The Battle of Korsun–Cherkassy (; ), also known as the Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket, was a World War II battle fought from 24 January to 16 February 1944 in the course of the Soviet Dnieper–Carpathian offensive in Ukraine, following the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky offensive.
In the battle, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, commanded, respectively, by Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev, encircled German forces of Army Group South in a pocket near the Dnieper River. During weeks of fighting, the two Red Army Fronts tried to eradicate the pocket. The encircled German units attempted a breakout in coordination with a relief attempt by other German forces, resulting in heavy casualties, estimates of which vary.
The Soviet victory in the Korsun–Cherkassy offensive marked the successful implementation of Soviet deep operations. Soviet deep battle doctrine envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defences to allow fresh operational reserves to exploit the breakthrough by driving into the strategic depth of the enemy front. The arrival of large numbers of American- and British-built trucks and halftracks gave the Soviet forces much greater mobility than they had had before. This, coupled with the Soviet capacity to hold large formations in reserve, gave the Red Army the ability to drive deep behind German defenses again and again.
Though the Soviet operation at Korsun did not result in the collapse of the German front that the Soviet command had hoped for, it marked a significant deterioration in the strength available to the German Army on that front, especially in heavy weaponry, nearly all of which was lost during the breakout. Through the rest of the war the Red Army would place large German forces in jeopardy, while the Germans were stretched thin and constantly attempting to extract themselves from one crisis to the next. Mobile Soviet offensives were the hallmark of the Eastern Front for the remainder of the war.
January 1944 In the autumn of 1943, the German forces of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South including General Otto Wöhler's 8th Army had fallen back to the Panther–Wotan line, a defensive position that in Ukraine followed the Dnieper River. However, when the German forces arrived, construction had only just been started, so the defensive positions essentially did not exist.
By 1 December 1943, the line had been broken and the Soviet Army had crossed the Dnieper in force. Only two corps, the XI under General Wilhelm Stemmermann, the XLII Army Corps under Lieutenant General Theobald Lieb and the attached Corps Detachment BCorps Detachment B was organized as an infantry division with six infantry battalions and normal supporting divisional units. The unit had been formed from elements contributed by the 112th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions. Tessin, pp. 26–27. from the 8th Army were holding a salient in the new Soviet line. The salient to the west of Cherkassy extended some 100 kilometers to the Dnieper River settlement of Kanev, with the town of Korsun roughly in the center of the salient, with the 1st Ukrainian Front to its left and the 2nd Ukrainian Front to its right.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov realized the potential for destroying Wöhler's 8th Army, using tactics similar to those used to encircle and destroy Paulus's 6th Army in the Battle of Stalingrad. Zhukov recommended to the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) deploying the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to form two armored rings of encirclement: an inner ring around the pocket, followed by the destruction of the forces it contained, and an external ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the surrounded units. Despite repeated warnings from Manstein and others, Hitler refused to allow the exposed units to be pulled back.
General Konev held a conference at his headquarters at Boltushki on 15 January, with his commanders and their political commissars to pass on the orders received from Stavka.Zetterling & Frankson, p. 37 The initial attack was to be conducted by Konev's own 2nd Ukrainian Front from the southeast by the 53rd Army and 4th Guards Army, with the 5th Guards Tank Army to exploit penetrations, supported by the 5th Air Army, to be joined in progress by the 52nd Army, 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and the 2nd Tank Army. Additionally, from Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front, the 27th and 40th Armies were to be deployed from the northwest, with the 6th Tank Army to exploit penetrations, supported by the 2nd Air Army.Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 37–39 Many of these formations had received an inflow of new personnel. Red Army planning further included extensive deception operations that the Soviets claimed were successful; however, the German 8th Army war diary shows clearly that the German staff was concerned about the threat at hand.Zetterling & Frankson, p. 39
Encirclement
The Soviet attack started on 24 January when Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked the salient from the southeast. A breakthrough was quickly achieved, and the penetration was exploited by the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, the following day.Glantz & House, p. 187 Despite the awareness of the German 8th Army's staff that an attack was imminent, they were surprised by the appearance of the 1st Ukrainian Front's newly formed 6th Tank Army.The 6th Tank Army had been formed on 20 January 1944. Dunn, Hitler's Nemesis The 6th Tank Army, with 160 tanks and 50 self-propelled guns,Erickson, p. 177 was inexperienced and took longer than expected to penetrate the western flank of the salient. A "mobile group" from the 5th Mechanized Corps' 233rd Tank Brigade, under the command of General Savelev, with 50 tanks and 200 sub-machine gun armed infantrymen, occupied Lysyanka and moved into the outskirts of Zvenyhorodka by 28 January. Here, these troops of the 6th Tank Army met the 2nd Ukrainian Front's 20th Tank Corps. Over the next three days, the two tank armies formed a thinly manned outer ring around what was now the Korsun Pocket while another, inner, ring was formed by the Soviet 27th, 52nd, and 4th Guard Armies.Erickson, p. 177; Glantz & House, p. 187; and Frieser, p. 396
The Soviet commanders were optimistic about the progress of the operation. Stalin was promised a second Stalingrad, and he expected it. Konev wired: "There is no need to worry, Comrade Stalin. The encircled enemy will not escape."Konev, Battles Hitler Lost, quoted in Nash, p. 200 Inside the pocket were nearly 60,000 men from six German divisions, at about 55% of their authorized strength, along with a number of smaller combat units. Among the trapped German forces were the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, with the attached 5th SS Infantry Brigade Wallonien, the Estonian SS infantry battalion Narwa, and "several thousand" Russian auxiliaries.Nash, p. 27 General Wilhelm Stemmermann, the commander of the XI Corps, was placed in command of the forces in the pocket. These forces were designated Gruppe Stemmermann. The 5th SS Panzer Division, with some 11,400 personnel,Frieser, p. 424 had 30 operational Panzer III/IV tanks and assault guns left, and six more under repair.Zetterling & Frankson, p. 335 The division further had 47 artillery pieces, of which 12 were self-propelled guns.Zetterling & Frankson, p. 336; a total of 242 artillery pieces were inside the pocket.
German relief attacks
Manstein moved quickly, and by early February the III and XLVII Panzer Corps were assembled for a relief effort. Hitler intervened, however, and ordered the attack be transformed into an effort to counter-encircle the two Soviet army groups.
General Hermann Breith, commander of the III Panzer Corps, requested the relief formations be united to attempt to force a corridor to the encircled Gruppe Stemmermann. This request was refused, and the counter-encirclement of the Soviet forces was attempted. The attack by the XLVII Panzer Corps' 11th Panzer Division on the southeastern flank of the pocket quickly stalled, as it had only 27 tanks and 34 assault guns operational.Perrett, p. 167 The III Panzer Corps' attempt continued until 8 February, when it became undeniable that the effort had failed.Frieser, p. 354 Manstein ordered the corps to instead drive directly to the relief of Gruppe Stemmermann. Pulling the III Panzer Corps back and reorganizing for the new attack 15 kilometers south of Boyarka, took three days.Frieser, p. 402
On 11 February, Breith began a push with the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions driving toward the Gniloy Tikich River. They initially made good progress. The 1st Panzer Division and 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH covered the northern flank of the drive. As they drove deeper into the Soviet positions, Zhukov ordered Vatutin to assemble four tank corps with the goal of cutting off the attacking German spearhead.Nash, p. 162 The weather warmed, turning the roads to a soft mud and bogging down German progress. Here the liabilities of Germany's wheeled vehicles became evident. The Soviet forces had been provided lend-lease U.S. built four-wheel and six-wheel drive trucks. These were largely able to get through, whereas German two-wheel-drive vehicles were not.
Konev issued orders for the 4th Guards Army and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps to attempt to split the pocket on the night of 5–6 February. The strike was to fall on the boundary between the two German corps.Zetterling & Frankson, p. 180 As fighting progressed, the Soviet goal became clear to Stemmermann and Lieb. Stemmermann ordered the 5th SS Division's armor to the scene. Together with the 72nd Infantry Division, it brought the Soviet attack to a halt, buying the Germans time. Red Army efforts were renewed between 7–10 February. This effort was hobbled by supply shortages. The III Panzer Corps' penetrations toward the Gniloy Tikich River made the supply lines for Soviet formations such as Vatutin's 6th Tank Army much longer.Zetterling & Frankson, p. 184 The Red Air Force attempted to resupply some units using Polikarpov Po-2 aircraft.Zetterling & Frankson, p. 185 Despite logistical difficulties, units from the 2nd Ukrainian Front were able to close in on Korsun by 10 February, collapsing the pocket to an area of six by seven miles.
German maneuver within the pocket
On 11 February, the III Panzer Corps continued its drive east. The force reached the Gniloy Tikich River and established a small bridgehead on the eastern bank. It was unable to advance further, meaning that Group Stemmermann had to fight its way out.Group Stemmermann consisted of first divisions: the 57th, 72nd, 88th and 389th Divisions, Corps Detachment B (Division Group 112), all infantry formations with no armored components; and the 5th SS Panzer Division with the attached 5th SS Infantry Brigade and the Narwa Battalion. The only units considered still capable of offensive operations were the 72nd Infantry and 5th SS Divisions. (Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–234, pp. 19–20)
Both sides realized that the Wehrmacht relief efforts had reached a critical stage. Despite heavy Soviet propaganda inducements, very few German soldiers and no Waffen-SS men in the cauldron had surrendered.Nash, p. 194 Zhukov thus decided to send parlementaires under a white flag with surrender demands. Red Army emissaries presented letters for both Stemmermann and Lieb signed by Marshal Zhukov and Generals Konev and Vatutin.DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 22 After cordial talks, refreshments and a handshake, the Soviet delegation departed without a positive answer.Nash, p. 198