The Battle of Stoney Creek was fought on 6 June 1813, during the War of 1812 near what is now Stoney Creek, Ontario, Canada. British units made a night attack on the American encampment, and due in large part to the capture of the two senior officers of the American force and an overestimation of British strength by the Americans, the outcome of the battle was a victory for the British, and a turning point in the defence of Upper Canada.
Background On 27 May, the Americans had won the Battle of Fort George, forcing the British defenders of Fort George into a hasty retreat. The British commander, Brigadier General John Vincent, gathered in all his outposts along the Niagara River, disbanded the militia contingents in his force and retreated to Burlington Heights (at the west end of Burlington Bay), with about 1,600 men in total. The Americans under the overall leadership of General Henry Dearborn, who was elderly and ill, were slow to pursue. A brigade under Brigadier General William H. Winder first followed up Vincent, but Winder decided that Vincent's forces were too strong to engage, and halted at the Forty Mile Creek. Another brigade joined him, commanded by Brigadier General John Chandler, who was the senior, and took overall command. Their combined force, numbering 3,400, advanced to Stoney Creek, where they encamped on 5 June.H. F. Wood, The Many Battles of Stoney Creek, in Zaslow (ed), p. 57. The two generals set up their headquarters at the Gage Farm,Extract – Niles' Register – Vol 11, pp.116–119, 19 October 1816, Cruikshank, pp. 30–38. confident of intelligence about the defensive layout of Burlington Heights provided by Aaron Stevens, a former member of the British Indian Department. Stevens would be captured five months later at the Battle of Nanticoke Creek and would be one of eight traitors hanged after the Ancaster Bloody Assize.
Vincent sent his deputy assistant adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey, to reconnoitre the American position. Harvey recommended a night attack, reporting that "the enemy's guards were few and negligent; his line of encampment was long and broken; his artillery was feebly supported; several of his corps were placed too far to the rear to aid in repelling a blow which might be rapidly struck in front".Zaslow, p. 58. The American dispositions described by Harvey account for the statement in the post-battle report of the U.S. Assistant Adjutant-General that only 1,328 American troops were engaged against the British, out of Chandler's total force of 3,400. A British column of five companies from the 1/8th (King's) Regiment of Foot and the main body of the 49th Regiment of Foot, about 700 men in all, was formed. Out of the 700 soldiers fighting on the British side, 14 were Canadian locals and the remainder were British regulars.Strange Fatality: The Battle of Stoney Creek, 1813 by James Elliot, 2009 p. 260 Although Vincent accompanied the column, he placed Harvey in command.
At this point, the story of Billy Green comes to light. Green was a 19-year-old local resident who had witnessed the advance of the Americans from the top of the Niagara Escarpment earlier in the day. Green's brother-in-law, Isaac Corman, had been briefly captured by the Americans, but was released after he convinced them (truthfully) that he was the cousin of American general William Henry Harrison. In order to be able to pass through the American lines, he was given the challenge response password for the day – "Wil-Hen-Har" (an abbreviation of Harrison's name). He gave his word of honour that he would not divulge this to the British army. He then revealed the word to Green, who rode his brother-in-law's horse part way, and ran on foot the rest of the way to Burlington Heights. Here, he revealed the password to Lieutenant James FitzGibbon. He was provided with a sword and uniform and used his knowledge of the terrain to guide the British to the American position.Berton, pp. 72–80. Green was present at the battle.
However, it has been suggested that the password was actually obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Harvey. According to an account given after the war by Frederick Snider, a neighbour of the Gages, Harvey had executed a ruse on the first sentry to be accosted. Pretending to be the American officer of the day making grand rounds, he approached the sentry and when challenged, came close to the sentry's ear as if to whisper the countersign. But with bayonet secreted in hand, he grabbed the surprised sentry by the throat and threw him to the ground. With the bayonet at his throat, the sentry gave up the password.Elliot Strange Fatality, p. 115. This suggestion illustrates the incomplete research into several aspects of the Battle of Stoney Creek. Snider gave this account not long before his death in 1877Clark et al., footnotes 34, 35. and his source for it was the April 1871 issue of The Canadian Literary Journal.Lubell et al., footnote 44. Snider was confusing Harvey with Colonel Murray, June 1813 with December 1813 and Stoney Creek with Youngstown near Fort Niagara. Snider makes several obvious errors, such as "the British General St. Vincent was found some days after wandering about in the woods nearly dead of hunger." His name was Vincent and he did not wander about the woods for days. Snider's source for the provenance of the countersign should thus be considered to be unreliable.
Battle
The British left their camp at Burlington Heights at 11:30 p.m. on 5 June. While Vincent was the senior officer present, the troops were placed under the conduct and direction of Lieutenant Colonel Harvey, who led them silently toward Stoney Creek. They had removed the flints from their muskets to ensure that there were no accidental discharges and dared not utter even a whisper. A sentry post of American soldiers was surprised and either captured or killed by bayonet.Letter, Lt. James FitzGibbon to Rev. James Somerville – 7 June 1813, Cruikshank, p. 12. Green is said to have bayoneted one of the American sentries personally, although this is not mentioned in any official British record. The British continued advancing toward the American campfires in silence. However at the repeated urging of Second Lieutenant Ephraim Shaler, the U.S. 25th Regiment which had earlier been camped there had been moved from their previous exposed position, leaving behind only the cooks who were preparing the troops' meal for the next day.Elliot, p. 119. Shaler had returned to the original position when he heard a sentry cry out as he was being tomahawked after being shot with an arrow from one of John Norton's small band of First Nations warriors.
Around the same time, a group of Vincent's staff officers who had come forward to watch the action let out a cheer. Their men took up the cheer, relieving their tension but depriving them of the element of surprise that was their primary advantage given the lopsided number of troops they faced. Instead of striking fear in their adversaries, the yells served to direct their attention to where the British were, helping the rousing troops to focus their attention and musket fire and making it nearly impossible for officers' orders to be heard above the din. Any hope of catching the Americans unaware and bayoneting them in their sleep was now lost and the British fixed their flints to their muskets and attacked. Lieutenant James Fitzgibbon and three sergeants of the Light Company of the 49th were able to keep their men from taking up the shout "until a late stage of the affair, when firing on our side became general".Stanley, p. 18. Gradually, the American troops began to recover from the initial surprise, recover their poise and start firing at the attacking British, at times from as far away as . The American artillery also entered the fray after having previously been rendered useless due to the dampness settling into the powder.Elliot, p. 123.
Holding the high ground, the Americans were able to pour both musket and artillery fire into the exposed British line and the line began to lose cohesion. For ammunition, the U.S. 25th Infantry was firing a variant of "buck and ball", in this instance firing 12 buckshot balls instead of the usual .65 calibre ball and 3 buckshot. This effectively turned their muskets into shotguns.Elliot, p. 121. Despite repeated charges by the British, the centre of the American line was holding and with the withering fire that the British line was sustaining, it was only a matter of time before they would have to retire.
A series of events coincided to change the course of the battle. General Winder ordered the U.S. 5th Infantry to protect the left flank. In doing so, he created a gap in the American line while at the same time leaving the artillery unsupported by infantry. Simultaneously, the other American commander, John Chandler, hearing musket shots from the far right of the American line and having already sent his staff officers off with other orders, rode out to investigate personally. But his horse fell (or was shot – Chandler gave both versions at different times) and he was knocked out in the fall.Elliot, p. 134.
Major Charles Plenderleath, commanding the British 49th Regiment, was able to ascertain the position of the American artillery when two field guns fired in quick succession (). Realising the importance of possession of the guns, he gathered troops of Fitzgibbon's and other nearby companies to charge the guns before they could reload. First to volunteer for what could be a suicidal attack were 23-year-old sergeant Alexander Fraser and his 21-year-old brother Peter, a corporal in Fitzgibbon's company,Elliot, p. 136. with 20 to 30 others. With bayonets fixed, Plenderleath led the charge up Gage's Lane, volunteers following at a run, all fearing that the next discharge from the cannons might annihilate them. However, the U.S. 2nd Artillery under the command of Captain Nathaniel Towson at that moment responded to an order to cease firing, unaware of the British troops advancing on their position. The gunners were without arms of their own. The British charged the field guns, and when they were within a few yards of the gun emplacement, the men began yelling "Come on, Brant". They set upon the helpless gunners, bayoneting man and horse, quickly overrunning and capturing the positionHitsman, p. 150. before continuing on to engage the U.S. 23rd Infantry which got off one round before the momentum of the 49th scattered them.Elliot, p. 137. The remaining British forces followed soon after.Letter, Brigadier General Vincent to Sir George Prevost – 6 June 1813, Cruikshank, p. 8.