The year 1961 saw a new American president, John F. Kennedy, attempt to cope with a deteriorating military and political situation in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong (VC) with assistance from North Vietnam made substantial gains in controlling much of the rural population of South Vietnam. Kennedy expanded military aid to the government of President Ngô Đình Diệm, increased the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam, and reduced the pressure that had been exerted on Diệm during the Eisenhower Administration to reform his government and broaden his political base.

The year was marked by attempts of the United States Army to respond to Kennedy's emphasis on developing a greater capability in counterinsurgency, The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) began providing counterinsurgency training to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and other security forces. The Kennedy Administration debated internally about introducing U.S. combat troops into South Vietnam, but Kennedy decided against ground soldiers. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began assisting Montagnard irregular forces, American pilots began flying combat missions to support South Vietnamese ground forces, and Kennedy authorized the use of herbicides (Agent Orange) to kill vegetation near roads threatened by the VC. By the end of the year, 3,205 American military personnel were in South Vietnam compared to 900 a year earlier.

North Vietnam continued to urge the VC to be cautious in South Vietnam and emphasized the importance of the political struggle against the governments of Diệm and the United States rather than the military struggle.

January 4 January United States Ambassador to South Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow forwarded a counterinsurgency plan for South Vietnam to the State Department in Washington. The plan provided for an increase in the size of the ARVN from 150,000 to 170,000 to be financed by the United States, an increase in the size of the Civil Guard from about 50,000 to 68,000 to be partially financed by the United States and a number of administrative and economic reforms to be accomplished by the Diệm government.

The counterinsurgency plan was a "tacit recognition that the American effort...to create an [South Vietnamese] army that could provide stability and internal security...had failed.

6 January Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would support Wars of national liberation around the world.

14 January Counterinsurgency expert and Diệm friend General Edward Lansdale returned to Washington after a 12-day visit to South Vietnam. Diệm had requested the Lansdale visit. Lansdale concluded that the U.S. should "recognize that Vietnam is in a critical condition and...treat it as a combat area of the cold war" Lansdale pushed for Durbrow to be replaced. He called for a major American effort to regain the initiative, including a team of advisers to work with Diệm to influence him to undertake reforms.Adamson, Michael R. "Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, Frederick Nolting, and the U.S. Commitment to Diem's Vietnam, 1957-1961", Pacific Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 2002), p. 243. Downloaded from JSTOR.

17 January - 30 September 1974 Operation Momentum was a secretive Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program to raise a guerilla army from the Hmong tribes in Laos.

19 January In a meeting between outgoing President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy, Eisenhower did not mention Vietnam as one of the major problems facing the U.S. Eisenhower described Laos as the "key to Southeast Asia."

20 January Kennedy was inaugurated as the 35th U.S. president and declared, "...we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to ensure the survival and the success of liberty."

21 January Lansdale wrote to Secretary of Defense designate Robert McNamara about his recent visit to South Vietnam. "It was a shock," said Lansdale, to find that the VC "had been able to infiltrate the most productive area of South Vietnam and gain control of nearly all of it except for narrow corridors protected by military actions."Lathan, Michael E. (2006), "Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the Failure of Nation Building in South Vietnam" Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 30

24 January The Politburo in North Vietnam assessed the situation of the VC in South Vietnam. In the Central Highlands the VC were making progress with good support from rural people and the ethnic minority Degar or Montagnards. In the Mekong Delta, however, the situation was less favorable due to the easy access to those areas by the South Vietnamese government. The revolutionary message in the cities was "narrow and weak" as rural cadres and urban dwellers mistrusted each other. The Politburo mandated that the VC concentrate on political struggle in the South and "avoid military adventurism." They were to prepare for war—but the time for protracted conflict had not yet arrived.

The Politburo also created the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) to coordinate military and political activity in South Vietnam. The U.S. would later devote much military effort to finding and destroying the Communist "Pentagon", but COSVN was always a mobile and widely dispersed organization and never a fixed place.Time "Just How Important are Those Caches?" 1 June 1970, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878283-1,00.html , accessed 1 Sep 2014

28 January Kennedy met with his national security team for the first time. He approved the counterinsurgency plan proposed by the U.S. Embassy and authorized the additional funding needed to implement it. The plan called for increasing the size of the ARVN from 150,000 to 170,000 men.

Lansdale gave Kennedy a pessimistic report on the situation in South Vietnam. Kennedy proposed that Lansdale be named Ambassador to South Vietnam, but the Department of State and CIA successfully opposed the nomination. Lansdale was "not a team player" and "too independent."

30 January Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) chief General Lionel C. McGarr said that Diệm had done "a remarkably fine job during his five years in office and negative statements about him were half truths and insinuations. U.S. policy should be to support Diệm, not reform his government."

To the contrary, Ambassador Durbrow recommended that Secretary of State Dean Rusk press Diệm to reform his government and threaten to withhold aid if he refused.

31 January - 6 June In the Battle of Ban Pa Dong the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Pathet Lao attacked Hmong forces of the Royal Lao Army forcing their dispersal.

February The military force of the VC, the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) was formed under the leadership of Tran Luong. Prior to this there had been no overall military command of the VC and the other groups united under the umbrella of the National Liberation Front.

13 February Durbrow urged on Diệm a number of specific reforms in accordance with the counterinsurgency plan which conditioned U.S. military and economic aid on reforms in Diệm's government. Contrary to Durbrow, MAAG chief McGarr expressed the view, supported by Lansdale and Rusk, that the Department of Defense (DOD) should oppose conditioning U.S. aid on reform.

March 1 March Rusk told the Embassy that Kennedy "ranks the defense of Vietnam among the highest priorities of U.S. foreign policy." He said that Kennedy was worried that the Diệm government would not survive the two years it would take to implement the reforms called for in the counterinsurgency plan.

From this date U.S. military personnel are eligible to be awarded the Vietnam Campaign Medal with 1960 Device for service in South Vietnam.

13 March - August 1961 Operation Millpond was the deployment of U.S. air assets to Thailand for use in Laos, however the intervention was cancelled and the units eventually withdrawn.

23 March A USAF C-47 flying from Vientiane to Saigon was shot down by Pathet Lao anti-aircraft gunners over the Plain of Jars in Laos. Six crewmen were killed and one was captured. The U.S. decided that henceforth all aircraft operating over Laos would bear Laotian identification markings.

28 March Kennedy was briefed by the intelligence agencies about the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. This was the first time that a National Intelligence Estimate expressed doubt about Diệm's ability to deal with the insurgency. Kennedy decided to send 100 additional military advisers to South Vietnam. Kennedy had pointed out the importance of counterinsurgency since the first days of his presidency. In a speech to Congress, he said the United States needed "a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrections, and subversion." He followed up his speech with proposals to expand the budget and military forces for unconventional war.

April 1 April The VC launched simultaneous attacks against two ARVN positions: one within Kien Hoa Province, and the other at Ben Cat north of Saigon. Both attacks were repulsed by ARVN troops, with the VC losing 100 men.

9 April Diệm was re-elected President of South Vietnam with nearly 80 percent of the votes. The VC attempted to disrupt the election in rural areas.

13 April Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, a British counterinsurgency expert who had helped the British defeat a communist insurgency in Malaya, visited South Vietnam at the invitation of Diệm and presented a report to Diệm recommending a Strategic Hamlet Program to defeat the VC. Thompson would be an important adviser to the South Vietnamese government throughout the war, but had only a limited influence on the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

mid April

An advance party of the USAF 6010th Tactical Group arrived at Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base at the request of the Thai government to establish an aircraft warning system. On 20 April six F-100 Super Sabres from the 510th Tactical Fighter Squadron based at Clark Air Base deployed to Don Muang in Operation Bell Tone. On 17 April USAF pilots began flying an RT-33 on reconnaissance missions over Laos under the code-name Operation Field Goal.

27 April The report of a high-level study group headed by Undersecretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric said that "South Vietnam is nearing the decisive phase of its battle for survival" and that the situation is "critical but not hopeless." It recommended that the United States show "our friends, the Vietnamese, and our foes, the Viet Cong, that come what may, the US intends to win this battle."Cable, Larry E. (1986), Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War, New York: New York University Press, p. 188

May 2 May A ceasefire was declared in Laos between the Pathet Lao and government troops. Kennedy had contemplated American military intervention in Laos, but the ceasefire damped down tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union supporting different Laotian factions.

4 May During a press conference, Rusk stated that the VC were estimated to number over 12,000, and that the United States would provide South Vietnam with "all possible help". However, he did not state if American troops would be dispatched to South Vietnam.

5 May At a press conference, a reporter asked Kennedy if he was considering the introduction of American combat troops into South Vietnam. Kennedy said he was concerned about the "barrage" faced by the government of South Vietnam from VC guerrillas and that the introduction of troops and other help was under consideration."May 5, 1961, Press Conference" http://www.historycentral.com/JFK/Press/5.5.61.html, accessed 4 Nov 2014

6 May