The Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army (initially designated as III Corps) was a corps-sized military field manoeuvre formation overseen and commanded by its Commander, typically at the holding rank of the Lieutenant-General.
From the partition of India by Great Britain in 1947 and until 1970, Pakistan was a divided country with consists of two wings geographically separated by . With chain of command and armed forces' combat machinery stationed in the Western wing, the military mission of the Pakistan armed forces in Eastern wing was to defend and hold in reserves until Pakistani military in west staled or ceasefire with larger Indian Army (in case of war). The Central Command based in Army GHQ in Rawalpindi at that time created the formation with one army commander who was to be assisted by the naval and air commanders. War planners had drawn up a plan to defend Dacca by concentrating all their forces along the Dhaka Bowl (the area surrounded by the rivers Jamuna, Padma and Meghna).
To curb the insurgent attacks, and political activism led by All-Pakistan Awami League in east, the Central Command authorised to launched clearance operations (Searchlight and Barisal), which led to the creation of Mukti Bahini and their fighting for independence throughout eastern wing, Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi revised the existing plan in accordance with Central Command directive (which emphasised the need to prevent the Mukti Bahini from occupying any area of the province and to fight for every inch of territory). The Central Command expected the Indians to occupy a large area of the province, transfer the Mukti Bahini and Bengali refugees there and recognise the Bangladesh government in exile – turning the insurgency into an international diplomatic issue. Lt-Gen. Niazi designated ten cities (Jessore, Jhenaidah, Bogra, Rangpur, Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong) on major communication hubs as "fortress towns" and deployed larger formations of ground troops near the Indian border. The final plan called for the armed forces to delay Indian attacks at the border and then gradually fall back to the fortress towns. From the fortresses, part of the surviving force was to take up positions near Dhaka and hold out until India was forced for a ceasefire in the west; Pakistani forces in the fortress towns would delay the bulk of the Indian forces and prevent them from concentrating on Dhaka.
Background The Pakistan Army inherited six infantry divisions and an armoured brigade after independence in 1947 from the British Indian Army,Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp47 deploying most of their armed assets in West Pakistan. East Pakistan had one infantry brigade in 1948, which was made up of two infantry battalions, the 1st East Bengal Regiment and the 1/14th (1st battalion of 14th Punjab Regiment) or 3/8th Punjab Regiment (3rd battalion of the 8th Punjab Regiment). Between them, the two battalions boasted five rifle companies (a battalion normally had five companies).Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp49 This weak brigade – under the command of Brigadier Ayub Khan (served as an acting Major General – appointment: GOC, 14th Infantry Division) – and a number of East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) wings were tasked with defending East Pakistan during the Kashmir War of 1947.Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp47, pp51 The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy had little presence in East Pakistan at that time. The reasons for placing more than 90 percent of the armed might in West Pakistan were: Pakistan did not have the economic base to support adequate forces in both wings, and West Pakistan had more strategic relevance than East Pakistan. Most government officials were from West Pakistan or non-Bengali. Most economic development was taking place in West Pakistan, and the bulk of the armed forces was placed there to keep its power base secure. Pakistani military staff planners proposed the following doctrine to justify this deployment: "The defense of the East lies in the West". Broadly speaking, this translated into Pakistan needing to defeat India in the west, regardless of what transpired in the east (including Indian occupation of East Pakistan) because a West Pakistani success would presumably force India to negotiate a favourable settlement. The Pakistani staff also believed in the martial race theory; it was widely believed that one Pakistani soldier was equal to four to ten Hindus/Indian soldiers,^ Library of Congress studies. and that the numerical superiority of the Indian armed forces could be negated by a smaller number of Pakistani soldiers.
1949–1965 The Pakistan Armed Forces grew significantly in size between the wars of 1949 and 1965. The number of infantry divisions jumped from 6 to 13; it also boasted two armoured divisions and several independent infantry and armoured brigades by 1965.Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp55 All these formations had the required artillery, commando, engineer and transport units attached to them. The growth in military infrastructure was slower in East Pakistan; the single division (14th Infantry division) HQed at Dhaka now contained two infantry brigades, with the 53rd Brigade stationed at Comilla and the 107th Brigade deployed in Jessore by 1963. In 1964, the 23rd Brigade was created in Dhaka. This under-strength division comprised three infantry brigades, with no armour and supported by 10 EPR wings, 12 F-86 Saber planes, and three gunboatsNasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp55 rode out the 1965 war in the east. The Air Forces had bombed each other's bases with the PAF emerging on top, while the Border Security Force (BSF) and EPR had skirmished along the border; although India had one infantry division and one armoured brigade posted near East Pakistan, the armies never clashed in the east.
Reforms of Yahya Khan When Yahya Khan became Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army in 1966, he initiated a series of reforms to revamp the combat capability of the Pakistan army. In East Pakistan a corps headquarters was to be established (initially designated as the III corps which later known as the Eastern Command), but except the 14th Infantry Division, Dacca no new division was raised (although the 57th Infantry Brigade was formed in Dhaka, while the 23rd Infantry Brigade was sent to Rangpur). In 1970, the 29th Cavalry was deployed in Rangpur from Rawalpindi, but East Pakistan was not given any corps artillery or armoured units.
The Pakistan Eastern Command headquarters was inaugurated in Dacca Cantonment, Dacca on 23 August 1969 and Lt. Gen. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was appointed as the commander; on 1 September 1969, the Chief Martial Law Administrator of the country, General Yahya Khan, sent Vice Admiral S. M. Ahsan as Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan.§The Man of Honor and Integrity: Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, Unified Commander of Pakistan Armed Forces in East Pakistan." (in English), Witness to Surrender., Inter Services Public Relations, Siddique Salik,, pp. 60–90, . Admiral Ahsan, when Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy, had established the naval forces in East Pakistan; the naval presence was tripled in East Pakistan with more officers from West Pakistan deployed in the region. Earlier, the Chief of the General Staff at GHQ, Rawalpindi, Major General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, decided to run a series of exercises in East Pakistan to formulate an integrated battle plan for the province in 1967. Dubbed "Operation X-Sunderbans-1", it was run by (then) Colonel Rao Farman Ali under the command of Major General Muzaffaruddin (GOC 14th Division); the conclusions of this exercise formed the basis for the Pakistani operational plan in 1971.
Strategy
Operation X-Sundarbans-1
Pakistani planners assumed that the army in East Pakistan would not defend every inch of the province. Pakistani staff planners identified the following features as significant for setting up a defence plan: Monsoon rains flood the mostly flat country, which hinders movement. The best time for conventional warfare is between November and March, when the ground firms up to allow easy mechanised movement and armoured warfare. Infrastructure was poor. All roads led to Dhaka; there was a lack of lateral roads. There were 300 water channels large enough to be navigable during summer. Without air parity and control of river crossings, movement along interior lines would be hindered. East Pakistan was a salient, surrounded on all sides by Indian forces. Instead of defending every inch of the land, survival of the armed forces was given top priority and the defence of Dhaka was the ultimate objective. Instead of deploying along the -long Indian border, three lines of deployment were identified: The Forward Line: Roughly forming a semicircle running from Jessore – Rajshahi – Hili – Dinajpur – Rangpur – Jamalpur. Mymensingh – Sylhet - Comilla – Chittagong. The Pakistan army did not have the numbers to defend the entire line. The Secondary Line: This began along the Madhumati River, ran north to the Padma River, ran west along the Padma to Rajshahi, north to Hili, east to Bogra, then east and south along the Brahamputra and Meghna rivers. Comilla was to be abandoned. Khulna, Jessore, and Dinajpur-Rangpur were not to be defended in force; Sylhet and Chittagong were to be independent defence areas. Inner Line: The Dhaka Bowl (the area between the Jamuna, Padma, Meghna and Old Brahmaputra Rivers). This (especially the city of Dhaka) must be defended until Pakistan defeated India in the west. The Pakistani planners were aware of the possible negative political implications among the Bengali population of abandoning forward areas and concentrating the army around the Dhaka Bowl to maximise the defensive potential and achieve better co-ordination; however, it failed to come up with an alternative solution. The planners recommended taking advantage of the poor state of infrastructure and natural obstacles to the fullest.
In brief, the plan was to defend Dhaka by starting with the secondary line and falling back to the inner line.
Training
Operation Titu Mir A series of exercises, codenamed "Titu Mir", was conducted by the Eastern Command in 1970; the last was staged in January. The conclusions drawn were: India would launch the main assault on East Pakistan from the west, aiming to capture the area up to the river Jamuna; secondary efforts, directed towards Sylhet and Chittagong, would take place in the east. Only with the fall of Dhaka would the capitulation of the province be completed. Against a conventional Indian attack with 3:1 superiority in numbers and enemy dominance of the air and sea, an East Pakistan armed force contingent consisting of a single infantry division (supported by a regiment of tanks, 17 EPR wings and other paramilitary forces, a squadron of jets and four gunboats) with no support from West Pakistan would probably be able to last for a maximum of three weeks.Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp73 The conclusions were submitted to GHQ in Rawalpindi, but no major alteration of the original plan took place at this time.
Military Engangments
Bangladesh War of Liberation
During the Pakistan Civil war, Eastern Command was the main branch to conduct operations against Mukti Bahini and Indian international forces. The sector continued to fight until the essential defeat at 16 December.
Operations Searchlight and Barisal