Following the Iranian Revolution, which overthrew the Shah of Iran in February 1979, Iran was in a "revolutionary crisis mode" until 1982 or 1983 when forces loyal to the revolution's leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, consolidated power. During this period, Iran's economy and the apparatus of government collapsed; its military and security forces were in disarray.

Rebellions by Marxist guerrillas and federalist parties against Islamist forces in Khuzistan, Kurdistan, and Gonbad-e Qabus started in April 1979, some of them taking more than a year to suppress. Concern about breakdown of order was sufficiently high to prompt discussion by the US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski over the danger of a Soviet invasion/incursion (the USSR sharing a border with Iran) and whether the US should be prepared to counter it.

By 1988, Khomeini and his supporters had crushed the rival factions and consolidated power. Elements that played a part in both the crisis and its end were the Iran hostage crisis, the invasion of Iran by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and the presidency of Abolhassan Banisadr.Encyclopedia of Islam and Muslim World, Thomson Gale, 2004, p. 357 (article by Stockdale, Nancy, L. who uses the phrase "revolutionary crisis mode")Keddie, Modern Iran, (2006), p. 241

Conflicts amongst revolutionaries It is generally agreed that while Khomeini had shrewdly assembled and kept together a broad coalition to overthrow the shah, it contained many mutually incompatible elements, "liberals of Mussadeq's old National Front, remnants of the communist Tudeh party, and the 'new left' movements, inspired by similar developments among Palestinian and Latin American youth ...", all of whom who had differences among each other and none of whom were interested in Khomeini's plans for a theocracy.

Khomeini's particularly contentious plan was for rule of Iran by Islamic jurists (a concept known as Velayat-e faqih), with himself as leader, a form of government that he had not mentioned in any public statements before taking power, and which it is thought would have been a political deal breaker for liberals, Muslim moderates, and supporters of Ali Shariati. With the fall of the Shah, the glue that unified the various ideological (religious, liberal, secularist, Marxist, and Communist) and class (bazaari merchant, secular middle class, poor) factions of the revolution—opposed to the Shah—was gone.Kepel, Jihad, 2002, p. 112 Different interpretations of the broad goals of the revolution (an end to tyranny, more Islamic and less American and Western influence, more social justice and less inequality) and different interests, vied for influence.

Some observers believe "what began as an authentic and anti-dictatorial popular revolution based on a broad coalition of all anti-Shah forces was soon transformed into a power-grab" by Islamic fundamentalists,Zabih, Sepehr, Iran Since the Revolution Johns Hopkins Press, 1982, p. 2 that significant support came from Khomeini's non-theocratic allies who had thought he intended to be more a spiritual guide than a rulerSchirazi, Constitution of Iran, (1997), pp. 93–94—Khomeini being in his mid-70s, having never held public office, having been out of Iran for more than a decade, and having told questioners things like "the religious dignitaries do not want to rule.""Democracy? I meant theocracy ", by Dr. Jalal Matini, translation & introduction by Farhad Mafie, August 5, 2003, The Iranian.Islamic Clerics , Khomeini Promises Kept, Gems of Islamism.

Another view was that although Khomeini may have needed elements of his broad coalition to overthrow the Shah, in the aftermath he had "overwhelming ideological, political and organizational hegemony,"Azar Tabari, "Mystifications of the Past and Illusions of the Future," in The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic: Proceedings of a Conference, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1982) pp. 101–24. and non-theocratic groups never seriously challenged Khomeini's movement in popular support.For example, the Islamic Republican Party and allied forces controlled approximately 80% of the seats on the Assembly of Experts of Constitution. (see: Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs (1983) pp. 78–82) An impressive margin even allowing for electoral manipulation.

Still another view, was held by Khomeini supporters (such as Hamid Ansari), who insist that Iranians opposed to the new ruling state were "fifth columnists" led by foreign countries attempting to overthrow the Iranian government.Ansari, Hamid, Narrative of Awakening: A Look at Imam Khomeini's Ideal, Scientific and Political Biography from Birth to Ascension, Institute for Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini, International Affairs Division, [no publication date, preface dated 1994] translated by Seyed Manoochehr Moosavi, pp. 165–67

Khomeini and his loyalists in the revolutionary organizations prevailed, making use of unwanted allies,Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 224 (such as Mehdi Bazargan's Provisional Revolutionary Government), and eliminating one-by-one with skillful timing both them and their adversaries from Iran's political stage,Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 203. and implemented Khomeini's velayat-faqih design for an Islamic Republic led by himself as Supreme Leader.Schirazi, Constitution of Iran, (1997), pp. 24–32.

Organizations of the revolution

The most important bodies of the revolution were the Revolutionary Council, the Revolutionary Guards, Revolutionary Tribunals, Islamic Republican Party, and at the local level revolutionary cells turned local committees (komitehs).Keddie, Modern Iran (2003), pp. 241–42.

While the moderate Bazargan and his government (temporarily) reassured the middle class, it became apparent they did not have power over the "Khomeinist" revolutionary bodies, particularly the Revolutionary Council (the "real power" in the revolutionary stateKepel, Jihad, (2001), p.113Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, (1988) p. 135) and later the Islamic Republican Party. Inevitably the overlapping authority of the Revolutionary Council (which had the power to pass laws) and Bazargan's government was a source of conflict,Keddie, Modern Iran (2003) p. 245 despite the fact that both had been approved by and/or put in place by Khomeini.

This conflict lasted only a few months, however, as the provisional government fell shortly after American Embassy officials were taken hostage on November 4, 1979. Bazargan's resignation was received by Khomeini without complaint, saying "Mr. Bazargan ... was a little tired and preferred to stay on the sidelines for a while." Khomeini later described his appointment of Bazargan as a "mistake".Moin, Khomeini, (2000), p. 222

The Revolutionary Guard, or Pasdaran-e Enqelab, was established by Khomeini on May 5, 1979, as a counterweight both to the armed groups of the left, and to the Iranian military, which had been part of the Shah's power base. 6,000 persons were initially enlisted and trained,Bakhash, Shaul, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, Basic Books, 1984, p. 63 but the guard eventually grew into "a full-scale" military force.Mackey, Iranians (1996), p. 371 It has been described as "without a doubt the strongest institution of the revolution".Schirazi, Constitution of Iran, (1997) p. 151

Serving under the Pasdaran were/are the Baseej-e Mostaz'afin ("Oppressed Mobilization"), volunteers originally made up of those too old or young to serve in other bodies. Baseej have also been used to attack demonstrators and newspaper offices that they believe to be enemies of the revolution.Keddie, Modern Iran, (2003) p. 275

Another revolutionary organization was the Islamic Republican Party started by Khomeini lieutenant Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti in February 1979. Made up of bazaari and political clergy,Moin, Khomeini (2000), pp. 210–11 it worked to establish theocratic government by velayat-e faqih in Iran, outmaneuvering opponents and wielding power on the street through the Hezbollah.

The first komiteh or Revolutionary Committees "sprang up everywhere" as autonomous organizations in late 1978. After the monarchy fell, the committees grew in number and power but not discipline.Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, (1984), p. 56 In Tehran alone there were 1,500 committees. Komiteh served as "the eyes and ears" of the new government, and are credited by critics with "many arbitrary arrests, executions and confiscations of property".Moin, Khomeini (2000) p. 211

Also enforcing the will of the new government were the Hezbollahi (followers of the Party of God), "strong-arm thugs" who attacked demonstrators and offices of newspapers critical of Khomeini.Schirazi, Constitution of Iran, (1987)p. 153

Non-Khomeini groups Two major political groups formed after the fall of the shah that clashed with pro-Khomeini groups and were eventually suppressed were the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Muslim People's Republic Party (MPRP). The first was a somewhat more leftist version of the National Front. The MPRP was a competitor to the Islamic Republican Party that, unlike that body, favored pluralism, opposed summary executions and attacks on peaceful demonstrations and was associated with Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari.

Armed erstwhile allies of Khomeini included the People's Mujahedin, Fedaian (majority), Fedaian (minority), Fedai Guerrillas. They had failed in building a connection with the masses they sought but following release of prisoners and the 1977-8 "revolutionary upsurge", had succeeded in providing the armed muscle to deliver the Shah's "regime its coup de grace" in 1979.Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.495

Concern about foreign interference Marxist guerrillas and federalist parties revolted against Islamist forces in some regions comprising Khuzistan, Kurdistan, and Gonbad-e Qabus. which resulted in fighting between them and the Islamic forces. These revolts began in April 1979 and lasted for several months to more than a year, depending on the region. In May 1979, the Furqan Group (Guruh-i Furqan) assassinated an important lieutenant of Khomeini, Morteza Motahhari.

Establishment of Islamic Republic Government Referendum of 12 Farvardin On March 30 and 31 1979 (Farvardin 10, 11) a referendum was held over whether to replace the monarchy with an "Islamic Republic"—a term not defined on the ballot. Supporting the vote and the change were the Islamic Republican Party, Iran Freedom Movement, National Front, Muslim People's Republic Party, and the Tudeh Party. Urging a boycott were the National Democratic Front, Fadayan, and several Kurdish parties. Khomeini called for a massive turnout, and most Iranians supported the change.Bakhash, Shaul, Reign of the Ayatollahs, (1984) p. 73 Following the vote, the government announced that 98.2% had voted in favor, and Khomeini declaring the result a victory of "the oppressed ... over the arrogant."

Writing of the constitution

On June 18, 1979, the Freedom Movement released its draft constitution for the Islamic Republic that it had been working on since Khomeini was in exile. It included a Guardian Council to veto un-Islamic legislation, but had no Guardian Jurist Ruler.Moin, Khomeini, 2000, p. 217. Leftists found the draft too conservative and in need of major changes, but Khomeini declared it 'correct'.Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, 1997, p. 22–23. To approve the new constitution a 73-member Assembly of Experts for Constitution was elected that summer. Critics complained that "vote-rigging, violence against undesirable candidates and the dissemination of false information" was used to "produce an assembly overwhelmingly dominated by clergy loyal to Khomeini."Moin, Khomeini, (2001), p. 218