The paradox of tolerance is a philosophical concept suggesting that if a society extends tolerance to those who are intolerant, it risks enabling the eventual dominance of intolerance, thereby undermining the very principle of tolerance. This paradox was articulated by philosopher Karl Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), where he argued that a truly tolerant society must retain the right to deny tolerance to those who promote intolerance. Popper posited that if intolerant ideologies are allowed unchecked expression, they could exploit open society values to erode or destroy tolerance itself through authoritarian or oppressive practices.
In his own words:
The paradox has been widely discussed within ethics and political philosophy, with varying views on how tolerant societies should respond to intolerant forces. John Rawls, for instance, argued that a just society should generally tolerate the intolerant, reserving self-preserving actions for only when intolerance poses a concrete threat to liberty and stability. Other thinkers, such as Michael Walzer, have examined how minority groups, which may hold intolerant beliefs, are nevertheless beneficiaries of tolerance within pluralistic societies.
This paradox raises complex issues about the limits of freedom, especially concerning free speech and the protection of liberal democratic values. It has implications for contemporary debates on managing hate speech, political violence, political extremism, and social policies aimed at fostering inclusivity without compromising the integrity of democratic tolerance.
History
One of the earliest formulations of the "paradox of tolerance" is given in the notes of Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies in 1945. Popper raises the paradox in the chapter notes regarding "The Principle of Leadership", connecting the paradox to his refutation of Plato's defense of "benevolent despotism". In the main text, Popper addresses Plato's similar "paradox of freedom": Plato points out the contradiction inherent in unchecked freedom, as it implies the freedom to act to limit the freedom of others. Plato argues that true democracy inevitably leads to tyranny, and suggests that the rule of an enlightened "philosopher-king" (cf. Noocracy) is preferable to the tyranny of majority rule.
Popper rejects Plato's argument, in part because he argues that there are no readily available "enlightened philosopher-kings" prepared to adopt this role, and advocates for the institutions of liberal democracies as an alternative. In the corresponding chapter notes, Popper defines the paradox of tolerance and makes a similar argument. Of both tolerance and freedom, Popper argues for the necessity of limiting unchecked freedom and intolerance in order to prevent despotic rule rather than to embrace it.
There are earlier examples of the discourse on tolerance and its limits. In 1801, Thomas Jefferson addressed the notion of a tolerant society in his first inaugural speech as President of the United States. Concerning those who might destabilize the United States and its unity, Jefferson stated: "let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Reprint from:
Gaetano Mosca, a political theorist, is also often quoted: "[i]f tolerance is taken to the point where it tolerates the destruction of those same principles that made tolerance possible in the first place, it becomes intolerable."
Either way, philosopher John Rawls concludes differently in his 1971 A Theory of Justice, stating that a just society must tolerate the intolerant, for otherwise, the society would then itself be intolerant, and thus unjust. However, Rawls qualifies this assertion, conceding that under extraordinary circumstances, if constitutional safeguards do not suffice to ensure the security of the tolerant and the institutions of liberty, a tolerant society has a reasonable right to self-preservation to act against intolerance if it would limit the liberty of others under a just constitution. Rawls emphasizes that the liberties of the intolerant should be constrained only insofar as they demonstrably affect the liberties of others: "While an intolerant sect does not itself have title to complain of intolerance, its freedom should be restricted only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in danger."
In On Toleration (1997), Michael Walzer asked, "Should we tolerate the intolerant?" He claims that most minority religious groups who are the beneficiaries of tolerance are themselves intolerant, at least in some respects. In a tolerant regime, such (intolerant) people may learn to tolerate, or at least to behave "as if they possessed this virtue".
Repressive tolerance A distinct but related critique of tolerance was advanced by Herbert Marcuse in his 1965 essay "Repressive Tolerance", published in A Critique of Pure Tolerance. Marcuse argued that in an oppressive society, tolerance is often a tool of the powerful, allowing the status quo to persist unchallenged while suppressing genuine dissent. He contended that so-called "pure tolerance" masks the fact that the dominant class already controls public discourse, and that this tolerance can be "repressive" because it tolerates injustices under the guise of pluralism. Marcuse proposed a "liberating tolerance" which would be intolerant of right-wing movements and policies that sustain oppression, and would instead practice selective intolerance toward regressive ideas. While Marcuse's argument is not identical to Popper's paradox, it reinforces the notion that tolerance can be self-defeating if it protects forces that seek to destroy the very conditions of liberation.
Exact formulations Preston King describes tolerance as occurring when one objects to but voluntarily endures certain acts, ideas, organisations and identities. This involves two components:
An objection component, wherein an agent objects to an item. For instance, a follower of one faith may assert the beliefs of another faith are wrong. If this objection component is absent, the agent is not tolerant but simply indifferent. An acceptance component, which does not resolve the objection but instead offers positive reasons for overlooking it, e.g., social harmony. This acceptance must be voluntary — enduring an oppressive government, for example, is not an instance of tolerance because it is not voluntary, as the person enduring such a government has no choice but to accept this state of affairs.
Deciding whether to tolerate an item involves a balancing of reasons, for example when we weigh the reasons for rejecting an idea we find problematic against the benefit of accepting it in the name of social harmony, and it is in this balancing of reasons that the paradox of tolerance arises. Most formulations of tolerance assert that tolerance is a reciprocal act, and the intolerant need not be tolerated. This necessitates drawing a limit between the tolerant and intolerant in every implementation of tolerance, which suggests that any act of tolerance requires an act of intolerance.
Proposed solutions Philosopher Rainer Forst resolves the contradiction in philosophical terms by outlining tolerance as a social norm and distinguishing between two notions of "intolerance": the denial of tolerance as a social norm, and the rejection of this denial.
Other solutions to the paradox of intolerance frame it in more practical terms, a solution favored by philosophers such as Karl Popper. Popper underlines the importance of rational argument, drawing attention to the fact that many intolerant philosophies reject rational argument and thus prevent calls for tolerance from being received on equal terms:Popper also draws attention to the fact that intolerance is often asserted through the use of violence, drawing on a point re-iterated by philosophers such as John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls asserts that a society must tolerate the intolerant in order to be a just society, but qualifies this assertion by stating that exceptional circumstances may call for society to exercise its right to self-preservation against acts of intolerance that threaten the liberty and security of the tolerant. Such formulations address the inherent moral contradiction that arises from the assumption that the moral virtue of tolerance is at odds with the toleration of moral wrongs, which can be resolved by grounding toleration within limits defined by a higher moral order.
Another solution is to place tolerance in the context of social contract theory: to wit, tolerance should not be considered a virtue or moral principle, but rather an unspoken agreement within society to tolerate one another's differences as long as no harm to others arises from same. In this formulation, one being intolerant is violating the contract, and therefore is no longer protected by it against the rest of society. Approaches in a defensive democracy which ban intolerant or extremist behavior are often ineffective against a strategy of a façade, which does not meet the legal criteria for a ban.
Legal implementations in democratic states Several post-war European democracies have translated the paradox of tolerance into legal doctrines. The German Basic Law embodies the concept of "Streitbare Demokratie" (defensive democracy) which permits the restriction of fundamental rights of those who abuse them to fight the democratic order. Article 18 allows the forfeiture of rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association if they are used to combat the liberal democratic foundation. Furthermore, Article 21(2) empowers the Federal Constitutional Court to ban political parties that seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order. Similar constitutional provisions exist in many other European countries, often referred to as "militant democracy". This approach directly confronts the paradox by denying the tools of democracy to those who would use them to establish a dictatorship.
Tolerance and freedom of speech The paradox of tolerance is meaningful in the discussion of what, if any, boundaries are to be set on freedom of speech. In The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: The Struggle Against Kahanism in Israel (1994), Raphael Cohen-Almagor asserts that to afford freedom of speech to those who would use it to eliminate the very principle upon which that freedom relies is paradoxical. Michel Rosenfeld, in the Harvard Law Review in 1987, stated: "it seems contradictory to extend freedom of speech to extremists who ... if successful, ruthlessly suppress the speech of those with whom they disagree."
United States versus European approaches Rosenfeld contrasts the approach to hate speech between Western European democracies and the United States, pointing out that among Western European nations, extremely intolerant or fringe political materials (e.g., Holocaust denial) are characterized as inherently socially disruptive, and are subject to legal constraints on their circulation as such, while the US has ruled that such materials are protected by the principles of freedom of speech and press in the First Amendment to the US Constitution, and cannot be restricted except when incitement to violence or other illegal activities is made explicit.