Ukraine, formerly a republic of the Soviet Union (USSR) from 1922 to 1991, once hosted Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems on its territory. The former Soviet Union had its nuclear program expanded to only four of its republics: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. After its dissolution in 1991, Ukraine inherited about 130 UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with six warheads each, 46 RT-23 Molodets ICBMs with ten warheads apiece, as well as 33 heavy bombers, totaling approximately 1,700 nuclear warheads that remained on Ukrainian territory. Thus Ukraine became the third largest nuclear power in the world (possessing 300 more nuclear warheads than Kazakhstan, 6.5 times less than the United States, and ten times less than Russia) and held about one third of the former Soviet nuclear weapons, delivery system, and significant knowledge of its design and production. While all these weapons were located on Ukrainian territory, initially they were not under Ukraine's control.
In July 1993, the Ukrainian parliament proclaimed ownership of the former Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.Security Cooperation Between Russia and Ukraine in the Post-Soviet EraAmerican-Ukrainian nuclear relationsSecurity, Economics and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Morality: Keeping or Surrendering the Bomb (New Security Challenges) Testimony from the same year by Bruce G. Blair cited the Russian Ministry of Defence’s Chief Directorate for Nuclear Munitions, Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, who reportedly stated that Russia had de facto lost control over the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine. The same report noted that crews operating strategic nuclear bombers, along with subunits responsible for nuclear munitions, had been incorporated into the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while Moscow still retained operational control over the strategic missile forces at that time. By late 1993, some estimates suggested that Ukraine could break the nuclear release codes between December 1993 and March 1994, as there were no fundamental obstacles preventing it from doing so.Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking U.S. Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation
In 1994, under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine agreed to transfer these weapons to Russia for dismantlement and became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in exchange for economic compensation and assurances from Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom to respect Ukrainian independence and sovereignty within its existing borders. In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, a violation of its assurances under the Budapest Memorandum that was compounded by Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.
Nuclear arsenal after dissolution of the Soviet Union
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, about one-third of the Soviet nuclear arsenal was deployed on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine also had significant capabilities for nuclear weapon design and production. 130 UR-100N/RS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with six warheads each, 46 RT-23 Molodets ICBMs with ten warheads apiece, as well as 33 heavy bombers, totalling approximately 1,700 warheads remained on Ukrainian territory, along with 2,883 tactical nuclear weapons.
Forty of the underground launch silos for the RT-23 ICBMs had been installed around the city of Pervomaisk in the Mykolaiv Oblast, the home of the 46th Rocket Division of the 43rd Rocket Army of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. The individual silos were scattered across the general area and often located on fields, surrounded by a fence and guarded. A group of nine or ten silos was connected to a common, underground Unified Command Post staffed by several military officers.
As a republic in the Soviet Union, Ukraine was the base for the following nuclear force units: 43rd Rocket Army 19th Rocket Division (Rakovo, Khmelnytskyi Oblast) (see :uk:19-та ракетна дивізія (СРСР)) 37th Guards Rocket Division (Lutsk, Volyn Oblast) 43rd Guards Rocket Division (Romny, Sumy Oblast) 46th Rocket Division (Pervomaisk, Nikolayev Oblast)Michael Holm, 46th Missile Division 50th Rocket Division (Bilokorovychi, Zhitomir Oblast)
All military personnel except those in the Black Sea Fleet had taken loyalty oaths to Ukraine.
Budapest Memorandum
The Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine in 1990 stated that Ukraine would not accept, acquire, or produce nuclear weapons, and its government declared on 24 October 1991 that Ukraine would be a non-nuclear-weapon state.Kobasa, Askold I. (December 1995). A Strategic-Military Analysis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Naval Postgraduate School. p. 23. Retrieved 25 January 2024.
On December 5, 1994, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States signed a memorandum to provide Ukraine with security assurances in connection with its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The four parties signed the memorandum, containing a preamble and six paragraphs. The memorandum reads as follows:
France and China's commitments France and China also provided Ukraine with assurances similar to the Budapest Memorandum, but with some significant differences. For instance, France's pledge does not contain the promises laid out in paragraphs 4 and 6 above, to refer any aggression to the UN Security Council, nor to consult in the event of a question regarding the commitments.
China's pledge takes a different form entirely, dating from December 4, and reading as follows: The Chinese Government welcomes the decision of Ukraine to destroy all nuclear weapons on its territory, and commends the approval by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on November 16 of Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. China fully understands the desire of Ukraine for security assurance. The Chinese Government has always maintained that under no circumstances will China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. This principled position also applies to Ukraine. The Chinese Government urges all other nuclear-weapon States to undertake the same commitment, so as to enhance the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States, including Ukraine. The Chinese Government has constantly opposed the practice of exerting political, economic, or other pressure in international relations. It maintains that disputes and differences should be settled peacefully through consultations on an equal footing. Abiding by the spirit of the Sino-Ukrainian joint communiqué of January 4, 1992 on the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Sino-Ukrainian joint communiqué of October 31, 1992 and the Sino-Ukrainian joint statement of September 6, 1994, China recognizes and respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and stands ready to further develop friendly and cooperative Sino-Ukraine relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
Thus, China's pledge, similar to France's, does not pledge to involve UN or consultative mechanisms in case of crisis. However, it does pledge to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Removal of nuclear weapons After the Budapest Memorandum was signed, the United States used its Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programme to provide financial assistance over $300 million (equivalent to $ million in ), and technical assistance in decommissioning the nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which took to 2008 to fully complete. The U.S. also doubled other economic aid to Ukraine to $310 million (equivalent to $ million in ) for 1994.
According to a South Korean declassified document, in 1994, Russia offered to repay a debt by converting 50 tonnes of highly enriched uranium removed from Ukrainian nuclear warheads into 1,500 tonnes of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for reactor fuel and supplying the ROK with 150 tonnes of LEU annually for 10 years.
Russian invasion and nuclear weapons
Russian forces withdrew nuclear weapons and delivery systems from the Crimean peninsula after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in the mid-1990s, with the exception of some nuclear-capable ships and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in accordance with agreements with Ukraine. After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, which the UN General Assembly rejected as invalid,General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region, GA/11493 27 March 2014. the Government of Ukraine in 2014 reaffirmed its 1994 decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state.Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine, March 25, 2014. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation again re-deployed nuclear-capable weapons to the peninsula, including S-300 antiaircraft missiles, and later Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers and Iskander-M ballistic missiles. In 2020, a Ukrainian NSDC official stated that Russia had done work on Soviet nuclear-weapons storage facility Feodosiia-13 in Krasnokamianka (Kyzyltash), and had added new tunnels to a nuclear submarine base at Balaklava.
Soon after the annexation of Crimea, Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, told USA Today that Ukraine may have to arm themselves with their own nuclear weapons if the United States and other world leaders do not hold up their end of the agreement. He said, "We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement. Now, there's a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake." He also said that, "In the future, no matter how the situation is resolved in Crimea, we need a much stronger Ukraine. If you have nuclear weapons, people don't invade you." On December 13, 2014 Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko stated that he did not want Ukraine to become a nuclear power again.Ukraine has no ambitions to become nuclear power again – Poroshenko, Interfax-Ukraine (December 13, 2014)
During the subsequent invasion of Ukraine Russia started using their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a potential military intervention by other countries. In July 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia has the right to defend Crimea using nuclear weapons, and in March 2015 president Putin said that during the invasion of Crimea he had been prepared to put nuclear forces on alert. Around the same time, a Russian foreign ministry official said that Russia had the right to deploy nuclear arms to the peninsula, which is internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory.
Debates about Ukrainian re-nuclearization
In 1993, international relations theorist and University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer predicted that a Ukraine without a nuclear deterrent was likely to be subjected to aggression by Russia.The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent retrieved 23/01/2022
However, Mariana Budjeryn, a Ukrainian scholar at Harvard argued that the denuclearization of Ukraine was not a mistake and that it was unclear whether Ukraine would be better off as a nuclear state. She argued that the deterrent value of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine was questionable. While Ukraine had "administrative control" of the weapons delivery systems, it would have needed 12 to 18 months to establish full operational control, and Ukraine would have faced sanctions from the West and likely retaliation from Russia. Moreover, Ukraine had no nuclear weapons program and would have struggled to replace nuclear weapons once their service life expired. Instead, by agreeing to give up the nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensations and the security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum.