Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that, in a union security agreement, unions are authorized by statute to collect from non-members only those fees and dues necessary to perform its duties as a collective bargaining representative.. The rights identified by the Court in Communications Workers of America v. Beck have since come to be known as "Beck rights", and defining what Beck rights are and how a union must fulfill its duties regarding them is an active area of modern United States labor law.Ford, Karen E.; Notestine, Kerry E.; and Hill, Richard N. Fundamentals of Employment Law. 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, 2000.
Background The union security agreement is a contractual agreement, usually part of a union collective bargaining agreement, in which an employer and a trade or labor union agree on the extent to which the union may compel employees to join the union, and/or whether the employer will collect dues, fees, and assessments on behalf of the union. Broadly speaking, there are three types of union security agreements: The closed shop, where only union members may be hired, and an employee must remain a union member in order to remain employed; The union shop, where the employer may hire union or non-union workers, but employees must join the union in order to remain employed; and The agency shop, where the employer may hire union or non-union workers, and employees need not join the union in order to remain employed. However, the non-union worker must pay a fee to cover collective bargaining costs.
In the United States, the fee paid by non-union members under the agency shop is known as the "agency fee". Where the agency shop is illegal, as is common in labor law governing American public sector unions, a "fair share provision" may be agreed to by the union and the employer. The provision requires non-union employees a pay "fair share fee" to cover the costs of the union's collective bargaining activities. The "fair share" is similar to the agency shop, but usually more restrictive as to what may be charged to the non-member.
In the United States, the concepts of closed shop, union shop, and agency shop have been established since at least the 1880s.Foner, Philip S. History of the Labor Movement in the United States. Vol. 5: The AFL in the Progressive Era, 1910–1915. New York: International Publishers, 1980. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the primary federal law governing labor relations in the United States, was enacted in 1935 and formally legalized the closed shop, union shop, or agency shop. In 1947, however, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, which amended the NLRA. Title I, Section 101 of the Taft-Hartley Act added a new Section 14 to the NLRA, part (b) of which banned the closed shop: Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.Title I, Sec. 101. An Act to Amend the National Labor Relations Act, to Provide Additional Facilities for the Mediation of Labor Disputes Affecting Commerce, to Equalize Legal Responsibilities of Labor Organizations and Employers, and for Other Purposes. (80 Pub.L. 101.) June 23, 1947. The Taft-Haftley Act did not, however, outlaw the union shop or agency shop (although it did place some procedural restrictions on their establishment and use).
During World War II, Congress also banned union political contributions to federal campaigns. The Smith-Connally Act, enacted in 1943, banned the use of union members' dues to make direct contributions to candidates for federal office but did not ban indirect expenditures which educated union members or the public about a candidate's voting record.La Raja, Raymond J. Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2008. The Taft-Hartley Act made that ban permanent.Goidel, Robert K.; Gross, Donald August; and Shields, Todd G. Money Matters: Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform in U.S. House Elections. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Smith, Bradley A. Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Taft-Hartley Act's ban on use of union dues for political purposes did not extend to internal communications directed at a union's own members.. Eleven years later, the Court refused to consider a federal district court's ruling that Taft-Hartley Act did not ban expenditure of union dues on communications with the public..
Disputes over the constitutional and statutory status of union shop and agency shop agreements began almost immediately after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. In the Supreme Court's first major ruling on the issue in Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956),. the Court held that the union security provisions of the Railway Labor Act were constitutional, but withheld judgment as to "the validity or enforceability of a union or closed shop agreement if other conditions of union membership are imposed or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First or the Fifth Amendment".Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. The ruling in Hanson appeared to call into serious question the viability of union shop agreements. Five years later, in Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), the Court held that the Railway Labor Act "denies the authority to a union, over the employee's objection, to spend his money for political causes which he opposes".. The high court also confronted the issue of remedy in Machinists v. Street, and outlined several options which unions and employers might adopt as well as rejecting remedies which the district court in the case had chosen.Street, 367 U.S. at 771–775. The Supreme Court returned to the union security issue three more times in 1963. In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), the Court held that agency fees equal to dues are not prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act.. Nonetheless, in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963), the Court questioned whether an agency fee set at a level equal to member dues was unfair because it set collective bargaining fees higher for non-members than for members."... if nonmember payments, equal to those of a member, go entirely for collective bargaining costs, the nonmember will pay more of these expenses than his pro rata share. The member will pay less and to that extent a portion of his fees and dues is available to pay institutional expenses. The union's budget is balanced. By paying a larger share of collective bargaining costs the nonmember subsidizes the union's institutional activities. . After reargument, however, the Court in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963), did not reach the issue again and instead decided the case on narrow procedural grounds (concluding that Florida's right-to-work law outlawed the union shop provision at issue)..Twomey, David. Labor and Employment Law: Text & Cases. 14th ed. Florence, Ky.: Cengage Learning, 2009. The Court further elaborated on the issue of remedies in Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963), allowing agency fee payers to opt out of all political expenditures rather than enunciate specific examples but refusing to allow them to act as a class.. The Supreme Court extended its constitutional and equity analysis to public employees in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), holding that, where public employee collective bargaining exists and agency fee clauses are clearly authorized by law, public employee agency fee mechanisms are also constitutional.Carelli, Richard. "Ruling Eases Non-Union Dues Payments". Associated Press. June 29, 1988..
Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had had occasion since 1945 to address the union shop and agency fee issues. Among its key cases was In re Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 NLRB 779, (1949).In re Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 NLRB 779, (1949), enf'd, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).Beck, 487 U.S. at 767. The Board held in Union Starch that unions were permitted to charge nonmembers agency fees that were nearly equal to full union dues so long as these agency fees were uniform in nature and no additional requirements were made in violation of NLRA Section 8(a)(3)(B) or §8(b)(2).In re Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 NLRB 779. A second important case,Beck, 487 U.S. at 754. Teamsters Local No. 959, 167 NLRB 1042 (1967), the Board concluded that special assessments or fees could not be part of the agency fee.Teamsters Local No. 959, 167 NLRB 1042 (1967). Reacting to the Supreme Court's ruling in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn,Detroit Mailers Union No. 40, 192 NLRB 951, 952 (1971). the Board held in Detroit Mailers Union No. 40, 192 NLRB 951 (1971) that certain fraternal activities may be included in the agency fee so long as they are not special assessments.Detroit Mailers Union No. 40, 192 NLRB 951 (1971). The Board also ruled repeatedly on a number of issues associated with agency fees. It held in several cases that the NLRA does not permit the collection of assessments through the agency fee.H. Muehlstein & Co., 118 NLRB 268 (1957); Convair (Pomona), 122 NLRB 1531 (1959), rev. (other grounds) NLRB v. Guided Missile Lodge 1254, 241 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1957); Tom's Monarch Laundry & Cleaning Co., 161 NLRB 740 (1966); International Longshoremen's Ass'n. Local 1180, 266 NLRB 954 (1982). The RLA, in contrast, does.Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 NLRB 1073 (1950), aff'd, The Board also held that when determining what an assessment is, facts (not labels) matter most.International Harvester Co., 95 NLRB 730 (951).Tool and Die Makers Lodge No. 113, IAM, 207 NLRB 795 (1973), en'fcd. NLRB v. Die & Tool Makers Lodge 113, 231 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1956); Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 110 NLRB 1925 (1954).