The Special Operations Command (; COPESP) is an elite unit of the Brazilian Army, headquartered in Goiânia and subordinated to the Planalto Military Command and the Land Operations Command. It is a brigade-level unit adapted for guerrilla warfare and counterterrorism, forming part of the Strategic Rapid Action Force, capable of responding to both conventional and unconventional threats. Its two operational units are the 1st Special Forces Battalion and the 1st Commando Actions Battalion.
Among its components, only the Special Operations Training Center, located in Niterói, is outside Goiânia. The 3rd Special Forces Company, based in Manaus, is subordinate to the Amazon Military Command. These components occasionally operate alongside the special forces of other Brazilian Armed Forces branches or police units, although there is no permanent joint command structure.
The first Brazilian special operations course was established in 1957, and the first operational unit in 1968, both within the current Paratrooper Infantry Brigade. These units have historical ties to jungle warfare training and police special forces. The special forces and commandos studied counterinsurgency tactics within the context of the Cold War and the armed struggle against the Brazilian military dictatorship. This focus continued even after redemocratization. During the Araguaia Guerrilla campaign, they applied the principle that "guerrilla warfare is fought with guerrilla tactics". The Amazon region remains a key area of interest for special operations, with plans to use these forces for indirect action against conventional invaders by organizing resistance among the local population. Since the 1990s, special forces have also been employed in securing major events and combating organized crime in Rio de Janeiro. Special operations forces were expanded into a brigade in 2002 when terrorism risk became a public concern. In 2003, the brigade was relocated to Goiânia, in central Brazil, and its current designation dates to 2014.
Army commandos and special forces operators use advanced equipment and undergo more rigorous selection and training than regular military personnel. The commandos, identified by the emblem of a dagger in a skull, are recruited from voluntary service members outside the 1st Command Actions Battalion (1st BAC). They are used for direct combat missions deep in enemy territory. Special Forces (FEs) are recruited from those already certified in the paratrooper and Command Actions courses; the difficult access to the 1st Special Forces Battalion (1st BFEsp) makes it highly prestigious within the institution. Their roles include advanced tasks such as early intelligence gathering and organizing irregular forces. Due to their secretive operations, they are also referred to as "ghosts". Both commandos and FEs rely on specialized vehicles, the Brazilian Air Force, and the Army Aviation for mobility, often entering hostile territory through infiltration. Beyond these two operational battalions, the Special Operations Command includes a Psychological Operations Battalion and a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Company (DQBRN).
Context in the Brazilian special forces
In the Brazilian Armed Forces, special forces share the use of small groups with specialized training and equipment, supported by advanced intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities. They operate covertly in sensitive areas within limited windows of opportunity, employing two forms of action: direct action, involving violent contact with the enemy, and indirect action, focused on preparing and supporting friendly irregular forces. They infiltrate enemy territory through land, water, or air routes, often operating under vulnerable conditions. These forces have limited access to fire support, typically relying only on air support. They are highly sensitive to enemy counterintelligence and electronic warfare, present significant logistical challenges, and face difficulties in replacing casualties due to the extensive time required to train new operatives. p. 33-37.
The Brazilian Navy's special forces include the Combat Divers Group (GRUMEC) and the Marine Corps Special Operations Battalion (Tonelero Battalion), while the Air Force's special unit is the Airborne Rescue Squadron (PARA-SAR). The special forces of the three branches occasionally conduct joint operations. However, there is no permanent joint command for all special forces, such as the United States Special Operations Command. p. 66-68.
There have also been instances of joint operations with police special forces, and the two share historical ties. The Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE) of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro had a majority of special forces personnel in its original formation, primarily paratroopers experienced in counterinsurgency. p. 41-44. However, the roots of police special forces are not exclusively linked to the army. As early as 1932, the Civil Police of Rio de Janeiro had the Special Police, a unit with rigorous selection that served as a precursor to both BOPE and the Special Resources Coordination Unit. p. 5.
History
Creation
The first Special Operations Course in Brazil was created in 1957 within what was then the Aeroterrestrial Division Nucleus, serving as the foundation for the current Commando Actions, Special Forces, and Jungle Operations courses. p. 50-51. In 1966, it was split into separate Commando and Special Forces courses. p. 19. That same year, the traditional Infantry School Regiment introduced a commando course, which was discontinued two years later. During the military reforms under the dictatorship, the nucleus was transformed into a brigade in 1968, incorporating a Special Forces Detachment, p. 165. which later became a company and was expanded in 1983 into the 1st Special Forces Battalion, including commando and special forces companies.
In a further expansion, the Special Operations Brigade was created in 2002 and renamed the Special Operations Command in 2013. Due to budget constraints, in 2002 the 42nd and 43rd Battalions of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade in Goiás were deactivated, reflecting a broader trend of indirect downsizing within the Brazilian Army. The brigade's original headquarters was in Rio de Janeiro, home to the Paratrooper Infantry Brigade, but the following year it was relocated to Goiânia.
Conceived missions The Brazilian Army draws parallels between the current missions of commandos and special forces and historical precedents during the Pernambuco Insurrection in the mid-17th century, particularly the actions of Portuguese military leader Antônio Dias Cardoso. He organized civilians into a resistance force against the Dutch invaders, employing ambushes as a primary tactic. Several other commanders, such as captain Francisco Padilha, also utilized ambushes and guerrilla tactics against the Dutch conventional army. p. 99-103. Antônio Dias Cardoso is now honored as the patron of the 1st Special Forces Battalion.
In their modern form, commandos and special forces proliferated during World War II and the Cold War. Brazil's first special operations course, established in 1957, initially focused on rescue and recovery operations, influenced by the 1952 crash of the Presidente airplane. Another focus soon emerged: "revolutionary warfare". At the start of the Cold War, military theorists in Brazil and the Western Bloc emphasized special forces for anti-communist counterinsurgency. They envisioned special forces soldiers as saviors of martial values, which were perceived to be eroding with advancements in military technology. These soldiers were also expected to surpass the traditional morality of warfare and fight "dirty" and violently, mimicking their opponents' tactics.
Paratrooper forces in South America were established during this period under American influence and were closely linked to special forces, commandos, and counterinsurgency efforts. p. 196-197. An American captain contributed to the creation of the Brazilian course, and after its initial sessions, Brazilian soldiers trained with Rangers and Special Forces in the United States. In Brazil's case, the Armed Forces as a whole sent relatively few personnel to study counterinsurgency at American institutions, and visits by American instructors, such as the Green Berets, were limited, with counterinsurgency taught as just one among several topics. p. 77-78. ch. 8 (p. 298). Opinions on the results of this influence are divided: some argued that American doctrinal and practical influence was decisive despite the small numbers, while others claimed it was of little importance, as the Brazilian Army already had its own counterinsurgency doctrine and employed methods distinct from those of other countries in the region.
The focus on counterinsurgency fell to the Paratrooper Brigade, which housed the special forces. In the early 1970s, it turned its efforts to combating the leftist armed struggle against the Brazilian military dictatorship. Terrain that was difficult for regular forces to access, such as jungles and mountains, was considered ideal for guerrilla warfare. The Jungle Warfare Training Center (CIGS), established in 1964, to some extent challenged the paratroopers' dominance over special forces training. While the qualification of special forces personnel and the operational unit remained with the paratroopers, from 1970 to 1978, the training of commandos was conducted at CIGS, in Manaus.
During the Araguaia Guerrilla, the largest counterinsurgency experience of the period, initial operations with conventional forces failed. The insurgents' focus on the jungle was neutralized by applying the principle that "guerrilla warfare is fought with guerrilla tactics". The insurgents were identified through intelligence work and eliminated by small groups of paratroopers and jungle warfare soldiers. Operating covertly and clandestinely, these soldiers often relied on local guides. The guerrilla tactics used against the insurgents in Araguaia were also hypothetically intended for use against a conventional invader in the Amazon. In the 21st century, special forces and jungle warfare units train for a "resistance strategy", infiltrating the jungle and blending with the local population. A significant portion of special operations training is geared toward the Amazonian context. p. 81-84.
After 1975, with Brazil's redemocratization and the end of guerrilla movements, the Paratrooper Brigade shifted its focus back to conventional warfare. However, "combat against subversion" continued to be studied by commandos, special forces, and paratroopers. In this way, the army maintained a counter-guerrilla capability even after dismantling the repressive DOI-CODI apparatus. In 2020, Operation Mantiqueira, a special operations exercise targeting a clandestine armed organization, included a fictional scenario that alluded to leftist organizations. The army denied any political or ideological connotation in the simulation. Interest in special operations for conventional warfare persisted, reinforced by the study of the Falklands War. Special forces became a priority destination for resources and were integrated as part of the Rapid Action Forces. p. 188-189 e 194.