The U-boat campaign from 1914 to 1918 was the World War I naval campaign fought by German U-boats against the trade routes of the Allies, largely in the seas around the British Isles and in the Mediterranean, as part of a mutual blockade between the German Empire and the United Kingdom.
Both Germany and Britain relied on food and fertilizer imports to feed their populations, and raw materials to supply their war industry. The British Royal Navy was superior in numbers and could operate on most of the world's oceans because of the British Empire, whereas the Imperial German Navy surface fleet was mainly restricted to the German Bight, and used commerce raiders and submarine warfare to operate elsewhere.
German U-boats sank almost 5,000 ships with over 12 million gross register tonnage, losing 178 boats and about 5,000 men in combat. The Allies were able to keep a fairly constant tonnage of shipping available, due to a combination of ship construction and countermeasures, particularly the introduction of convoys.
1914: Initial campaign North Sea: Initial stage
In August 1914, a flotilla of ten U-boats sailed from their base in Heligoland to attack Royal Navy warships in the North Sea in the first submarine war patrol in history.Gibson and Prendergast, p. 2 Their aim was to sink capital ships of the British Grand Fleet, and so to reduce the Grand Fleet's numerical superiority over the German High Seas Fleet. The first sortie was not a success. One of 's engines broke down and she had to return to Heligoland. Only one attack was carried out, when fired a torpedo (which missed) at . Two of the ten U-boats were lost.
Later in the month, the U-boats achieved success, when sank the cruiser . In September, sank three armoured cruisers (, , and ) in a single action. Other successes followed. In October U-9 sank the cruiser and U-27 sank the submarine E3, the first time one submarine sank another, and on the last day of the year sank the pre-dreadnought battleship . By the end of the initial campaign, the U-boats had sunk nine warships while losing five of their own number.Tarrant pp. 10, 11
Due to fears of submarine attack, the Grand Fleet spent much of the first year dispersed on the West coast, while their home base at Scapa Flow had defenses installed.
Mediterranean: Initial stage
The initial phase of the U-boat campaign in the Mediterranean comprised the actions by the Austro-Hungarian Navy's U-boat force against the French, who were blockading the Straits of Otranto. At the start of hostilities, the Austro-Hungarian Navy had seven U-boats in commission; five operational, two training; all were of the coastal type, with limited range and endurance, suitable for operation in the Adriatic. However during the war new larger U-boats came into service plus Germany shipped several overland. The Austro-Hungarian U-boats had a number of successes. On 21 December 1914 torpedoed the (beyond Otranto), causing her to retire to Malta for serious repairs, and on 27 April 1915 sank the , with a heavy loss of life.
Submarine against warships While U-boats could sink a large and expensive armored warship with one torpedo, they needed to be in position before an attack took place. Their fastest speed, while surfaced, of around 15 knots, was less than the cruising speed of most warships and only two-thirds that of the most modern dreadnoughts.Jane pp. 39–41, 124 Their chief advantage was to submerge, because surface ships had no means to detect a submarine underwater, and no means to attack. However, while submerged, the U-boat was virtually blind and immobile, as early submarines had limited underwater speed and endurance.
The U-boats scored a number of impressive successes early in the war, but warships adopted tactics to counter them. Whilst warships were traveling at speed and on an erratic zigzag course they were relatively safe, and for the remainder of the war, the U-boats were unable to mount a successful attack on a warship traveling in this manner.
Overall, the German Navy was unable to erode the Grand Fleet's advantage as hoped. In the two main surface actions of this period, the U-boat was unable to have any effect, and the High Seas Fleet was unable to draw the Grand Fleet into a U-boat trap.
First attacks on merchant ships The first attacks on merchant ships had started in October 1914. At that time there was no plan for a concerted U-boat offensive against Allied trade. It was recognised that the U-boat had several drawbacks as a commerce raider, and such a campaign risked alienating neutral opinion. In the six months to the opening of the commerce war in February 1915, U-boats had sunk 19 ships, totalling .Tarrant p. 148
1915: War on commerce Unrestricted submarine warfare
Because Germany could not possibly deal with British naval strength on an even basis, the German navy was relatively inactive at the start of the war, yet eager to demonstrate a role for itself. Throughout 1914, figures like Hermann Bauer, Alfred von Tirpitz and Hugo von Pohl argued that submarine commerce raiding provided a means of quickly defeating Britain. Perhaps influenced by the appearance of submarines in fiction, naval officials proposed extremely optimistic views of how effective even a very a small U-boat (with as few as 4–20 vessels) blockade could be. Such views were readily taken up by the German public, as by early 1915, all the combatants had lost the illusion that the war could be won quickly, and began to consider harsher measures in order to gain an advantage.
The British, with their overwhelming sea power, had established a naval blockade of Germany immediately on the outbreak of war in August 1914, and in early November 1914 declared the North Sea to be a "Military Area". Any ships entering were advised to pass through specific lanes (inspected by the British) or risk striking a growing array of minefields. While the word "blockade" was avoided in official pronouncements, this amounted to unprecedented restrictions on trade with the Central Powers, with even food considered "absolute contraband of war". Though at this point Germany was still receiving sufficient imports from neutral countries, Germans regarded this as a blatant attempt to starve the German people into submission and wanted to retaliate in kind, and in fact the severity of the British blockade did not go over well in America either. This gave the Germans the pretext to act.Ritter, p. 126 The German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, felt that such a submarine blockade, based on "shoot without warning", would simply antagonise the United States and other neutrals and have little chance of achieving its objectives. However, he was unable to hold back the pressures for taking such a step. The Chancellor and the Admiralty came to an agreement on 1 February and directives were sent out the next day.Ritter, p. 127
On 4 February 1915 Admiral Hugo von Pohl, commander of the German High Seas Fleet and Head of the Admiralty Staff until 1 Feb, published a warning in the Deutscher Reichsanzeiger (Imperial German Gazette):
Von Pohl breached protocol by acting without proper consultation with the Kaiser and the other naval offices, but the Germans were now bound to the strategy to avoid political embarrassment. The measure was subject to fierce internal debate amongst the German government as neutral nations and the Kaiser reacted strongly negatively, and a compromise was put in place whereby neutral shipping (which the admiralty wished to attack as well) would be spared.Ritter, pp. 128–130 In a February 12 directive, von Pohl's replacement as Admiralty Chief Gustav Bachmann however noted that enemy passenger vessels should be deliberately targeted, so as to create a "shock effect".
Though the Germans had only 21 submarines available, not all of which were operational, they were now primarily based at Ostend in Belgium, giving the submarines better access to the sea lanes around England. In January, before the declaration of "unrestricted submarine warfare" as the submarine blockade was called, 43,550 tonnes of shipping had been sunk by U-boats. The number of sinkings then steadily increased, with 168,200 tonnes going down in August. Attacking sometimes without warning,Until 1917, U-boat captains preferred to abide by cruiser rules anyway, due to a shortage of torpedoes and a periscope launched torpedo accuracy of only 42%. Ritter, p 123 German U-boats sank nearly 100,000 GRT per month, an average of 1.9 ships daily. The economic and military effect was however, virtually nothing.Ritter, p. 131 Britain alone had around 20 million GRT in shipping at the start of the war and production managed to keep pace with losses.
On 10 April 1915 the British steamer Harpalyce, a Belgian relief ship and clearly marked as such, was torpedoed without warning by near the North Hinder lightship, just outside the strip of sea declared safe by von Pohl. The ship had been en route for America to collect food for starving Belgians, and its sinking outraged US citizens already unhappy at the death of Leon C. Thrasher, drowned when sank on 28 March 1915.Compton-Hall, p. 196
RMS Lusitania
On 7 May 1915, the liner was torpedoed by , off the Old Head of Kinsale, Ireland, and sank in just 18 minutes. Of the 1,960 people aboard, 1,197 were killed, 124 of them Americans.The official figures give 1195 lost out of 1959, excluding three stowaways who also were lost. The figures here eliminate some repetitions from the list and people subsequently known not to be on board.
Following the incident, the German government attempted to justify it with a range of arguments. This only exacerbated the massive outrage in Britain and America. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson refused to overreact, though some believed the massive loss of life caused by the sinking of Lusitania required a firm response from the United States.
When Germany began its U-boat campaign against Britain, Wilson had warned that the United States would hold the German government strictly accountable for any violations of American rights. Backed by State Department second-in-command Robert Lansing, Wilson made his position clear in three notes to the German government issued on 13 May, 9 June, and 21 July.
The first note affirmed the right of Americans to travel as passengers on merchant ships of any nationality. As the Germans claimed it was impossible to use submarines "without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity", it called for the Germans to abandon submarine warfare against commercial vessels, whatever flag they sailed under."This government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental."
In the second note Wilson rejected German defenses, rebutting some false claims and asserting that all that mattered was that the Lusitania did not defend herself, but was attacked without warning in such a way that endangered innocent civilian lives."Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy." Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan considered Wilson's second note too provocative and resigned in protest after failing to have it moderated.