United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court landmark case which held that both the United States and a Native American (Indian) tribe could prosecute an Indian for the same acts that constituted crimes in both jurisdictions. The court held that the United States and the tribe were separate sovereigns; therefore, separate tribal and federal prosecutions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.United States v. Lara, (hereinafter cited as Lara).
In the 1880s, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction in regard to several felony crimes. In 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in Duro v. Reina that an Indian tribe did not have the authority to try an Indian criminally who was not a member of that tribe. The following year, Congress passed a law that stated that Indian tribes, because of their inherent sovereignty, had the authority to try non-member Indians for crimes committed within the tribe's territorial jurisdiction.
The defendant, Billy Jo Lara, was charged for acts that were criminal offenses under both the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe's laws and the federal United States Code. Lara pleaded guilty to the tribal charges, but claimed double jeopardy against the federal charges. The Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy did not apply to Lara since "the successive prosecutions were brought by separate and distinct sovereign bodies"., (2008).
Background
History
The Sioux people consist of three main groups, the Lakota in the west, the Western Dakota in the center, and the Eastern Dakota in the east. In the east, the Santee was originally from the Minnesota area. The Chippewa or Ojibwe people were also from the same general area. The two tribes had been at war from at least 1736, (1990); , xvi, 15 (2011). and by 1750 the Chippewa had forced the Santee to the west into the prairie., at 37; , at xvi-xvii, 15. The war between the tribes continued until at least the 1850s., at 77. Only after 1862, when the Santee rose up against the whites and were subsequently removed to the Dakota Territory, did the fighting cease. In 1872, the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the Santee signed a treaty that resulted in their moving to the Spirit Lake Reservation.
Major Crimes Act
Originally, crimes committed by Indians against Indians were not subject to federal or state jurisdiction, but were handled by tribal law. In 1881, a Brulé Lakota named Crow Dog shot and killed another Indian, Spotted Tail, on the Great Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. Crow Dog was tried in federal court for murder, found guilty, and sentenced to hang. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court, and in Ex parte Crow DogEx parte Crow Dog, . the Supreme Court found that the federal government did not have jurisdiction to try the case. Crow Dog was ordered released, having made restitution under tribal law to Spotted Tail's family.
In response to Ex Parte Crow Dog, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act in 1885.Major Crimes Act of 1835, March 3, 1885, (codified as amended as et seq.). The Act provided that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over certain Indian-on-Indian crimes when the crimes were committed in "Indian country." et seq.; Allison M. Dussias, Heeding the Demands of Justice: Justice Blackmun's Indian Law Opinions (1995). In 1886, the Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama.United States v. Kagama, .
Duro v. Reina In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Duro v. ReinaDuro v. Reina, . that an Indian tribe did not have jurisdiction to try an Indian of another tribe.Duro, 495 U.S. at 694; , at 45. Tribal leaders urged Congress to fix the problem that the Duro decision created., at 47. In 1991, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights ActIndian Civil Rights Act of 1968, April 11, 1968, (codified as amended at ). (ICRA) to recognize that Indian tribes had inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians., at 47; , at 187. This legislation became known as the "Duro fix",Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation 47 (2004–2005) (hereinafter cited as Skibine, Dialectic; Elizabeth Burleson, Tribal, State, and Federal Cooperation to Achieve Good Governance, (2007); , (2010). and was based on tribal sovereignty rather than a federal delegation of power., (2005).
Arrest Billy Jo Lara was an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians located in northern North Dakota near the Canada–U.S. border.Skibine, Dialectic, at 51. The Spirit Lake Reservation is approximately south of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Lara had married a member of the Spirit Lake Santee tribe and had resided on the Spirit Lake Reservation with her and their children until he was banished from the reservation due to several serious misdemeanors., (2007); , at 153. Lara returned to the reservation, where he was arrested and charged with public intoxication. After the arrest, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officer Bryon Swan took Lara to the police station where Lara was informed of a Sioux order excluding him from the reservation. Lara then struck Swan, who as a BIA officer was considered both a tribal officer and a federal law enforcement officer.United States v. Lara, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20182 (D.N.D. 2001) aff'd, 294 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2002) on rehearing en banc, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) rev'd, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) and rev'd, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) rev'd, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
Procedural history Trial courts Following his arrest, the tribal court of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe charged Lara with assaulting the arresting officers, along with four other charges.MacKenzie T. Batzer, Trapped in a Tangled Web United States v. Lara: The Trouble with Tribes and the Sovereignty Debacle (2005); , (2009). Lara pleaded guilty to the tribal charge of "violence to a policeman". Soon after, federal prosecutors charged Lara with assault on a federal officer and a federal grand jury indicted him.Batzer, at 295. Lara moved to dismiss the charge based on double jeopardy and other constitutional grounds.Will Trachman, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction After U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, (2005); Skibine, Dialectic, at 51; , at 781. The Federal District Court, with Magistrate Judge Alice R. Senechal sitting by consent, denied the motions and Lara entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal. Senechal noted that two other trial courts in the circuit had already ruled that double jeopardy did not apply, that the ICRA only recognized the inherent sovereignty of the tribes and did not delegate prosecutorial power to the tribe. She further noted that another circuit court had ruled the same way.Lara, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20182 at *3. Lara also argued that the Petite doctrine, if applied, would preclude his prosecution, and that since it was never applied to federal prosecutions following convictions in tribal court, it discriminated against Indians.Lara, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20182 at *3-4. Senechal denied this motion, noting that Lara had shown no examples of other races not being prosecuted for like offenses.Lara, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20182 at *4.
Court of Appeals Lara appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the Tribal Court obtained its authority from the ICRA, an act of Congress, and that both the Tribal Court and the Federal Court derived their power from the same sovereign. A three-judge panel of the Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, holding that the tribe derived its power from its own retained sovereignty that was separate from the sovereignty of the United States.United States v. Lara, 294 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2002) on rehearing en banc, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) rev'd, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (hereinafter cited as Lara I). The Eighth Circuit's panel noted that in the Duro decision, the Supreme Court had observed that Congress could address the jurisdictional system, which Congress did.Lara I, 294 F.3d at 1006. When Congress amended the ICRA, they were addressing a federal common law issue, not a constitutional issue, and were within their authority to recognize the sovereignty of the tribes. The panel then affirmed the trial court on the Petite claim.Lara I, 294 F.3d at 1007. Judge Hansen dissented, believing that the tribe drew its authority to try Lara from the federal government.Lara I, 294 F.3d at 1007–10. (Hansen dissenting).
Lara then requested a rehearing en banc by the full court. The request was granted, and the full court reversed the decision of the three-judge panel, ordering that the federal indictment be dismissed on the grounds of double jeopardy.United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) rev'd, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (hereinafter cited as Lara II). While the court noted that the Fifth Amendment allowed prosecution by two separate sovereigns, such as the federal government and a state government, it found that an Indian tribe derived its authority to prosecute offenders from the ICRA, which was federal law. The court noted that in previous Supreme Court rulings, the determination of tribal jurisdiction was based on the tribal membership of the individual, not on his race as an Indian.Lara II, 324 F.3d at 637-38. This meant that double jeopardy attached.Lara II, 324 F.3d at 641. The United States then appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to hear the case.Lara, 541 U.S. at 193.
Supreme Court Arguments United States Solicitor General Ted Olson argued that Congress, in response to the Duro decision, acted to "recognize and affirm" the Indian tribe's inherent power to enforce its criminal laws against Indians of other tribes.Br. of United States 11-12, 17-18. Olson noted that the United States v. WheelerUnited States v. Wheeler, . decision clearly stated that a tribe could prosecute a tribal member for a crime and that the Federal government could subsequently prosecute for the same criminal acts without invoking double jeopardy if the actions of the accused violated Federal law.Br. of United States 15-16. Olson noted that the legislative history of the Duro fix bill clearly indicated that Congress intended to restore, not delegate, authority to prosecute non-member Indians by a tribe.Br. of United States 18-19. The government argued that the limitation in Duro was a statutory limitation of the tribe's sovereignty, not a constitutional limit, and that Congress had the authority to remove that limitation.Br. of United States 23-26. He noted that a tribe's sovereignty has allowed prosecution of non-member Indians for centuries, until it was limited by Congress.Br. of United States 31 n. 11. The United States was supported by amicus briefs filed by the State of Washington and seven other states, the State of Idaho and five other states, the National Congress of American Indians,Br. of Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians. and eighteen Indian tribes.
Lara