Mihail Popov Savov (Bulgarian: Михаил Попов Савов) (born 14 November 1857 in Stara Zagora - died 21 July 1928 in Saint-Vallier-de-Thiey, France) was a Bulgarian lieutenant general, government minister and diplomat who played a prominent role in Bulgaria’s military affairs during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A veteran of the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, he served twice as Minister of War, from 1891 to 1894 and from 1903 to 1907. Savov served as assistant commander-in-chief (de facto commander-in-chief) of the Bulgarian Army during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. After his military career, he also served as a Bulgarian diplomatic representative in France and Belgium.
Early life and Careeer Mihail Savov was born on 14 November (26 November NS) 1859 in Eski Zagra (Stara Zagora), at that time under Ottoman rule. He studied in Hasköy (Haskovo), Filibe (Plovdiv), in the Aprilov National High School in Gabrovo and then in the Imperial lyceum Galatasaray in Istanbul (1876).
He graduated the Military School in Sofia in 1879 as lieutenant. On 9 July 1881 he was promoted to first lieutenant and then continued his education in the Nicolas General Staff Academy in Saint Petersburg (1881–1885).Ташев, Ташо (1999). Министрите на България 1879-1999. София: АИ "Проф. Марин Дринов" / Изд. на МО. / After his return to Bulgaria, he was appointed in the Eastern Rumelia militia. On 9 September 1885 he was promoted to captain and with Order №4 of Knyaz Alexander Batenberg in the same day he was appointed for adjutant in the army.
Serbo-Bulgarian War During the Serbo-Bulgarian War in 1885 he was appointed as head of one of the departments of the Ministry of Defence and commanded the left flank during the battle of Slivnitsa. He had contributions for the defeat of the Serbian Morava Division and the successful battle of Pirot. He was awarded with Order of Bravery III grade.
In 1886, he participated in the commission for the settlement of the Bulgarian-Ottoman border in the Rhodope Mountains and served in the headquarters of the Minister of Defence. Between 1886 and 1887 he was assistant of the Defence Minister. On 17 April 1887 he was promoted to major and worked in the Department of the General Stuff as officer in the 5th infantry brigade.
In 1887 Mihail Savov was appointed for Fligel Adjutant of Knyaz Ferdinand. On 16 February he became Minister of Defence in the cabinet of Stefan Stambolov and on 2 August in the same year was promoted to lieutenant colonel. After the fall of Stambolov in 1894, he was dismissed from the army, but in 1897 his position was restored and he became director of the Military School until 1903. On 1 January 1899 he was promoted to colonel.
Between 1903 and 1908 Savov was again Minister of Defence in the third cabinet of Stoyan Danev, in the second cabinet of Racho Petrov and in the cabinets of Dimitar Petkov, Dimitar Stanchov and Petar Gudev. On 1 January 1904 he was promoted to major general. In 1907 he was charged for corruption and malpractice with the supply of weapons. On 30 October 1908 he was promoted to lieutenant general and left the army for the second time.
First Balkan War In the weeks before the start of the First Balkan War, Mihail Savov was again drawn into discussions about Bulgaria's military preparations and organization. At the time, he was living in a village called Ferdinandovo near Plovdiv and was awaiting judicial proceedings connected with corruption scandals from his previous ministership. When Prime Minister Ivan Geshov visited him on 15 September to ask for his opinion on the chances of the Balkan League in a war against the Ottoman Empire, Savov estimated the chances of victory for the Balkan League at around 85 percent, given that the mobilization, supply, and deployment went according to plan.Markov,2012, pp. 97. During the mobilization of the Bulgarian Army in September 1912, Ferdinand considered placing Savov as commander-in-chief. Savov was regarded as a capable, experienced, and energetic commander and had considerable prestige within the army. His confidence stood in contrast to the more cautious Fichev.Markov,2012, pp. 109. On 22 September 1912, Ferdinand created the Main Headquarters of the Active Army and formally assumed the position of commander-in-chief. Savov was appointed his assistant, while Fichev became chief of staff.Markov, 2012, pp. 109. Savov's exact position within the high command, however, was not clearly defined as he wished. As assistant to the commander-in-chief, he was directly subordinate to Ferdinand, while the relationship between the monarch, the government, and the Main Headquarters remained constitutionally unclear.Markov, 2012, pp. 110.
Lozengrad With the beginning of operations around Lozengrad in Eastern Thrace, Savov's outlook differed from the position taken by Chief of Staff Ivan Fichev. Fichev was worried about a possible Ottoman counter-offensive and already started considering defensive plans in case the Bulgarian offensive failed, while Savov remained confident in the Bulgarian army and its ability. Markov,2012, p. 139. On 9 October 1912, Stoyan Danev met Ferdinand after being told that Fichev panicked and said the fighting around Lozengrad could develop into another prolonged siege similar to Pleven and that diplomatic intervention might be necessary. Ferdinand was furious with Fichev's conduct. Savov intervened in the discussion and reassured Danev by telling him not to be influenced by overly theoretical assessments and confidently predicted that Lozengrad would fall the following day. The Bulgarian success later confirmed Savov's prediction. Markov,2012, p. 140. Ferdinand discussed his dissatisfaction with the chief of staff directly with Savov and blamed Fichev's pessimistic views for spreading uncertainty among the political and military leadership of Bulgaria.Markov,2012, pp. 139-140. Advance to Constantinople After the Bulgarian victory at Lule Burgas, Savov at first supported the possibility of bringing the war to an end by means of diplomatic mediation. Markov, 2012, p. 203. However, his position soon changed with the Bulgarian armies continuing their offensive toward Çatalca. On 25 October, Ferdinand, ever more focused on the possibility of reaching Constantinople, ordered Savov by telephone to continue the offensive towards the Çatalca defensive line. Savov argued that an armistice at this stage of the campaign would be harmful to Bulgarian interests. Markov, 2012, p. 207. On 28 October, Savov sent an inquiry to the armies concerning their strength, morale, ammunition, and food supplies. The responses indicated that they were considered capable of continuing the advance. Markov, 2012, pp. 207-209. The Bulgarian armies, however, also started facing more serious logistical difficulties, including long supply lines, poor roads, and shortages of food and transport. Markov, 2012, pp. 208-209.
On 30 October, the Bulgarian armies started to prepare their positions for an eventual assault on Çatalca. Savov informed Ferdinand that the troops were strengthening their positions in preparation for an attack.Markov 2012, p. 220. At first, Savov and Fichev agreed that the attack should not be rushed. On the morning of 1 November, after considering the arguments for and against an assault, they decided that the armies first needed to be properly coordinated and prepared. The rapidly spreading cholera epidemic made a prolonged delay increasingly dangerous. The disease coincided with a wider deterioration of the Bulgarian medical and logistical system: the rapid advance had stretched field hospitals and transport, while the troops arriving to Çatalca were increasingly tired and undersupplied.Hall 2000, p. 35.Borodziej and Górny 2021, p. 57. Savov was sent to the front to examine the condition of the troops, meet with the commanders of the armies, and report their views before a final decision could be made. Savov thought the authority given to him allowed him to order the attack if he considered the circumstances favorable.Markov 2012, pp. 226, 230-231.
Ferdinand personally authorized Savov to order an attack if he found the operation feasible. Savov went to the headquarters of the United First and Third Armies, and there he discussed the readiness and supply of the troops with Generals Radko Dimitriev and Vasil Kutinchev.Markov 2012, p. 233. After several meetings, Savov ordered the United First and Third Armies to begin their offensive against the Çatalca position on the morning of 4 November. Dimitriev asked Savov to assume direct command of the United Armies for the battle, but Savov declined, explaining that he did not know the terrain well enough and was expected to return to Lozengrad.Markov 2012, p. 237. First Battle of Çatalca and its aftermath The attack on the Çatalca position began before dawn on 4 November 1912. Savov remained near the front with Radko Dimitriev and observed the fighting. The strength of the Ottoman artillery and the limited effect of the Bulgarian artillery quickly became apparent, although the Bulgarian command still believed that the attack could succeed.Markov 2012, pp. 241–242. Bulgarian artillery failed to achieve superiority like in the previous battles in Thrace; much of it lacked the range and weight necessary to suppress the Ottoman batteries, while Ottoman artillery and naval gunfire strengthened the defenses, particularly on the southern part of the line.Hall 2000, pp. 36–37. During the evening Dimitriev again asked Savov to assume direct command of the United First and Third Armies, but Savov declined and returned to Lozengrad, still expressing confidence that the battle would be resolved quickly.Markov 2012, p. 243.
By 5 November the offensive had stalled and Dimitriev ordered the attack to stop.Markov 2012, pp. 246–248. The failure reflected a combination of strong Ottoman defenses, ineffective concentration and weight of Bulgarian artillery, exhaustion, worsening weather and disease. The attacks had been dispersed across much of the front rather than concentrated against a decisive point, exposing the infantry to heavy fire.Hall 2000, pp. 36–38.Borodziej and Górny 2021, pp. 57–58. Savov's responsibility for the decision to attack became controversial later. Although he had ordered the operation, he was not in direct command during the battle. Savov defended the operation by arguing that its strategic conception had been sound but that errors had been made in its tactical execution.Markov 2012, p. 252.
The failure at Çatalca changed Savov's attitude toward further offensives. By 8 November Savov and Fichev had concluded that the United Armies were not capable of further offensive action and estimated that the troops required at least twenty days of rest because of the cholera, exhaustion and supply difficulties.Markov,2012, p. 259. Together with Fichev, he opposed proposals requiring the United Armies to withdraw from their positions at Çatalca, believing that such a move could leave them vulnerable if the war continued.Markov 2012, pp. 272–273. By 19–20 November Savov's main worry was the condition and supply of the armies. He and Fichev warned Stoyan Danev that excessive political demands should not prevent the conclusion of an armistice and leave the exhausted troops indefinitely in the cholera-stricken positions at Çatalca.Markov 2012, pp. 282–283. Armistice and the London Peace Conference