston and his staff heard the firing and ordered a general attack. Keeping Beauregard in the rear directing men and supplies, he rode to the front to lead his men, effectively ceding control of the battle to Beauregard. Meanwhile, Powell sent word back to Peabody that he was being driven back by an enemy force of several thousand. Meanwhile, Prentiss was outraged to learn Peabody had sent out a patrol and accused him violating Grant's order to avoid provoking a major engagement. However, he soon realized a large Confederate force was attacking and sent reinforcements forward. The five-company patrol partially spoiled the Confederate element of surprise and gave Stuart's brigade on the AoT's left, and the rest of the army, time albeit brief to stand to arms and form up. As the Zouaves and other regiments stood to arms, some Union commanders still were unconvinced that they were under attack, and Sherman himself was not convinced until his 7:00a.m. ride to investigate the commotion near Rea Field. In response, Sherman quickly and sent word to McClernand asking him to support his left and to Hurlbut, asking him to support Prentiss. It became impossible for Johnston to control the intermingled units, so his corps commanders decided to divide the battlefield and lead their battlefield portion instead of their own corps. The rebel attack went forward as a broad frontal assault. Johnston and Beauregard did not put more strength on their right, which, fortunately for the 54th Ohio, meant they did not focus on turning the Union left.
Grant, at his Savannah headquarters having breakfast, heard the distant sounds of artillery fire. Grant was waiting for more of Buell's army to arrive in Savannah. Ahead of most of his divisions, Buell and his 4th Division under Brig. Gen. Nelson had already arrived in Savannah, and they were walking to Grant's headquarters when Grant departed by boat for Pittsburg Landing. Grant ordered Nelson to march his division along the east side of the river to a point opposite Pittsburg Landing, where it could be ferried over to the battlefield. Grant then took his steamboat, Tigress, south, stopping at Crump's Landing to tell Lew Wallace to get his division ready to move, and Grant arrived at Pittsburg Landing around 9:00a.m. Grant rode inland and confirmed that Johnston had launched a full-scale attack. He sent a message to back to Lew Wallace at Crump's Landing to bring his division to the battlefield.