The 1954 to 1959 phase of the Vietnam War was the era of the two nations. Coming after the First Indochina War, this period resulted in the military defeat of the French, a 1954 Geneva meeting that partitioned Vietnam into North and South, and the French withdrawal from Vietnam (see First Indochina War), leaving the Republic of Vietnam regime fighting a communist insurgency with USA aid. During this period, North Vietnam recovered from the wounds of war, rebuilt nationally, and accrued to prepare for the anticipated war. In South Vietnam, Ngô Đình Diệm consolidated power and encouraged anti-communism. This period was marked by U.S. support to South Vietnam before Gulf of Tonkin, as well as communist infrastructure-building.
The period ended with major negotiations, but formal discussions had started as early as 1950, with less formal meetings during and immediately after the Second World War. France gave limited autonomy in February 1950, Associated States of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) within the French Union., pp.6-7 The enabling agreement was signed among the five states on 23 December 1950, and was the prerequisite for direct U.S. aid to Indochina.
U.S. missions to Indochina U.S. aid to the non-Communist forces of the area had started in 1950, both with materiel and assistance to the French doing the primary training. It had to wait for U.S. aid that was administered by the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (MAAG-I), which had been established in October 1950 under the command of brigadier general (BG) Francis G. Brink, followed by major general (MG) T.J.H. Trapnell.
Starting in 1952, a more senior officer, lieutenant general (LTG) John W. O'Daniel, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), made three fact-finding trips to France, after Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, dying of cancer, had been replaced by General Raoul Salan on 1 April 1952, and after General Henri Eugène Navarre had succeeded General Salan in May of the following year. While he had no effect on French operations, he did build relationships. O'Daniel had been a division commander during the Korean War, so was not unknown since the French had forces in that war.Eckhardt, p. 8
Nevertheless, the relationships both with the French and Vietnamese changed with the French defeat and gradual withdrawal. French trainers did not abruptly withdraw in 1954 after the Geneva accords, and, indeed, there was a French desire to stay involved in training the South Vietnamese. Part of this may have been pride, and partially a desire to maintain French influence.
France's painful withdrawal may have led to its lack of cooperation in European defense arrangements that included the United States. France rejected European Defense Community on August 30, 1954, possibly to thank the Soviets for help at Geneva. But it is certain that many French were persuaded that the U.S. and the UK furnished inadequate support to France during the latter phases of the war, and at the Conference. And it is equally certain that American policy in the aftermath of Geneva widely alienated affection for the U.S. in France, and created that lack of confidence which the Suez crisis of summer, 1956, translated into outright distrust.
All the foregoing tension resolved to two central issues between the United States and France. The first was the question of how and by whom Vietnam's armed forces were to be trained. In addition, the Geneva accords limited the number of advisers that could be assigned, and specified that equipment could be replaced, but that no additional quantities be given. These agreements were ignored by all.
The second, and more far-reaching, was whether Ngô Đình Diệm was to remain at the head of Vietnam's government, or whether he was to be replaced by another nationalist leader more sympathetic to Bảo Đại and France. The first issue was resolved relatively quickly. General Collins struck an agreement with General Ely in Vietnam by which, despite serious misgivings in Paris, France agreed to turn over the training of the Vietnamese army to the U.S. and to withdraw French cadres.
US personnel dealing with the Government of Vietnam had difficulty in understanding the politics. The diplomats were not getting clear information in 1954 and early 1955, but the CIA station "had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on."
Also, after the end of French rule, Laos became independent, but with a struggle there among political factions, with neutralists heading the government and a strong Pathet Lao insurgency. Laos, also not to have had foreign military involvement according to the Geneva agreement, quickly had the beginnings of U.S. involvement as well as the continuing effects of North Vietnam sponsoring the Pathet Lao.
Communist strategy In a section titled "The Viet Minh Residue", the Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force or "Pentagon Papers" cited a study of twenty-three Viet Minh who, according to U.S. analysts, told consistent stories of being given stay-behind roles by the Viet Minh leadership going north. Some were given political roles, while others were told to await orders:
It is quite clear that even the activists were not instructed to organize units for guerrilla war, but rather to agitate politically for the promised Geneva elections, and the normalization of relations with the North. They drew much reassurance from the presence of the ICC, and up until mid-1956, most held on to the belief that the elections would take place. They were disappointed in two respects: not only were the promised elections not held, but the amnesty which had been assured by the Geneva Settlement was denied them, and they were hounded by the Anti-Communist campaign. After 1956, for the most part, they went "underground."
The Viet Minh went underground in 1956, but there was no major decision until 1959. A 1964 interrogation report also included in the Pentagon Papers determined:
The period from the Armistice of 1954 until 1958 was the darkest time for the VC in South Vietnam. The political agitation policy proposed by the Communist Party could not be carried out due to the arrest of a number of party members by RVN authorities. The people's agitation movement was minimized. However, the organizational system of the party from the highest to the lowest echelons survived, and since the party remained close to the people, its activities were not completely suppressed. In 1959 the party combined its political agitation with its military operations, and by the end of 1959 the combined operations were progressing smoothly.
Southern strategy After partition, the South worked on defining an identity. Its core had been Buddhist, but also had a number of influential groups, some religious and some simply taking power. Now, hundreds of thousands, close to a million, Northern refugees, mostly Catholic, joined the approximate 5 million population in the South.
Diệm, who was backed by the U.S. was an Annamite, from Central Vietnam (although not the Central Highlands) in the South upon taking power. In seeking political support from Southerners, he was not nearly as visible as Bảo Đại, nor was he seen as sympathetic to Buddhism or the smaller minorities. Diệm had to create a viable alternative to the Viet Minh in those areas where the French had provided security, both the cities and towns, but also in pockets of the rural areas inhabited by people of the regional or "folk" religions, such as the Cao Đài. The existing upper class might be wealthy, but the French had found it was neither popular nor internally cohesive., p. 15
While the Communists certainly had external assistance, they still considered themselves Vietnamese Communists. Clearly, pure geography would prevent them from being a Soviet satellite, and the long history of Chinese conquest and Sino-Vietnamese conflict would also limit the role of Great Powers in defining the DRV.
Vis-a-vis Great Powers and the South, however, the situation was quite different. John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower administration had a priority of stopping Communism everywhere, and saw South Vietnam as a key barrier to Communist expansion., pp.443-444 Diệm, despite his personal rigidity, distrust of those outside his immediate circle, and minority ethnicity and religion, was, most importantly to the U.S., neither pro-Communist nor pro-French. That he was a nationalist was secondary. The ideal of U.S. policy was for Diệm to form a representative government, oust Bảo Đại, and introduce democracy. French relations with the U.S., with France seen as an important anti-Communist resource in Europe, complicated the situation. The French ambassador to the U.S. warned John Foster Dulles that American support was being offered to Diệm without conditions that he form a stable and representative government. Guy le Chambre, French minister for the Associated States (i.e., Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) reportedly felt Diệm would lead the country into disaster, but, since the U.S. had so visibly supported him,
We would prefer to lose in Vietnam with the US than to win without them...we would rather support Diệm knowing he is to lose and thus keep Franco-US solidarity than to pick someone who could retain Vietnam for the free world if this meant breaking Franco-US solidarity.Patti, p. 444
Events
1954 Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael "Iron Mike" O'Daniel had been a U.S. observer in Indochina before Dien Bien Phu. Keyes Beech, a reporter for the Chicago Daily News, said that O'Daniel was optimistic of forming tank divisions and saving Dien Bien Phu, but was both sensitive to, and contemptuous of, the French. Beech quoted him as saying "I can understand why they are sensitive, but not what they are proud of."
In deference to French sensibilities and to ensure the seniority of the French Commander in Chief in Indochina, O'Daniel relinquished his third star and reverted to the rank of major general.
LTG O'Daniel was to have retired, but was convinced to come to Vietnam, in April 1954, as the third head of MAAG-I. Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), on three trips to Indochina. General O'Daniel's visits were made after General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny had been replaced by General Raoul Salan on 1 April 1952, and after General Henri-Eugene Navarre had succeeded General Salan in May of the following year. With him was then-Lieutenant Colonel William B. Rosson, who would later rise to high rank with the U.S. combat forces in Vietnam.
Agreements and arrivals in June Ngô Đình Diệm arrived in Saigon from France on 25 June 1954. and, with U.S. and French support, was named Premier of the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bảo Đại, who had just won French assent to "treaties of independence and association" on 4 June.
On June 15, O'Daniel had established an informal agreement for U.S. training of native forces, with General Paul Ély, who had replaced Navarre in the dual roles of French High Commissioner and commander of military forces. This arrangement, however, was not to be formalized until December.
The initial Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) team in Saigon was the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), headed by United States Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale, who arrived on 1 June 1954. The SMM was not part of the CIA Station in the Embassy. His diplomatic cover job was Assistant Air Attaché. The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare. Beech observed Lansdale to become an "adviser and confidant" of Diệm.Beech, p. I-5