The 51st Troop Carrier Wing is an inactive United States Air Force unit. The wing was formed during World War II and was the first troop carrier wing in the Army Air Forces (AAF) organized for deployment overseas. During the war, it served in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and its elements participated in every airborne assault in the theater. The wing also transported personnel and supplies within the theater. Its units also performed the majority of special operations flights by AAF units in the theater. Following V-E Day, the wing moved to Germany, where it became part of the occupation forces, operating as the European Air Transport Service until inactivating in January 1948. In August 1946, two of its planes were shot down by Yugoslav Air Force fighters near Yugoslavia's border with Austria and Italy.
In 1985, the wing was consolidated with the 551st Airborne Early Warning and Control Wing, which provided airborne surveillance off the eastern coast of the United States from December 1954 through December 1969. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, this wing's aircraft provided air defense warning and control between Florida and Cuba. The consolidated unit remained inactive until it was consolidated with the Battle Management Systems Wing in 2006, with the unit receiving its most recent name, the 551st Electronic Systems Wing, a few days afterward. From 2004 to 2010, it was responsible for development of battle management systems.
History World War II Organization and deployment
The wing was activated on 1 June 1942 at Pope Field, North Carolina as the 51st Transport Wing, becoming the 51st Troop Carrier Wing a few weeks later. Its first elements were the 60th, 61st, 62d and 64th Transport Groups, flying Douglas C-47 Skytrains and C-53 Skytroopers. The wing was the first airlift wing in the Army Air Forces (AAF) expressly organized for service overseas, initially for support of Operation Bolero, the planned cross-Channel invasion of Europe.Warren, J., p. 3The 50th Transport Wing had been organized earlier, but at first it was primarily concerned with transporting depot materiel. By 1942, it had been decided that the 50th Wing would remain in the United States as a training headquarters. Warren, J., p. 3. When the wing was activated, the 60th and 64th Groups were at Westover Field, Massachusetts,Maurer, pp. 123–125Maurer, pp. 130–131 having already begun their deployment to Europe, while the 61st and 62d Groups were still stationed in the Carolinas, near wing headquarters.Maurer, pp. 125–127Maurer, pp. 127–129
The wing and its combat groups were all in England by the end of September 1942, where they initially became part of Eighth Air Force. The first elements to arrive, had been used to haul supplies between depots in the United Kingdom, but in the fall, 60th Group operations turned to training for airdropping paratroopers and preparing for Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa.Freeman, p.13 In October, the wing became part of Twelfth Air Force, and the 60th, 62d and 64th Groups, which had been assigned to Twelfth Air Force on 14 September, were returned to its control.
North African Campaign
It was critical for Operation Torch that the airfields near Oran, Algeria, Tafaraoui Airfield and La Senia Airfield, be seized immediately. The wing's most experienced group, the 60th, was tasked with transporting elements of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, flying across Spain, with plans to drop the paratroopers on Tafaraoui shortly after midnight if French resistance was expected, or to land them at La Senia early in the morning if a friendly reception was expected. In either case, the distance involved made this a one-way mission and the C-47s would have to land on the seized airfields. In the event, the force departed on 8 November 1942, expecting to land at La Senia, but was scattered while penetrating clouds associated with a weather front over Spain. Unexpected winds over southern Spain blew many aircraft off course. Navigational assistance expected toward the end of the mission evaporated. A British destroyer transmitted its navigational aid on the wrong frequency and a covert agent transmitting from a site near the airfields was not informed of the delay and destroyed his equipment when planes did not arrive after midnight. Planes were scattered over Morocco and Algeria, and this, the first combat drop of American paratroopers, occurred near Lourmel Airfield, not in the planned drop zone (DZ). The paratroopers proceeded to Tafaraoui by foot and by the time they and the wing's C-47s arrived there, other allied forces were approaching the field, so the airborne operation had little impact on the invasion of North Africa. Despite the expectation of a friendly reception, both fighter and antiaircraft artillery opposition was encountered, with several group planes forced to land, although none were lost to enemy action.Warren, J., pp. 3–13
By 11 November, the available planes of the 60th Group, and some from the 64th Group, flew paratroopers to occupy Maison Blanche Airport, near Algiers. The 64th Group had been operating from Gibraltar with British paratroops from the 3rd Parachute Battalion. Two days later, the 60th Group was ordered to occupy Tebessa, near the Tunisian border. On 15 November, the same day the 62d Group arrived in Algeria, the wing's forces at Maison Blanche flew an "ad hoc" mission transporting 300 troops of the 503rd Regiment to Youks-les-Bains Airfield, from Tebessa, where they were successfully dropped.Warren, J., pp. 15–16 Wing headquarters was established at Tafaraoui on 14 November, so the entire wing was now operating in Algeria.The 64th Group headquarters did not formally arrive until mid-December, but it was operating in November. Maurer, pp. 130–131. On 12 November, the 64th carried British paratroopers from Maison Blanche to seize Bône Airfield, to use as a base to take Bône, which provided the best port facilities in eastern Algeria.Warren, J., p. 17
The remainder of the British 1st Parachute Brigade had arrived in Algiers by water transport, and were tasked with taking Souk-el-Arba Airfield, which was located on a major junction on the main road to Tunis. The only map available for planning was a road map, and the DZ had to be selected by the paratroop commander, who rode in the cockpit of the lead plane of the 64th Group formation. After an aborted mission due to fog on 15 November, on 16 November 384 British paratroopers were dropped successfully and no planes were lost on this mission. By late November, Allied forces were approaching Tunis, and a plan was drawn up to drop airborne forces into Tunis, behind the German lines. Planners presumed that resistance would be light, with enemy forces deployed to meet troops advancing from Algeria. British paratroopers were to be dropped on Pont du Fahs Airfield. On 29 November, the day of the drop, intelligence indicated that Pont du Fahs and Depienne Airfields were unoccupied, and the decision was made to switch the drop to Depienne, which was about closer to Tunis that Pont du Fahs. A formation of planes from the wing's 62d and 64th Groups with over 500 paratroopers of the British 2nd Parachute Battalion and led by the 51st Wing commander flew the mission. The drop was successful, and no planes were lost, although the inexperienced 62d Group dropped paratroopers over a widely dispersed area. Unfortunately for the paratroopers, the Germans halted the First Army's advance and they were trapped behind German lines. Only half the battalion was able to fight their way back to friendly forces.Warren, J., pp. 17–18
For the next four months, the Allies would be on the defensive and no major air assaults were planned. The long distances involved in the theater and primitive communications made air transport vital for logistics and communications, and the wing concentrated on missions in these areas. However, the demand for theater airlift was so great that the wing was unable to even temporarily withdraw any of its squadrons to maintain proficiency in dropping paratroops.Warren, J., pp. 18–19
Invasion of Sicily In January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference, the Allies determined that the next objective would be Sicily.Warren, J., p. 20Theater planners had also studied landings in Sardinia or even southern France. Warren, J., p. 20. Detailed planning for what would be called Operation Husky began the following month. By April it was determined that both the American landings in the west and the British landings in the southeast of the island would be supported by airborne operations. By May, the 52d Troop Carrier Wing had arrived in the theater from the United States to reinforce the 51st. The 52d was tasked with dropping the American airborne forces, while the 51st and elements of the Royal Air Force's (RAF) No. 38 Wing would support the British paratroopers. The 64th Group was detached to the 52d Wing for the initial operation, but would return to the 51st Wing for followup drops. The 51st would tow Waco CG-4 (known as the Hadrian in British service) gliders with British troopers to a point near Syracuse. This operation was named Operation Ladbroke. The wing had not used gliders before, and when enough had arrived in Tunisia, it began training with them in June.Warren, J., pp. 21–25
On the night of 9 July 1943, 137 planes launched for Sicily. Between 109 and 119 of the airplanes, with over 1,000 troopers in tow, released their gliders within sight of their objective, the Ponte Grande, south of Syracuse but only one in five troopers was able to reach the objective that night. Although searchlights and anti-aircraft fire did little damage to the wing's aircraft, they disrupted the release of the gliders to a point that only about 58 of the gliders were released near Syracuse, while 69 landed in the water. In addition, strong headwinds reduced the distance gliders were able to glide to reach their landing zones. All wing airplanes returned safely, but casualties in the landing force reached 60%, although they were able to keep the Germans from destroying the bridge before reinforcements arrived.Warren, J., pp. 41–47
On 13 July, wing aircraft took off on Operation Fustian, intended to capture the Primasole Bridge over the Simeto River near Catania. Over 100 planes from the 60th and 62d Groups were joined by a handful that had returned to wing control from the 64th Group carrying 1,856 troops from the British 1st Parachute Brigade. Nineteen gliders towed by elements of No. 38 Wing would follow with vehicles and artillery. Although a course to Sicily was designed to avoid naval convoys, the planes, flying at came near several concentrations of Allied ships, and about half of them came under friendly fire en route. Although escorting destroyers had been briefed on the operation, troop transports and cargo ships had not, and took the low flying troop carriers for attacking German planes. Two planes were shot down and nine others were forced to turn back because of wounded crew or damage to the planes. Over the DZ, German fire accounted for an additional nine shot down while dropping their paratroopers, although four of these were able to make emergency landings off the coast. Overall, about 10% of the planes involved in the operation were lost. Only 39 planes were able to place their paratroopers within a mile of the briefed DZs, but ten planes of the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron dropped all their troops as briefed. Only four Airspeed Horsa gliders played an active role in the operation. Although the bridge was secured, a German counterattack drove the British away until reinforcements arrived on the 16th.Warren, J., pp. 47–54 In late August 1943, the wing moved its headquarters to Sicily, moving to Gela Airfield at the end of August.
Move to Italy