In 1960, the oft-expressed optimism of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam that the Viet Cong (VC) were nearly defeated proved mistaken. Instead the VC became a growing threat and security forces attempted to cope with VC attacks, assassinations of local officials, and efforts to control villages and rural areas. Throughout the year, the U.S. struggled with the reality that much of the training it had provided to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during the previous five years had not been relevant to combating an insurgency. The U.S. changed its policy to allow the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to begin providing anti-guerrilla training to ARVN and the paramilitary Civil Guard.

President Ngô Đình Diệm of South Vietnam was faced with growing dissatisfaction with his government, culminating in a coup d'état attempt by military officers in November.

North Vietnam's support for the VC increased, and in December the National Liberation Front (NLF) was created to carry on the struggle. Ostensibly a coalition of anti-Diem organizations, the NLF was under the direct control of Communist Party of Vietnam.

January 4 January President Diem said to General Samuel Williams, the head of MAAG in Saigon, that the counterinsurgency programs of his government had been successful and that "the Communists have now given up hope of controlling the countryside."

7 January General Williams said that "the internal security situation here now, although at times delicate, is better than it has been at any time in the last two or three years.

17 January – 26 February In what has been called "the start of the Vietnam War", the VC attacked and took temporary control of several districts in Kiến Hòa Province (now Bến Tre Province) in the Mekong Delta.Pringle, James, "Meanwhile: The quiet town where the Vietnam War began", The New York Times, 223 March 2004 The VC set up "people's committees," and confiscated land from landlords and redistributed it to poor farmers. One of the leaders of the uprising was Madame Nguyễn Thị Định who led the all-female "Long Hair Army." Dinh was the secretary of the Bến Tre Communist Party and later a VC Major General."Ben Tre Province", accessed 2 Dec 1963

Although the ARVN recaptured the villages, uprisings spread to many other areas of South Vietnam. The uprisings were spontaneous, and contrary to the restrained and defensive policy of the Communist government in Hanoi.

26 January Two hundred VC guerrillas attacked the headquarters of the ARVN 32nd Regiment, 21st Division in Trang Sup village in Tây Ninh Province northeast of Saigon. The VC killed or wounded 66 soldiers and captured more than 500 weapons and a large quantity of ammunition. Later, a VC spokesman said that "the purpose of the attack was to launch the new phase of the conflict with a resounding victory and to show that the military defeat [of the South Vietnamese Army] was easy, not difficult." The attack shocked the Diệm government and its American advisers. A U.S. Embassy study of the implications of the battle recommended that two divisions of the ARVN be trained in guerrilla warfare.

February 15 February On his own initiative without consulting his American advisers, President Diệm ordered the formation of commando companies to undertake counter-insurgency (as anti-guerrilla warfare was beginning to be called) operations. Diệm planned to create 50 commando companies, composed of volunteers, of 131 men each. MAAG and the United States Department of Defense (DOD) opposed Diệm's proposal. General Williams said that Diệm's proposal to create 50 commando companies was "hasty, ill-considered, and destructive." To defeat the VC, he said that South Vietnam needed a well-trained Civil Guard, intensive training between operations, improved counterintelligence, and a clear chain of command. The U.S. was also concerned that Diem's proposal was an attempt to increase the number of South Vietnamese military personnel beyond the 150,000 ceiling that the U.S. was committed to support.

19 February United States Ambassador to South Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow requested that U.S. Army Special Forces provide anti-guerrilla training to the 50,000 man para-military Civil Guard. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operative Colonel Edward Lansdale in Washington concurred with the request. Up until this time MAAG in South Vietnam had provided training only for conventional warfare and only to the ARVN."Vietnam War Timelines: 1958-1960" http://www.vietnamgear.com/war1959.aspx, accessed 26 Aug 2014

26 February President Diệm requested that the United States provide anti-guerrilla training to both the Civil Guard and ARVN.

March 2 March Ambassador Durbrow reported to the Department of State that the VC now numbered more than 3,000 men and that the Diệm government was losing its capability of dealing with the VC insurgency in rural areas.Adamson, Michael R. "Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, Frederick Nolting, and the U.S. Commitment to Diem's Vietnam, 1957-1961" Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 2002), p. 235. Downloaded from JSTOR

Two hundred VC in the Mekong Delta ambushed three ARVN companies. More than 40 soldiers were killed, wounded, or missing.

18 March Stimulated by a report from CIA operative and Diệm confidant Edward Lansdale, a military conference in Washington concluded that in South Vietnam "military operations without a sound political bases will be only a temporary solution." The conference recommended that the U.S. assign advisers to Vietnamese provincial governments to attempt to overcome shortcomings of the government at the local as well as the national level. The recommendation had little immediate impact.

20 March General Williams reported a difficult military situation in the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. The VC were overrunning Civil Guard posts and assassinating village officials. The guerrillas were also launching successful attacks on the ARVN which was unable to deal effectively with the guerrillas.Buzzanco, Robert Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 71

25 March An ARVN company on the Cái Nước River in the Mekong Delta was ambushed by VC. More than 50 ARVN soldiers were killed or wounded. A few days later in the same area more than 100 ARVN soldiers were killed in an ambush.

30 March In response to the request of Ambassador Durbrow, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff reversed MAAG policy and directed that MAAG assist the ARVN to develop an anti-guerrilla capability.

April 7 April Ambassador Durbrow requested permission from the State Department to threaten Diệm with actions to encourage him to reform his government. General Williams in Saigon and General Lansdale in Washington, strongly disagreed with Durbrow. Lansdale said "it would not be wisdom now, at a time of threat, to harass Diệm with ill-conceived political innovations.

14 April Increasing evidence was coming to light that the VC had infiltrated many South Vietnamese government agencies including the ARVN. The CIA reported that the ARVN had conducted five major operations in the Mekong Delta that year. In each case, 'there was every evidence that the Viet Cong knew in advance" about the date, plan, and route of the operation.

15 April Communist authorities in Hanoi continued to resist supporting an all-out insurgency in South Vietnam. National Assembly leader Tôn Đức Thắng said "the will and keen wish of our [North Vietnamese] people are work and peace. We want to preserve peace in order for our people to use their strength to build socialism." However, at the same meeting of the National Assembly southern leaders called for assistance and support from the north to support the VC who faced "an extremely unsafe situation."

17 April North Vietnam protested to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, about the large increase in the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam and accused the U.S. of preparing for "a new war."

18 April The ARVN reported that it had killed 931 VC and captured 1,300 from mid-January to mid-April, but reported that they had captured only 150 weapons. During the same period the ARVN lost more than 1,000 weapons which led General Williams to doubt "how a well-trained...soldier feels it necessary to throw his weapons away."

23 April The Army Times praised General William's MAAG group in Saigon as possibly "the finest there is."

27 April Eighteen prominent Vietnamese intellectuals, in the "Caravelle Group"," wrote to President Diệm to express their concerns about the direction the government was taking. In particular they protested against the agroville program which aimed to concentrate rural residents into protected settlements. The intellectuals said, "Tens of thousands of people are being mobilized for hardship and toil to leave their work and go far from their homes and fields, separated from their parents, wives and children, to take up a life in collectivity in order to construct beautiful but useless agro-villes which tire the people, lose their affection, increase their resentment and most of all give an additional opportunity for propaganda to the enemy."Zasloff, Joseph J. "Rural Resettlement in South Vietnam: The Agroville Program", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1962-1963), p. 337. Downloaded from JSTOR.

May 5 May The U.S. announced that the number of personnel of the MAAG would be increased from 327 to 685 by the end of 1960.

9 May President Eisenhower agreed that Diệm was becoming "arbitrary and blind" to the growing problems of his country and directed the State Department, CIA and the DOD to try to prevent the further deterioration of the situation."

20 May General Williams told Senator Mike Mansfield that MAAG could probably be reduced in size in 1961 by about 15 percent and reduced another 20 percent in 1962.

30 May Three U.S. Special Forces teams, a total of 46 soldiers, arrived in South Vietnam to train Vietnamese commando companies. These 4-week courses were the first formal training for counterinsurgency operations that the U.S. had provided to the ARVN.

June 2 June In an interview with Time-Life magazines General Williams said that the ARVN was "whipping" the VC.

3 June A senior South Vietnamese official told the CIA that the government would probably lose control of the Cà Mau Peninsula, the southernmost part of South Vietnam, to the VC.

6 June The U.S. Embassy submitted a critical analysis of the Agroville Program to the Department of State. The program, begun by President Diệm, aimed to concentrate rural villagers into defensible settlements. The Embassy stated that the Agroville program "is a complete reversal of tradition and the social and economic pattern of the people affected. It is apparent that all planning and decisions have been made without their participation and with little if any consideration of their wishes, interests or views."Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, p. 579

July The Nam Bo (Southern Vietnam) Executive Committee of the VC asked Hanoi for more and better weapons as the armed struggle against the Diệm government was still weak.

August In August, Diệm abandoned the unpopular Agroville program.

9 August Captain Kong Le and the 2nd Lao Paratroop battalion overthrew the government of Laos, thus initiating a struggle for power in Laos with both the United States and the Soviet Union taking sides and supporting their respective factions. For the remainder of 1960 and extending into 1961, Laos eclipsed Vietnam in the interest of the superpowers and the media.

23 August