Widerøe Flight 744, also known as the Namsos Accident (), was a scheduled flight of Widerøes Flyveselskap from Trondheim Airport, Værnes, via Namsos, to Rørvik Airport, Ryumsjøen, Norway. On 27 October 1993, the de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter serving the flight underwent a controlled flight into terrain during its approach to Namsos Airport, Høknesøra. The incident occurred at 19:16:48 and killed six of the nineteen people on board, including the crew of two. The aircraft crashed at Berg in Overhalla Municipality because it held too low an altitude.
Parallel investigations were carried out by Namdal Police District and the Accident Investigation Board for Civil Aviation (HSL). A conflict arose between the two as the latter in cooperation with the Norwegian Airline Pilots Association did not want a police investigation until after their report was finished. After two years in the courts, the police eventually gained access to evidence. The report found no technical problems with the aircraft. However, it found several pilot errors and laid a large responsibility on the airline for lack of proper organization and routines. No-one was charged after the accident, but it led to a major restructure of operations and procedures in Widerøe.
Accident Widerøe Flight 744 was a scheduled flight from Trondheim Airport, Værnes, to Namsos Airport, Høknesøra, operated with a de Havilland Canada DHC-6-300 Twin Otter. The aircraft had registration LN-BNM and serial number 408, and was delivered to Widerøe in 1974. The aircraft had flown 40,453 hours and had met all service requirements. The pilot in command, Jan Bjørstad, was 43 years old, had held a pilot's license since 1974 and had been employed in Widerøe since 1985. He had held a C certificate since 4 January 1993, and had been a pilot in command since 20 January. He had flown 4,835 hours in total and had landed 13 times at Namsos Airport in the 12 months prior to the accident. The first officer, Trond Hamre, was 34 years old, had training from the United States which had been converted to a C certificate in 1988. He had 6,354 hours of flight, of which 1,356 was in a Twin Otter. He had been a pilot in command for 3,441 hours prior to working for Widerøe, where he had been employed since 1990. He had landed 27 times at Namsos Airport in the 12 months preceding the accident.
The first officer was using a medication against back pains which was not permitted while flying. However, these had been prescribed by a physician who had training in aviation medicine. No traces of the substance were found in the pilot's body after the accident. The crew had started duty at Bodø Airport at 13:30 (Central European Time, UTC+1) and were to make a round trip to Trondheim Airport, with intermediate stops at Sandnessjøen Airport, Mosjøen Airport, Brønnøysund Airport and Rørvik Airport as Flight 711. On the way south, the crew canceled its stop at Mosjøen because of bad weather. The aircraft landed at Trondheim Airport at 17:52. The return flight was to operate as Flight 744 from Trondheim via Namsos to Rørvik, where the plane and crew were to stay overnight.
At Trondheim, 17 passengers boarded along with of cargo. The estimated flight time to Namsos was 35 minutes. The aircraft had a maximum take-off weight of , while the aircraft took off with . Prior to departure, the ground handling agent SAS Ground Handling had calculated the passenger load and center of gravity of the passengers. When correcting after observing the seating of the passengers, the pilot in command had made a calculation mistake in which he thought the passengers did not need to move around. In reality they would have to be rearranged to meet the limits of the distribution of weight. The aircraft left Trondheim Airport at 18:37 after which it ascended to cruising height at . At 18:53, the QNH (altimeter setting) was confirmed by Namsos to be 1017 hPa. This gave a height reading of , respectively, for the pilot in command and first officer. There was wind from 250°, with gusts up to .
The pilot in command then decided on the descent plan, involving an initial descent to , then to , before making a turn towards localizer 255. Then the aircraft should descend to and head towards Namsos Beacon inbound. After that, minimum height was set to . At 19:01, the aerodrome flight information service (AFIS) announced new weather data: the wind had changed to 260° at , with gusts up to . As the crew planned to use runway 26, this would give wind directly against the craft, so the crew decided to add some height to the descent. At 19:05, the first officer stated that the descent checklist was completed, and the pilot in command started the approach checklist. At this time, both height indicators showed . At 19:07, the aircraft was turned to 050°.
At 19:10, the aircraft reached the approach centerline and was confirmed by Namsos AFIS at 255°. By 19:14, the aircraft had descended to and at 19:15:13, it passed Namsos Beacon. At 19:15:30, the first officer confirmed visual contact with the field. At 19:16:35, the pilot in command stated a height of , confirmed by the first officer. Four seconds later, the pilot in command stated: "we should not descend any further". The aircraft then first hit some trees, located above mean sea level. At 19:16:48, the aircraft hit a hill from the airport, at Berg in Overhalla. An ELT signal was received by Namsos and a search and rescue operation was started immediately. Both pilots and four passengers were killed, while the remaining thirteen passengers were injured.
Cause The weather in the area had wind up towards , with clouds and heavy rain, and some reports of turbulence. The aircraft was not equipped with ground proximity warning system, nor was this required. There was no requirement for the aircraft to have a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder (CVR), but the airline had chosen to install the latter. Interviews with the surviving passengers showed that none of them perceived that there was any problems with the flight until the sudden impact. One of the passengers was a navigation professional and could see parts of the cockpit from his seat; he was thus able to confirm some of the navigational display readings. Interviews with locals indicated that the aircraft followed a normal path.
The report from the Accident Investigation Board for Civil Aviation characterized the accident as a controlled flight into terrain. The report pointed to several errors, both from the pilots, but also systematic failures from Widerøe and the Norwegian Aviation Authority. In particular, the report commented on the lack of callouts during descent. The base turn procedure was also criticized, because the crew failed to time it correctly, ending up from the airport. When the flying pilot canceled the instrument landing and changed to visual landing during darkness, he did not have sufficient visual references to the terrain. During this part of the approach, the aircraft's position was not controlled with any available navigational aids. This was in part due to both pilots focusing on extra-cockpit activity after the non-flying pilot had identified the necessary sight to the airport. The crew were not aware of their distance from the terrain; the small margins from were in part caused by pilots' unawareness. The cooperation between the crew did not follow the regulations of crew resource management and seemed to have stopped after visual identification of the airfield. The airline was criticized for not having standardized an operative concept that the crew fully respected and followed.
Aftermath
One man in his twenties was nearly unhurt in the accident and ran to the nearby farm of Berg. After saying "The aircraft has fallen down. You must call for help!", he ran back to the aircraft. The farm's three residents were the first to arrive at the site of the crash. The site was subject to sleet, rain and a southwestern wind, causing the victims to quickly freeze. Several of the wounded could not move because of fractures. The farmhouse became the base of operations for the emergency crews. The wounded were carried to the farm, where they received initial treatment before being transported to Namsos Hospital—the last arriving at 22:30. About seventy people participated in the emergency work.
The accident was the fifth fatal accident with a Twin Otter in Norway and the fourth fatal accident by Widerøe in eleven years. The company's executive management met in Bodø the evening of the accident before chief executive officer Bård Mikkelsen and others traveled to Namsos to investigate the crash site of the third fatal accident since Mikkelsen started in his position in 1988. Widerøe stopped all advertisements in the period after the accident. Widerøe announced in November that they would accelerate the replacement of their Twin Otter and de Havilland Canada Dash 7 aircraft with new de Havilland Canada Dash 8 aircraft, but denied that the accident influenced the decision and instead cited financial reasons. Widerøe's chief operating officer, Per-Helge Røbekk, announced in July 1994 that he would step down because of the strain of the three accidents.
By 1996 Widerøe had undertaken a series of operational amendments after recommendation from the commission, including a reorganization of the aircraft operation division, the quality assurance division and the company's reporting systems. Another concern was that pilots did not follow the company's routines, resulting in the company grounding about ten pilots who did not follow policy or made too many errors during observations. Some would receive additional training while others would be retired. The company would further invest 40 million Norwegian krone () to improve safety.
The aircraft was written off after the accident. Immediately after the accident, Widerøe paid a compensation of NOK 10,000 () to each of the survivors. The survivors and the deceased's next-of-kin claimed damages for several million NOK, including three people who each demanded over one million after becoming disabled. The demands were raised against the insurance company Norsk Flyforsikringspool. After mediation, the airline agreed to compensate the passengers with an additional NOK 15,000 in cash and NOK 30,000 worth of free travel with Widerøe.
Investigation Four inspectors from the HSL, two police investigators from the National Criminal Investigation Service and a technician from Widerøe arrived at the site at 13:30 on 28 October. By then flights had resumed at Namsos Airport. They secured an area of for the investigation, in which all the debris of the aircraft had landed and trees had been felled by the crashing aircraft. The instrument landing system at Namsos Airport was tested by the Norwegian Aviation Authority on 28 October and 4 November, without any faults being found.Accident Investigation Board Norway (1996): 19