Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company (119 Cal.App.3d 757, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348) was a personal injury tort case decided in Orange County, California in February 1978 and affirmed by a California appellate court in May 1981. The lawsuit involved the safety of the design of the Ford Pinto automobile, manufactured by the Ford Motor Company. The jury awarded plaintiffs $127.8 million in damages, the largest ever in US product liability and personal injury cases. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company was one of the most widely publicized of the more than a hundred lawsuits brought against Ford in connection with rear-end accidents in the Pinto.: Ford customers filed 117 lawsuits, according to Peter Wyden in The Unknown Iacocca. The trial judge reduced the jury's punitive damages award to $3.5 million.

On appeal, Ford contested the trial court judgement on the basis of errors, and contested the punitive damages award on the grounds of an absence of malice and that the punitive damages award was not authorized by statute and was unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed the trial court.

Trial

A 1972 Pinto rear-end impact and fire in San Bernardino, California, resulted in the death of the driver Lilly Gray and severe injury to passenger Richard Grimshaw. Gray's family and Grimshaw filed separate suits against Ford, but the actions were consolidated for trial. The jury awarded $127.8 million in damages; $125 million in punitive damages, and $2,841,000 in compensatory damages to Grimshaw and $665,000 in compensatory damages to the Gray family. The jury award was the largest ever in US product liability and personal injury cases. The jury award was the largest against an automaker until a $150 million verdict in a 1996 case, Hardy vs. General Motors.

The judge reduced the jury's punitive damages award to $3.5 million, which he later said was "still larger than any other punitive damage award in the state by a factor of about five."

Reaction

University of California Los Angeles law professor Gary T. Schwartz, writing in 1990, said that the jury verdict was plausible, and that the "core of the Pinto story" was:

According to the Los Angeles Times in 2010, the award "signalled to the auto industry that it would be harshly sanctioned for ignoring known defects."

Appeal

In discussing the appellate court findings of fact Schwartz (1990) notes that the appellate court was under strict rules of interpretation. He states:

Appellate court findings of fact

The trial court's findings of fact regarding the accident, the design of the Pinto, Ford's crash testing, and Ford's cost benefit analysis were not contested on appeal, and were accepted by the appellate court "in accordance with established principles of appellate review.": Since sufficiency of the evidence is in issue only regarding the punitive damage award, we make no attempt to review the evidence bearing on all of the litigated issues. Subject to amplification when we deal with specific issues, we shall set out the basic facts pertinent to these appeals in accordance with established principles of appellate review

The accident

A 1972 Ford Pinto hatchback stalled on a freeway, erupting into flames when it was rear-ended by a Ford Galaxie proceeding in the same direction. Lilly Gray, the driver of the Pinto, suffered severe burns to her entire body and resulted in her death by congestive heart failure on her way to the hospital. 13-year-old Richard Grimshaw, a passenger, suffered severe, permanently disfiguring burns to his entire body. Grimshaw underwent numerous skin grafts and extensive surgeries, but still lost portions of the fingers on his left hand and his left ear in the accident. Doctors estimated that Grimshaw would require many more surgeries within the next 10 years.

The plaintiff's expert testified that the Pinto's gas tank was pushed forward upon impact and punctured by a flange or bolt on the differential housing. Fuel sprayed from the tank and entered the passenger compartment through the gaps between the rear wheel wells and the floor.

Design of the Pinto fuel system

In 1968, Ford began designing the subcompact car that would eventually become known as the Pinto.

The courts found that Lee Iacocca, at the time a vice president at Ford, conceived the Pinto "project and was its moving force" and said that "Ford's objective was to build a car at or below 2,000 pounds to sell for no more than $2,000.": In 1968, Ford began designing a new subcompact automobile which ultimately became the Pinto. Mr. Iacocca, then a Ford vice president, conceived the project and was its moving force. Ford's objective was to build a car at or below 2,000 pounds to sell for no more than $2,000. The courts described the Pinto as a "rush project," and said that while standard automotive industry practice was that "engineering studies precede the styling," in the case of the Pinto project "styling preceded engineering and dictated engineering design to a greater degree than usual.": Ordinarily marketing surveys and preliminary engineering studies precede the styling of a new automobile line. Pinto, however, was a rush project, so that styling preceded engineering and dictated engineering design to a greater degree than usual.

The court found that the Pinto's styling required the gas tank to be placed behind the rear axle, instead of over the rear axle as was "the preferred practice in Europe and Japan" and that the Pinto had "only 9 or 10 inches" () of "crush space," "far less than in any other American automobile or Ford overseas subcompact.": Among the engineering decisions dictated by styling was the placement of the fuel tank. It was then the preferred practice in Europe and Japan to locate the gas tank over the rear axle in subcompacts because a small vehicle has less "crush space" between the rear axle and the bumper than larger cars. The Pinto's styling, however, required the tank to be placed behind the rear axle leaving only 9 or 10 inches of "crush space"--far less than in any other American automobile or Ford overseas subcompact. The court found that the Pinto's bumper "was little more than a chrome strip, less substantial than the bumper of any other American car produced then or later.": In addition, the Pinto was designed so that its bumper was little more than a chrome strip, less substantial than the bumper of any other American car produced then or later. The court found that the Pinto's rear structure lacked reinforcement "found in all automobiles produced by Ford's overseas operations," rendering the Pinto "less crush resistant than other vehicles.": Pinto's rear structure also lacked reinforcing members known as "hat sections" (two longitudinal side members) and horizontal cross-members running between them such as were found in cars of larger unitized construction and in all automobiles produced by Ford's overseas operations. The absence of the reinforcing members rendered the Pinto less crush resistant than other vehicles. The court found that a flange and a line of bolts on the Pinto's differential housing "were sufficient to puncture a gas tank driven forward upon rear impact.": Finally, the differential housing selected for the Pinto had an exposed flange and a line of exposed bolt heads. These protrusions were sufficient to puncture a gas tank driven forward against the differential upon rear impact.

Crash tests

Ford tested two production models of the Pinto and prototypes, some of which "were true duplicates of the design car," "to determine, among other things, the integrity of the fuel system in rear-end accidents.": During the development of the Pinto, prototypes were built and tested. Some were "mechanical prototypes" which duplicated mechanical features of the design but not its appearance while others, referred [119 Cal. App. 3d 775] to as "engineering prototypes," were true duplicates of the design car. These prototypes as well as two production Pintos were crash tested by Ford to determine, among other things, the integrity of the fuel system in rear-end accidents. Proposed federal regulations required impacts "without significant fuel spillage," up to impacts by 1972 and by 1973.: Ford also conducted the tests to see if the Pinto as designed would meet a proposed federal regulation requiring all automobiles manufactured in 1972 to be able to withstand a 20-mile-per-hour fixed barrier impact without significant fuel spillage and all automobiles manufactured after January 1, 1973, to withstand a 30-mile-per-hour fixed barrier impact without significant fuel spillage.

Crash tests proved that the Pinto could not meet the proposed regulations. A collision from the rear "caused the fuel tank to be driven forward and to be punctured, causing fuel leakage." A collision of a production Pinto "caused the fuel neck to be torn from the gas tank and the tank to be punctured by a bolt head on the differential housing." In at least one test collision "spilled fuel entered the driver's compartment through gaps resulting from the separation of the seams joining the rear wheel wells to the floor pan," separations due in part to "the lack of reinforcement in the rear structure.": The crash tests revealed that the Pinto's fuel system as designed could not meet the 20-mile-per-hour proposed standard. Mechanical prototypes struck from the rear with a moving barrier at 21 miles per hour caused the fuel tank to be driven forward and to be punctured, causing fuel leakage in excess of the standard prescribed by the proposed regulation. A production Pinto crash tested at 21 miles per hour into a fixed barrier caused the fuel neck to be torn from the gas tank and the tank to be punctured by a bolt head on the differential housing. In at least one test, spilled fuel entered the driver's compartment through gaps resulting from the separation of the seams joining the rear wheel wells to the floor pan. The seam separation was occasioned by the lack of reinforcement in the rear structure and insufficient welds of the wheel wells to the floor pan.

Ford tested modified Pinto prototypes, which "proved safe at speeds at which the Pinto failed," including modifications to line the fuel tank with a rubber bladder, to locate the fuel tank above rather than behind the rear axle, and to add reinforcement.: Tests conducted by Ford on other vehicles, including modified or reinforced mechanical Pinto prototypes, proved safe at speeds at which the Pinto failed. Where rubber bladders had been installed in the tank, crash tests into fixed barriers at 21 miles per hour withstood leakage from punctures in the gas tank. Vehicles with fuel tanks installed above rather than behind the rear axle passed the fuel system integrity test at 31-miles-per-hour fixed barrier. A Pinto with two longitudinal hat sections added to firm up the rear structure passed a 20-mile-per-hour rear impact fixed barrier test with no fuel leakage.

The cost to remedy design deficiencies

The courts found that, while "the standard of care for engineers in the industry" after a failed safety test was to "redesign and retest," and although fixes were inexpensive, "Ford produced and sold the Pinto to the public without doing anything to remedy the defects.": When a prototype failed the fuel system integrity test, the standard of care for engineers in the industry was to redesign and retest it. The vulnerability of the production Pinto's fuel tank at speeds of 20 and 30-miles-per-hour fixed barrier tests could have been remedied by inexpensive "fixes," but Ford produced and sold the Pinto to the public without doing anything to remedy the defects.