Ressentiment (full German title: Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil) is a 1912 book by Max Scheler (1874–1928), who is sometimes considered to have been both the most respected and neglected of the major early 20th-century German Continental philosophers in the phenomenological tradition. His observations and insights concerning "a special form of human hate" and related social and psychological phenomenon furnished a descriptive basis for his philosophical concept of "Ressentiment". As a widely recognized convention, the French spelling of this term has been retained in philosophical circles so as to preserve a broad sense of discursive meaning and application. Scheler died unexpectedly of a heart attack in 1928 leaving a vast body of unfinished works. Extrapolations from his thoughts have always since piqued interest and discussion on a variety of topics. His works were on the Nazi book burn list.
As a concept belonging to the study of ethics, Ressentiment represents the antithetical process of Scheler's emotively informed non-formal ethics of values. But Ressentiment can also be said to be, at once, Scheler's darkest as well as his most psychological and sociological of topics, foreshadowing many later findings in those particular social sciences.
Folk wisdom comes closest to Scheler's meaning by recognizing Ressentiment as a self-defeating turn of mind which is non-productive and ultimately a waste of time and energy. Maturity informs most of us that sustained hatred hurts the hater far more than the object of our hate. Sustained hatred enslaves by preventing emotional growth from progressing beyond the sense of pain having been precipitated, in some way, by whom or what is hated (i.e., another person, group or class of persons).
Background It is difficult to imagine the intellectual concern of the late 19th and early 20th century over the collective drift in Western civilization away from old-guard monarchical and hierarchical societal structures (i.e., one's station in life being determined primarily by birth), toward the relative uncertainty and instability embodied in such Enlightenment era ideals as democracy, nationhood, class struggle (Karl Marx), human equality, humanism, egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the like. As such, Ressentiment, as a phenomenon, was first viewed as a pseudo-ethically based political force enabling the lower classes of society to rise in their situation in life at the (perceived) expense of the higher or more inherently "noble" classes. Hence, Ressentiment first emerged as what some might view a reactionary and elitist concept by today's democratic standards; while others of a more conservative mind-set might view Ressentiment as liberalism disguised as a socialist attempt at usurping the role of individual responsibility and self-determination. In any event, Scheler's contributions regarding this topic can not be fully appreciated without some cursory reference to the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900).
Friedrich Nietzsche used the term Ressentiment to explain this emerging degenerative morality issuing from an underlying existential distinction between what he saw as the two basic character options available to the individual: the Strong (the "Master") or the Weak (the "Slave"). The Master-type fully accepts the burdens of freedom and decides a path of self-determination. The Slave, rather than deciding to be the authentic author of their own destiny, chooses a repressed unsatisfying mode of life, blaming (by projection) his submissiveness, loss of self-esteem and pitiful lot in life upon the dominant Master figure (and their entire social class) who by contrast seems to flourish at every moment. A true enough assessment, given that economic exploitation always seems to lie at the heart of any intrinsic Master / Slave social arrangement, along with the Master class "washing their hands" (so to speak) of the burdens of social responsibility. This underlying Ressentiment forms the underlying rationale for a code of conduct (e.g., passive acceptance of abuse, fear of reprisal for asserting personal rights due to implied intimidation, or inability to enjoy life) belonging to the Slave-type or class ("Slave Morality").
Nietzsche was an atheist and harbored a particular disdain for Christianity, which he viewed as playing a key role in supporting Slave Morality. In supporting the Weak and disadvantaged of humanity, Christianity undermined the authority, social position and cultural progress of the Strong. Nietzsche viewed the progress of such Slave Morality as a sort of violation of the natural order and a thwarting of the authentic advancements of civilization available only through the Strong. This view of a "natural order", so typical of 19th-century Europe (e.g., Darwin's Theory of Evolution) is expressed in Nietzsche's principle – Will to Power. Scheler, by comparison, ultimately viewed the universal salvic nature of Christian love as contradicting Nietzsche's assessments, and in later life developed an alternative metaphysical dualism of Vital Urge and Spirit: Vital Urge as closely allied to Will to Power, and Spirit as dependent yet truly distinct in character.
Contrary to Nietzsche's ultimate intent, much of his legacy ultimately led to an implosion of objectivity in which (i) truth became relative to individual perspective, (ii) "might ultimately made right" ("Social Darwinism"), and (iii) ethics would become subjective and solipsistic.
By contrast, Scheler, who also was sceptical over the historically emerging unchecked power of mass culture and the prevalence and leveling power of mediocrity upon ethical standards and upon the individual human person (as a unique sacred value), was nonetheless a theistic ethical objectivist.. For Scheler, the phenomenon of Ressentiment principally involved Spirit (as opposed to Will to Power, Drives or Vital Urge), which entailed deeper personal issues involving distortion of the objective realm of values, the self-poisoning of moral character, and personality disorder.
Basic features of Ressentiment Scheler's described Ressentiment in his 1913 book by the same title as follows:
"…Ressentiment is a self-poisoning of the mind which has quite definite causes and consequences. It is a lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic repression of certain emotions and affects which, as such, are normal components of human nature. Their repression leads to the constant tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value delusions and corresponding value judgments. The emotions and affects primarily concerned are revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract and spite."
Although scholars do not agree on a fixed number or attributes materially defining Ressentiment, they have nonetheless collectively articulated about ten authoritative and insightful points (frequently combining them) which stake out the boundaries of this concept:
1) Ressentiment must first and foremost be understood in relation to what Scheler termed the a priori hierarchy of value modalities. While the direction of personal transcendence and ethical action is one towards positive and higher values, the direction of Ressentiment and unethical action is one towards negative and lower values. Scheler viewed values as emotively experienced with reference to the aforementioned universal, objective, constant and unchanging hierarchy. From lowest to highest, these modalities (with their respective positive and corresponding negative dis-value forms) are as follows: sensual values of the agreeable and the disagreeable; vital values of the noble and vulgar; mental (psychic) values of the beautiful and ugly, right and wrong and truth and falsehood; and finally values of the Holy and Unholy of the Divine and Idols. Ressentiment represents the dark underside, or inversion, of Scheler's vision of a personal and transformational non-formal ethics of values.
2) Ressentiment, as a personal disposition, has its genesis in negative psychic feelings and feeling states which most people experience as normal reactive responses to the demands of social life: i.e., envy, jealousy, anger, hatred, spite, malice, joy at another's misfortune, mean-spirited competition, etc. The objective sources of such feeling states responses might be occasioned by almost anything: e.g., personal criticism, ridicule, mockery, rejection, abandonment, etc.
For the individual person, the ethical and psychological issue becomes how the energy from these feeling states will be channeled so as to better benefit the individual person and society.
3) Ressentiment is highly situational in character in that it always involves "mental comparisons" (value-judgments) with other people who allegedly have no such Ressentiment feelings, and who likewise exhibit genuinely positive values. Hence, although Ressentiment might begin with something like admiration and respect, but surely ends in a sort of coveting of those personal qualities and goods of another: i.e., advantages afforded by their beauty, intelligence, charm, wit, personality, education, talent, skills, possessions, wealth, work achievement, family affiliation and the like. This early stage of Ressentiment resembles what we might refer to today as an inferiority complex.
However, one can easily extend this notion of "comparing" to externally acquired qualifiers having the potential for negative valuations which also tend to a support consumer based economics: i.e., status symbol possessions (a lavish house, or car), expensive fashion accessories, special privileges, club memberships, plastic surgery and the like. This principle is expressed in our common colloquialism of "Keeping up with the Joneses'". The subliminal result of all of these "comparisons" tends to lend credence the idea that one's self-concept, self-image, self-esteem, worth or social desirability is linked to one's social inclusion or exclusion in a favoured superior class having the means to insulate themselves from the rest of society.
4) Ressentiment, as situational, also typically extends to inherent social roles. Many social roles involve relationships frequently occasioning some level of inter-personal value-judgment with accompanying negative psychic feelings and feeling states which suggest dominant and submissive roles, not unlike Nietzsche's Master-Slave dichotomy. For example:
The subordinate and/or submissive gender roles assigned to woman in terms of sexuality, child rearing and nurturing tasks. Generational Divides ("Generation Gaps"): The rejection of a younger generation by members of an older generation, due to the latter's inability to accept their own changes and to move beyond the value pursuits proper to those preceding stages of life. Also, the reverse is true. The rejection of an older generation by members of a younger generation due to the latter's inability to accept the fact that the older generation understands and sympathizes with the challenges they face. Progressive forms of inter-family and blended-family relations: e.g., younger siblings towards the elders' sense of entitlement; the hyper-critical mother-in-law towards the daughter-in-law;, or even the more contemporary abandonment of an ex-spouse in favour of a "trophy wife" or "trophy husband" as a status symbol signaling an increase in social status; the relational neglect towards children from a previous marriage over ones of the current; the reactions of peer friends and family to a romantic relationship involving partners of vastly different ages; the pathetic efforts of a mediocre ne’er-do-well child to live up to the standards of a successful high achieving parent, etc. The classic employee / employer adversarial relationships.