Chovot HaLevavot (; ),Diana Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue: Philosophy and Mysticism in Rabbi Bahya inn Paquda's "Duties of the Heart", Introduction, text: "The Hidāya was written in Judeo-Arabic around 1080." known in English as The Duties of the Hearts, is the primary work of the Jewish scholar Bahya ibn Paquda, a rabbi believed to have lived in the taifa of Zaragoza in al-Andalus in the eleventh century. It was written in Judeo-Arabic CE and translated into Hebrew by Judah ben Saul ibn Tibbon during 1161–1180 as (). There was another contemporary translation by Joseph Kimhi, but its complete text did not endure time. In 1973, Yosef Qafih published his Hebrew translation from the original Judeo-Arabic, the latter appearing beside his Hebrew translation.
Organization and influences The Duties of the Heart is divided into ten sections termed "gates" (), which correspond to the ten fundamental principles that, according to ibn Paquda's view, constitute human spiritual life. The book makes numerous references to both Hebrew Biblical and Talmudic texts.
Contents and message The core principle of spirituality, according to ibn Paquda, is the acknowledgment of God as the singular creator and designer of all things. He sets "Sha'ar HaYihud" (Gate of the Divine Unity) as the introductory section of the work. Using the Jewish declaration of faith—": the is our God, the is One!"—as his thought's foundation, the author underscores that Jewish religious life primarily involves an emotional connection with God, emphasizing love and ownership over intellectual understanding.
Ibn Paquda posited that acceptance of belief should not be based solely on unexamined faith, as exemplified by children, or on the teachings of predecessors, which may characterize those who adhere blindly to tradition and lack independent thought. He argued that belief in God should not be interpreted in an anthropomorphic manner but based on conviction stemming from thorough knowledge and research. The Torah encourages the use of reason and knowledge as validation for the existence of God, suggesting that it is the responsibility of individuals to engage in speculative reasoning and knowledge in pursuit of true faith.
Instead of intending to give a compendium of metaphysics, ibn Paquda furnishes a system of religious philosophy with merit in this first "gate". Unfamiliar with Avicenna's works, which replaced Neoplatonic mysticism with clear Aristotelian thought, ibn Paquda, like many Arabic philosophers before him, bases his arguments upon a creation myth. He starts from the following three premises: A thing does not create itself which is known on account of that before it existed there is no it to create itself, whereas after it exists it already exists (see also Saadia, "Emunot," i. 2). The causes of things are necessarily limited in number and lead to the presumption of a first cause (i.e., God) that is necessarily self-existent, having neither beginning nor end, because everything that has an end must have a beginning. All composite beings have a beginning; on account of that, it must have a composer.
The world is arranged and furnished like a great house: the sky forms the ceiling, the earth forms the floor, and the stars form the lamps. Humankind is the proprietor, to whom the three kingdoms—the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral—are submitted for use, each composed of the four elements. (The celestial sphere, composed of a fifth element—quinta essentia, according to Aristotle, or fire, according to others—makes an exception.) The four elements are composed of matter and form, substance and accidental qualities, such as warmth and cold, state of motion and rest, and so forth. Consequently, by combining many forces, the universe must have a creative power as its cause. Furthermore, the existence of the world cannot be due to mere chance. Where there is purpose manifested, there must have been wisdom at work.
Unity of God Ibn Paquda then proceeds, following chiefly Saadia Gaon and the ("Kalamists"), to prove the unity of God (tawhid) by showing: All classes, causes, and principles of things lead back to one principal cause. The harmony of all things in nature, the interdependence of all creatures, the wondrous plan and wisdom displayed in the structure of the greatest and smallest of animal beings, from the elephant to the ant, all point to one great designer—the physico-theological argument of Aristotle. There is no reason for assuming more than one Creator since the world manifests but one plan and order everywhere. Without sufficient cause, no one would ascribe a letter in the same style and handwriting to more than one writer. The assumption of many creators would necessitate either a plurality of identical beings, which, having nothing to distinguish them, could not but be the same—that is, God—or of different beings which, having various qualities and lacking some qualities which others possess, can no longer be infinite and perfect, and therefore must themselves be created, not self-existent. Every plurality, being a combination of units, presupposes an original unity; hence, even those that assume a plurality of gods must logically admit the prior existence of a divine unity—a Neoplatonic argument borrowed by ibn Paquda from the Brethren of Purity. The Creator cannot share accidents and substances with the creatures. Assuming a plurality, an accident and not a substance would lower God, the Creator, to the level of creatures. The assumption of two creators would necessitate insufficiency of either of them or interference of one with the power of the other; and as the limitation deprives the Creator of his power, unity alone establishes divine omnipotence.
Ibn Paquda then endeavours to define God as absolute unity, distinguishing it from all other possible unities. Ibn Paquda's work, in this regard, prompted Yemeni 12th-century Jewish philosopher Natan'el al-Fayyumi to compile a work that counters some of the basic arguments espoused by ibn Paquda; al-Fayyumi argues for a more profound unity of God than that expressed.Natan'el al-Fayyumi, Sefer Gan HaSikhlim ("Garden of the Intellects"), ed. Yosef Qafih, 4th edition, Kiryat Ono 2016, Introduction (p. 10) [Hebrew].
Attributes of God
Adopting his Neoplatonic idea of God as the one who can be only felt by the longing Soul (not grasped by reason), ibn Paquda finds it superfluous to prove the incorporeality of God. The question ibn Paquda poses about God is, how can one know a being so far beyond our mental comprehension that we can not even define him? In answering this, ibn Paquda distinguishes between two kinds of attributes: essential attributes and those derived from activity.
Three attributes of God are essential, though one derives them from Creation: God's existence, since a non-existent being can not create things. God's unity. God's eternity since the last cause of all things is necessarily one and everlasting. Ibn Paquda holds that these three attributes are one and inseparable from the nature of God; in fact, they are only negative attributes: God cannot be non-existent, or a non-eternal, or a non-unit, or else he is not God.
The second class of attributes, derived from activity, is most frequently applied to God in the Hebrew Bible and equally applies to the creatures and the Creator. These anthropomorphisms, however, whether they speak of God as having human form or as displaying a human-like activity, are used in the Hebrew Bible only to impart knowledge of God to humans who would otherwise not comprehend him in homely language. At the same time, the thinker will gradually divest the Creator of every quality that renders him human-like or similar to any creature. The true essence of God is inaccessible to our understanding, and the Hebrew Bible offers the name of God as a substitute, making it the object of human reverence and the center of ancestral tradition.
Just because the wisest of humans learn to know only their inability to name God adequately, the appellation "God of the Fathers" will strike with peculiar force all people alike. All attempts to express in terms of praise all the qualities of God will necessarily fail. Man's inability to know God parallels his inability to understand his Soul, whose existence is manifested in every one of his acts. Just as each of the five senses has its natural limitations—the sound that is heard by the ear, for instance, not being perceptible to the eye—so human reason has limits regarding the comprehension of God. Insistence on knowing the sun beyond what is possible to the human eye causes blindness in man; so does the insistence on knowing Him who is unknowable, not only through the study of His work but through attempts to ascertain His essence, bewilder and confound the mind, to impair man's reason. To reflect on the greatness and goodness of God, as manifested throughout Creation, is consequently the highest duty of man; and to this is devoted the second section of the book, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Behinah" (Gate of Reflection).
His natural philosophy Ibn Paquda points out a sevenfold manifestation of creative wisdom in: The combination of the elements of which the earth forms the center, with water and air surrounding it, and fire placed above the perfection of man as the microcosm The physiology and intellectual faculties of man the order of the animal kingdom that of the plant kingdom the sciences, arts, and industries of man; and the divine revelation as well as the moral and social welfare of all the nations. Ibn Paquda held that man should think about his wondrous formation to recognize the wisdom of his Maker. Ibn Paquda then surveys the then-understood physiology and psychology of humanity, showing the wisdom displayed in the construction of each organ and of each faculty and disposition of the Soul, as well as in such contrasts as memory and forgetfulness—the latter being as necessary for human peace and enjoyment as the former for his intellectual progress. In nature, likewise, the consideration of the sublimity of the heavens and the motion of all things, the interchange of light and darkness, the variety of colour in the realm of Creation, the awe with which the sight of living man inspires the brute, the extraordinary fertility of each grain of corn in the soil, the ample supply of those elements that are essential to organic life, such as air and water, and the lesser frequency of those things that form the objects of industry and commerce in the shape of nourishment and clothing—all these and similar observations tend to fill man's Soul with gratitude and praise for the providential love and wisdom of the Creator.
Worship of God In this view, such understanding necessarily leads man to worship God, to which the third section, "Sha'ar Avodat Elohim" (Gate of Divine Worship), is devoted. Every benefit received by man, says ibn Paquda, will evoke his thankfulness in the same measure as intentions of doing good prompt it, though a portion of self-love be mingled with it, as is the case with what the parent does for his child, which is but part of himself, and upon which his hope for the future is built; still more so with what the master does for his slave, who is his property. Also, charity bestowed by the rich upon the poor is more or less prompted by commiseration, the sight of misfortune causing pain of which the act of charity relieves the giver; likewise, does all helpfulness originate in that feeling of fellowship, which is the consciousness of mutual need. However, God's benefits rest upon love without considering self. On the other hand, no creature is so dependent upon helpful love and mercy as humanity from the cradle to the grave. Pedagogical value of halakha