Max Ferdinand Scheler (; 22 August 1874 – 19 May 1928) was a German philosopher known for his work in phenomenology, ethics, and philosophical anthropology. Considered in his lifetime one of the most prominent German philosophers,Davis, Zachary and Anthony Steinbock, "Max Scheler", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/scheler/>. Scheler developed the philosophical method of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology.
After Scheler's death in 1928, Martin Heidegger affirmed, with Ortega y Gasset, that all philosophers of the century were indebted to Scheler and praised him as "the strongest philosophical force in modern Germany, nay, in contemporary Europe and in contemporary philosophy as such."Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, “In memoriam Max Scheler,” trans. Michael Heim (Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 50-52.
Biography
Childhood Max Scheler was born in Munich, Germany, on 22 August 1874, to a well-respected Orthodox Jewish family: his Catholic father had converted to Judaism in order to marry his mother. He had "a rather typical late nineteenth century upbringing in a Jewish household bent on assimilation and agnosticism."Graham McAleer, "Introduction to the Transaction edition", in Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, London: Routledge, 2017, p. lxiii. He converted to Catholic Christianity in 1901.
Student years Scheler began his university studies as a medical student at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; he then transferred to the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin where he abandoned medicine in favor of philosophy and sociology, studying under Wilhelm Dilthey, Theodor Lipps, Carl Stumpf and Georg Simmel. He moved to the University of Jena in 1896, where he studied under Rudolf Eucken, at that time a very popular philosopher who went on to win the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1908. (Eucken corresponded with William James, a noted proponent of philosophical pragmatism, and throughout his life, Scheler entertained a strong interest in pragmatism.) It was at the University of Jena that Scheler completed his doctorate and his habilitation and began his professional life as a teacher. His doctoral thesis, completed in 1897, was entitled Beiträge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien (Contribution to establishing the relationships between logical and ethical principles). In 1898, he made a trip to Heidelberg and met Max Weber, who also had a significant impact on his thought. He obtained his habilitation in 1899 with a thesis entitled Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode (The transcendental and the psychological method) directed by Eucken. He became a lecturer (Privatdozent) at the University of Jena in 1901.
Philosophical contributions
Love and the "phenomenological attitude" When the editors of Geisteswissenschaften invited Scheler (about 1913/14) to write on the then developing philosophical method of phenomenology, Scheler indicated that the phenomenological movement was not defined by universally accepted theses but by a "common bearing and attitude toward philosophical problems."Max Scheler, Selected Philosophical Essays, "Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition," trans. David Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 137. Scheler disagrees with Husserl that phenomenology is a method of strict phenomenological reduction, but rather "an attitude of spiritual seeing … something which otherwise remains hidden …." Calling phenomenology a method fails to take seriously the phenomenological domain of original experience: the givenness of phenomenological facts (essences or values as a priori) "before they have been fixed by logic," and prior to assuming a set of criteria or symbols, as is the case in the natural and human sciences as well as other (modern) philosophies which tailor their methods to those of the sciences.
Rather, that which is given in phenomenology "is given only in the seeing and experiencing act itself." The essences are never given to an 'outside' observer without direct contact with a specific domain of experience. Phenomenology is an engagement of phenomena, while simultaneously a waiting for its self-givenness; it is not a methodical procedure of observation as if its object is stationary. Thus, the particular attitude (Geisteshaltung, lit. "disposition of the spirit" or "spiritual posture") of the philosopher is crucial for the disclosure, or seeing, of phenomenological facts. This attitude is fundamentally a moral one, where the strength of philosophical inquiry rests upon the basis of love. Scheler describes the essence of philosophical thinking as "a love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles."Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, "The Essence of Philosophy and the Moral Preconditions of Philosophical Knowledge" trans. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 74.
The movement and act of love is important for philosophy for two reasons: (1) If philosophy, as Scheler describes it, hearkening back to the Platonic tradition, is a participation in a "primal essence of all essences" (Urwesen), it follows that for this participation to be achieved one must incorporate within oneself the content or essential characteristic of the primal essence.Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, "The Essence of Philosophy and the Moral Preconditions of Philosophical Knowledge" trans. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 75. For Scheler, such a primal essence is most characterized according to love, thus the way to achieve the most direct and intimate participation is precisely to share in the movement of love. It is important to mention, however, that this primal essence is not an objectifiable entity whose possible correlate is knowledge; thus, even if philosophy is always concerned with knowing, as Scheler would concur, nevertheless, reason itself is not the proper participative faculty by which the greatest level of knowing is achieved. Only when reason and logic have behind them the movement of love and the proper moral preconditions can one achieve philosophical knowledge.Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, "The Essence of Philosophy and the Moral Preconditions of Philosophical Knowledge" trans. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 77. Scheler criticizes Plato and Aristotle on precisely this point. He writes, "Since … their philosophy defined the primal essence as an objectifiable entity and therefore a possible correlate of knowledge, they had also to regard knowledge as the definitive, ultimate participation in reality which man might attain …. Accordingly they could not but see the highest and most perfect form of human being in the philosophos, the 'wise one'." On the Eternal in Man, 77. (2) Love is likewise important insofar as its essence is the condition for the possibility of the givenness of value-objects and especially the givenness of an object in terms of its highest possible value. Love is the movement which "brings about the continuous emergence of ever-higher value in the object--just as if it was streaming out from the object of its own accord, without any sort of exertion...on the part of the lover. ...true love opens our spiritual eyes to ever-higher values in the object loved."Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 57. Hatred, on the other hand, is the closing off of oneself or closing one's eyes to the world of values. It is in the latter context that value-inversions or devaluations become prevalent, and are sometimes solidified as proper in societies. Furthermore, by calling love a movement, Scheler hopes to dispel the interpretation that love and hate are only reactions to felt values rather than the very ground for the possibility of value-givenness (or value-concealment). Scheler writes, "Love and hate are acts in which the value-realm accessible to the feelings of a being...is either extended or narrowed."Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred Frings and Robert Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 261.
Material value-ethics Values and their corresponding disvalues are ranked according to their essential interconnections as follows:
Religiously relevant values (holy/unholy) Spiritual values (beauty/ugliness, knowledge/ignorance, right/wrong) Vital values (health/unhealthiness, strength/weakness) Sensible values (agreeable/disagreeable, comfort/discomfort)Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. M. Frings and R. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 104-110. Concerning the status of values of utility, Manfred Frings lists utility as higher in value than sensible values. (Cf. Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler, 29-30.) However, Scheler's list of the rank of values in the Formalism does not list values of utility as an independent self-value, but as "consecutive values" of sensible values (104).
In Ressentiment, Scheler writes, "It is true that enjoyment can and should be subordinated to higher values, such as vital values, spiritual values of culture, 'sacredness.' But subordinating it to utility is an absurdity, for this is a subordination of the end to the means. Cf. Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. Lewis Coser et al. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2003), 108.
Further essential interconnections apply with respect to a value's (disvalue's) existence or non-existence:
The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value. The existence of a negative value (disvalue) is itself a negative value. The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value. The non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value.Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. M. Frings and R. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 26.
And with respect to values of good and evil:
Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a positive value in the sphere of willing. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a negative value in the sphere of willing. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a higher value in the sphere of willing. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a lower value [at the expense of a higher one] in the sphere of willing.
Goodness, however, is not simply "attached" to an act of willing, but originates ultimately within the disposition (Gesinnung) or "basic moral tenor" of the acting person. Accordingly:
The criterion of 'good' consists in the agreement of a value intended, in the realization, with the value preferred, or in its disagreement with the value rejected. The criterion of 'evil' consists in the disagreement of a value intended, in the realization, with the value preferred, or in its agreement with the value rejected.
Man and History (1924) n 1924, Man and History (Mensch und Geschichte), Scheler gave some preliminary statements on the range and goal of philosophical anthropology.Cook, Sybol (2003) Race and racism in continental philosophy