During the afternoon rush hour of June 22, 2009, a subway train wreck occurred between two southbound Red Line Washington Metro trains in Northeast Washington, D.C., United States. A moving train collided with a train stopped ahead of it; the train operator along with eight passengers died, and 80 people were injured, making it the deadliest crash in the history of the Washington Metro.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation found that after a June 17 replacement of a track circuit component at what became the crash site, the track circuit had been suffering from parasitic oscillations that left it unable to reliably report when that stretch of track was occupied by a train. The struck train came to a stop because of traffic ahead. Because the entire train was within the faulty circuit, it became invisible to the Automatic Train Control (ATC) system. The train behind it was therefore commanded to proceed at . The operator of the striking train applied the emergency brake after the stopped train came into full view, but there was not enough time to prevent the collision, which occurred at approximately .
Collision
Rolling stock involved
Train 112 (the moving train) was made up of cars 1079, 1078, 1071, 1070, 1130 and 1131—all from the 1000-series. Train 214 (the stationary train) was made up of cars 3036, 3037, 3257, 3256, 5067 and 5066, from the Breda 3000-series and the CAF 5000-series respectively. The cars are equipped with on-board systems called Automatic Train Operation and Automatic Train Control, which allow autonomous operation with little human intervention.
Accident Sequence On June 17, 2009, technicians ran maintenance on track circuits between Fort Totten station and Takoma station, as part of a system-wide track circuit replacement program. This includes replacing an impedance bond for circuit B2-304 near Fort Totten station. During the installation, the Operations Control Center reported that circuit B2-304 began “bobbing” (intermittently losing detection) due to electrical issues, where the circuit would keep showing if the tracks are occupied or unoccupied, even if a train was not present on the circuit. The Operations Control Center began a work order for circuit B2-304, but the repairs were not acted on, despite maintenance crews visiting the sections prior. Between June 17 and June 22, trains passing through the section would experience a loss of speed commands in the controls, but would resume once they reached the next circuit, B2-303. Due to this, operators did not report the issue.National Transportation Safety Board (2010). Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains Near Fort Totten Station, Washington, D.C., June 22, 2009 — Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-10/02. NTSB. Retrieved 2026-02-08, from https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/rar1002.pdf
On June 22, 2009, Train 214 began its rush hour run from Silver Spring station, heading to Grosvenor–Strathmore station, operating in manual mode. Following behind Train 214 was Train 112, also beginning its rush hour run from Silver Spring station, heading to Shady Grove station, operating in automatic mode. Due to an earlier train malfunction, trains were congested outside of Fort Totten station. After Train 214 left Takoma station, it was following Train 110 closely, with Train 214 slowing down multiple times.
At approximately 4:55 pm EDT (20:55 UTC), Train 112 left Takoma station. One minute later, Train 112 received a 0 mph speed limit due to the presence of Train 214. At the same time, Train 214 entered the faulty B2-304 track circuit, receiving a loss of speed commands. The operator of Train 214 manually slowed his train down and stopped the train completely. However, Train 214 stopped on top of the faulty B2-304 track circuit, making the Automatic Train Control computer indicate the tracks were cleared ahead, and failing to detect Train 214. As a result, at 4:57 pm EDT, Train 112 was given a 55 mph speed limit and the train began moving. At 4:58 pm EDT (20:58 UTC), at 53 mph, Train 112 had a clear view of Train 214 ahead. Train 112's operator Jeanice McMillan applied the emergency brakes, managing to slow Train 112 to 44 mph. However the collision was already unavoidable.
Train 112 collided with Train 214 at 44 mph. The first railcar of Train 112 (Car 1079), overrode and telescoped on top of car 5066 from Train 214, causing severe structural damage on Car 1079. While stopped outside Fort Totten, the operator of Train 214 felt a "strong push", hearing noise at the end of his train, and lost power in his car. The operator looked outside his cab window and noticed a train "kind of like on top” of his train, thinking a CSX freight train derailed. Train 214's operator went to investigate, carrying a portable radio due to the operator thinking the public address system was inoperable due to the loss of power. As the operator walked through the trains, he noticed many passengers knocked out their seats from the impact, and tried to contact the Operations Control Center using the portable radio and his personal cell phone, but the attempt was unsuccessful. Later, it was determined that the Operations Control Center personnel could hear the operator, but the operator was unable to hear their responses.
After the operator got to the fourth car, he encountered smoke, and told passengers to move forward on the train. Then the operator applied the emergency release lever in the car to open one of the train doors, from which he jumped to the ground to investigate. After realizing a collision had occurred, the operator successfully established communications with Metro Control and reported the collision, also asking for both electrical power on the third rail to be cut, and requested emergency medical assistance to the injured passengers. The operator then reboarded the train to help injured and trapped passengers.
Following the collision, a Red Line controller at the Operations Control Center showed the third rail on the inbound track de-energized between Takoma and Fort Totten stations on his display screen. Also, a graphical representation of Train 112 was showing to be occupying the Control Center's display screen. The controller attempted to contact Train 112, but received no response. The controller did hear Train 214's operator reporting a collision.
An employee from Metrorail's car equipment maintenance was at Fort Totten station at the time of the accident. The controller from the Operations Control Center sent the employee to the accident area to verify any information that the OCC was receiving, and ordered all trains in the area to hold at stations. At 5:10 pm EDT, the Operations Control Center cut power on the adjacent track following the collision.
Response
At 5:20 pm, rescuers first entered car 1079, the lead car of train 112. This car had telescoped over the rear car of the stationary train, trapping many passengers who required rescue by emergency workers using ladders for access. Survivors described the crash as "like... hit[ting] a concrete wall," with air clouded by smoke and debris, and panic among passengers when car doors did not immediately open.Metro crash 'like we hit a concrete wall,' passenger says. CNN. June 23, 2009. Retrieved June 23, 2009.
Dennis Oglesby, a United States Army soldier, and Martin Griffith, an Army contractor and former Army soldier, who were in the lead train and were uninjured in the collision, helped passengers evacuate from their train, most of whom appeared to have minor injuries. Oglesby and Griffith then noticed that six to eight people from the other train had been ejected by the force of the collision and were more seriously injured. One person from the overtaking train had been thrown onto the roof of the stationary train and had suffered a severe head wound. Oglesby and Martin gave first aid to the more seriously injured victims until help arrived, and informed responding emergency personnel that the rails were still powered and needed to be shut down.Cox, Matthew, "Soldiers jumped into action after D.C. crash", Military Times, August 23, 2009.
Immediately following the collision, firefighters and paramedics from the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department were dispatched to the Takoma Metro station, and arrived at the location of the collision soon after. D.C. Fire Chief Dennis Rubin stated that the initial 9-1-1 emergency calls made the incident seem small, but after firefighters arrived on scene, they dispatched mass casualty incident teams. Within two hours, more than 200 firefighters were on-scene in response to the three-alarm incident."D.C. Fire Chief: Firefighters Expected a 'Small Incident'." The Washington Post. June 23, 2009. Rescuers worked through the night of June 22, using cranes and heavy rescue equipment to free trapped passengers and search for bodies.
Fire Chief Dennis Rubin initially confirmed four fatalities (including the train operator) and 74 injuries, 14 of which were considered moderate and 6 critical."4 Dead After Metro Trains Collide in Washington D.C." Fox News. June 22, 2009. Five of the dead were discovered in the wreckage and removed from the site of the collision on the morning of June 23, as cranes dismantling the wrecked trains revealed the bodies. Nine fatalities were eventually confirmed. Jeanice McMillan, 42, of Springfield, Virginia, the train operator, died while attempting to stop the train and was later commended for her efforts. Major General (ret.) David F. Wherley Jr. of the District of Columbia Air National Guard – known for deploying fighter jets to defend Washington, D.C. during the September 11 attacks – died in the collision along with his wife, Ann; the other passengers who died in the crash were Lavonda King, Veronica DuBose, Cameron Williams, Dennis Hawkins, Mary Doolittle, and Ana Fernandez. An additional 80 people were injured. The death toll makes the crash the deadliest in Metro history.
According to Daniel Kaniewski, a former George W. Bush administration Homeland Security official now with the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University, the overall emergency response was "calm and ordered," indicating that U.S. emergency response "during extraordinary incidents [has] significantly improved" since the September 11 attacks.
Service disruption