In 1992, Northern cod populations fell to 1% of historic levels, in large part from decades of overfishing. The Canadian federal minister of fisheries and oceans, John Crosbie, declared a moratorium on the Northern Cod fishery, which had primarily shaped the lives and communities of Canada's eastern coast for 500 years. A significant factor contributing to the depletion of the cod stocks off Newfoundland's shores was the introduction of equipment and technology that increased landed fish volume. From the 1950s onwards, new technology allowed fishers to trawl a larger area more deeply and for longer, with the catches peaking in the 1970s and 1980s. Cod stocks were depleted at a faster rate than could be replenished.
The trawlers also caught enormous amounts of non-commercial fish, which were economically unimportant but very important ecologically. The incidental catch undermined the stability of the ecosystem by depleting stocks of important predator and prey species.
Technological factors
A significant factor contributing to the depletion of the cod stocks off the shores of Newfoundland included the introduction and proliferation of equipment and technology that increased the volume of landed fish. For centuries, local fishers had used technology that limited the volume of their catch and the area that they fished. It also let them target specific species and ages of fish. From the 1950s onwards, as was common in all other industries, new technology was introduced that allowed fishers to trawl a larger area and to fish more deeply and for longer. By the 1960s, powerful trawlers that were equipped with radar, electronic navigation systems, and sonar allowed crews to pursue fish with unparalleled success, and Canadian catches peaked in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
The new technologies adversely affected the northern cod population by increasing both the area and the depth that were fished. The cod were being depleted until the surviving fish could not replenish the stock that was lost each year. The trawlers caught enormous amounts of non-commercial fish, which are very important ecologically. Economically-unimportant incidental catch undermines ecosystem stability by depleting stocks of important predator and prey species. Significant amounts of capelin, an important prey species for the cod, were caught as bycatch and further undermined the survival of the remaining cod stock.
Ecology Poor knowledge and understanding of the ocean ecosystem related with Newfoundland's Grand Banks and cod fisheries, as well as technical and environmental challenges associated with observational metrics, led to a misunderstanding of data on the "cod stocks," the residual and recoverable fish. Rather than metrics of megatonnage of harvest or average size of fish, metrics of the residuum had a high variation in the countable population because sampling errors and dynamic environmental factors like the ocean temperature made it difficult to discern the effects of exploitation to an amateur regulator. That led to uncertainty of predictions about the "cod stock," which made it difficult for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in Canada to choose the appropriate course of action when the federal government's priorities were elsewhere.
Socioeconomic factors In addition to ecological considerations, social and economic factors also influenced decisions on the future of the fisheries. Throughout Atlantic Canada but especially in Newfoundland, the cod fishery was a source of social and cultural identity. For many families, it also represented their livelihood since most families were connected directly or indirectly with the fishery as fishermen, fish plant workers, fish sellers, fish transporters, or employees in related businesses. Additionally, many companies, both foreign and domestic, and individuals had invested heavily in the fishery's boats, equipment, and infrastructure.
Mismanagement In 1949, Newfoundland joined Canada as a province and so its fishery fell under the management of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). The department mismanaged the resource and allowed overfishing.
In 1968, the cod catch peaked at 810,000 tons, approximately three times more than the maximum yearly catch achieved before the super-trawlers. Around eight million tons of cod were caught between 1647 and 1750 (103 years), encompassing 25 to 40 cod generations. The factory trawlers took the same amount in 15 years. In 1969, the number of fishing trawlers increased, and coastal fishermen complained.Taking Stock [Motion picture]. (1994). Canada. That resulted in the federal government redefining the offshore fishery boundaries several times. In 1976, the Canadian government declared the right under the UNCLOS to manage the fisheries in an exclusive economic zone that extended to offshore. Fish mortality decreased immediately, not because of a rise in cod stocks but because foreign trawlers could no longer fish the waters. Therefore, DFO set quotas overestimating the total supply and increased the total allowable catch. With the absence of foreign fishing, many Canadian and American fishing trawlers took their place, and the number of cod kept diminishing past the point of recovery.
Many local fishers noticed the drastic decrease of cod and tried to inform local government officials. In a 1978 white paper, the Newfoundland government stated:Government of Newfoundland and Labrador: White Paper on Strategies and Programs for Fisheries Development to 1985 (St. John's, 1978), p. 2.
In 1986, scientists reviewed calculations and data and determined that the total allowable catch rate had to be cut in half to conserve cod stocks. However, even with the new statistics brought to light, no changes were made in the allotted yearly catch of cod. With only a limited knowledge of cod biology, scientists predicted that the population of the species would rebound from its low point in 1975.
In the early-1990s, however, the industry collapsed entirely. In 1992, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans John Crosbie set the quota for cod at 187,969 tonnes, even though only 129,033 tonnes had been caught the previous year. Months later, the government announced a two-year moratorium on cod fishing. The moratorium was limited in the hope that the northern cod population and thus the fishery would recover. By 1993, facing the collapse of six cod populations, the government removed the limit and extended the moratorium indefinitely. Spawning biomass had decreased by at least 75% in all stocks, by 90% in three of the six stocks, and by 99% in the case of "northern" cod, which was once the largest cod fishery in the world. The previous increases in catches had been wrongly thought to be caused by "the stock growing" but were really caused by new technology such as trawlers.
Intense fishing pressure also contributed to fisheries-induced evolution in northern cod. Maturation reaction norms of northern cod had shifted towards younger ages and smaller sizes in the decade that led up to the collapse. The small size at maturity has continued into the mid 2000s, despite stricter fishing regulations, which supports the theory that there have been genetic changes in growth in Northern cod populations in response to size-selective fishing. In addition, the trend has been attributed to a hypothesis suggesting that selection differentials that are caused by the environment are not as strong as the artificial selection differentials that have been imposed by heavy fishing. Other factors for the slow recovery of the original life-history characteristics of cod include lower genetic heritable variation from overexploitation. It has been estimated that such a full recovery of life-history characteristics in a population of cod may take up to 84 years.
Impact on Newfoundland Approximately 37,000 fishermen and fish plant workers lost their jobs by the collapse of the cod fisheries; many people had to find new jobs or further their education to find employment. The effects are reflected in the Canadian folklorist and songwriter Shelley Posen's song "No More Fish, No Fishermen," and heavily covered in contemporary media.
The collapse of the northern cod fishery marked a profound change in the ecological, economic, and sociocultural structure of Atlantic Canada. The 1992 moratorium was the largest industrial closure in Canadian history and was expressed most acutely in Newfoundland, whose continental shelf lay under the region that was the most heavily fished. Over 35,000 fishermen and plant workers from over 400 coastal communities became unemployed. In response to dire warnings of social and economic consequences, the federal government initially provided income assistance through the Northern Cod Adjustment and Recovery Program and later through the Atlantic Groundfish Strategy, which included money specifically for the retraining of those workers displaced by the closing of the fishery. Newfoundland has since experienced a dramatic environmental, industrial, economic, and social restructuring, including considerable outward migration, increased economic diversification, and increased emphasis on education. As the predatory groundfish population declined, a thriving invertebrates fishing industry emerged, snow crab and northern shrimp proliferated, which provides the basis for a new initiative roughly equivalent in economic value to the cod fishery that it replaced.
Post-collapse management In 1997, the Minister for DFO partly lifted the ban on Canadian cod fishing ten days before a federal election. However, independent Canadian scientists and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea doubted there had been sufficient recovery. In general, depleted populations of cod and other gadids do not appear to recover easily when pressure from fishing is reduced or stopped.
In 1998, the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) assessed Atlantic cod. COSEWIC's designations, in theory, are informed by reports that it commissions and by expert discussion in the panel, and it claims to be scientific and apolitical. Recognizing faults in processes is not recreational but is an essential step in their improvement. In this case, much was mishandled. One observer, who opined that the "this process stinks," later joined and then became Chair of COSEWIC, which listed Atlantic cod as "vulnerable" (this category later renamed "special concern") on a single-unit basis: assuming a single homogeneous population. The assigned basis (single-unit) of designation and the level (vulnerable) contrasted to the range of designations, including "endangered"Ottawa Citizen April 18, 1998, p. 1 for some of the ten management (sub) units addressed in the report that COSEWIC had commissioned from Dr. K.N.I. Bell. The contradiction between the report and the listing reflected political pressure from the DFO; such bureaucratic pressure had been evident through three years of drafts.
The 1998 designation followed on from a deferral in 1997 and bureaucratic tactics that included what one COSEWIC insider characterized as "a plan to make it late." Press interest before the 1998 meeting had, however, likely deterred a further deferral. COSEWIC's "single-unit" basis of listing was at the behest of DFO, which had demanded in criticism (properly given the new evidence) that the report address multiple stocks. Bell had agreed with that criticism and revised accordingly, but DFO then changed its mind without explanation.