Sa'id Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al Shihri (Arabic: سعيد علي جابر الخثيم الشهري) was a Saudi Arabian deputy leader of the designated terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and possibly involved in the kidnappings and murders of foreigners in Yemen. Said Ali al-Shihri was captured at the Durand Line, in December 2001, and was one of the first detainees held at the Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba, arriving on 21 January 2002. He was held in extrajudicial detention in American custody for almost six years. Following his repatriation to Saudi custody he was enrolled in a rehabilitation and reintegration program. Following his release, he traveled to Yemen.
In January 2009, Al-Shihri appeared in a YouTube video, with three other men, announcing the founding of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
On 24 December 2009, it was reported that he may have been killed in an air strike in Yemen. But on 19 January 2010, Yemen security authorities reported they had captured him. On 22 February 2010, the Yemen Post reported that the release of an audio recording, after the reports of his death, or capture, confirmed he was at large. Yemen officials reported he was killed by a drone strike on 10 September 2012. Six days later, a Yemeni official told the London-based daily Asharq Al-Awsat that DNA tests reportedly determined he was not killed in the drone strike.
On 20 September 2012, sources close to AQAP told the Yemen Observer that al-Shihri was not killed in the strike. Yemeni officials also told the same newspaper that contrary to what Asharq Al-Aswat reported, no DNA tests had yet been taken and that the United States had requested that the Yemeni government wait until an American team of examiners could administer the DNA tests on the corpses of the men killed in the drone strike.
On 21 October 2012, al-Shihri released an audio tape confirming that he was not killed in the drone strike. On 22 January 2013, it was reported that al-Shihri had died of wounds from a drone strike in late 2012.
On 17 July 2013, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula confirmed that he had been killed in a U.S. drone strike instead of succumbing to wounds. In August 2014, the group revealed in a video that the drone strike that killed al-Shihri took place in 2013 and that he had survived the 2012 drone strike but was severely wounded.
Early life The Yemen Post reports al-Shihri did not finish high school. According to the United States Department of Defense, al-Shihri spent two months in Afghanistan in approximately 2000, and trained at the Libyan training camp north of Kabul.
Al-Shihri said that he was in Afghanistan to purchase carpets for his family's furniture business. He denied any knowledge of weapons or participation in hostilities.
In 2001, al-Shihri left Saudi Arabia and went to Bahrain. He was on a watch list because he was suspected of funding other fighters' travels to Afghanistan after 9-11. He was also accused of helping Saudis acquire false travel documents to enter into Afghanistan. Specifically he was accused of meeting with "a group of extremists in Mashad, Iran", and briefing them on entry procedures into Afghanistan via the Al-Tayyibat crossing.
Capture Al-Shihri was captured at the Pakistan border crossing in December 2001 near Spin Boldak. He was traveling with an Afghan driver, another Saudi man who worked with the Red Crescent, and a member from the Saudi embassy in Pakistan, in a vehicle taking supplies to a camp in Afghanistan. He was found with an injured leg incurred during the American aerial bombardment of Afghanistan. He was also allegedly carrying $1,900.
He claimed he wanted to give the money to the Red Crescent charity organization, but according to the US, he used the money to finance the travel for other fighters traveling from Bahrain to Afghanistan.
Combatant Status Review
Initially the Bush administration asserted they could withhold the protections of the Geneva Conventions from captives in the war on terror, while critics argued the Conventions obliged the United States to conduct competent tribunals to determine the status of prisoners. Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals, to determine whether the captives met the new definition of an "enemy combatant".
Detainees do not have the right to a lawyer before the CSRTs or to access the evidence against them. The CSRTs are not bound by the rules of evidence that would apply in court, and the government’s evidence is presumed to be “genuine and accurate.” However, unclassified summaries of relevant evidence may be provided to the detainee and each detainee has an opportunity to present “reasonably available” evidence and witnesses.
From July 2004 through March 2005, a CSRT was convened to make a determination whether each captive had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Said Ali al-Shihri was among the one-third of prisoners for whom there was no indication they chose to participate in their tribunals.OARDEC, Index to Transcripts of Detainee Testimony and Documents Submitted by Detainees at Combatant Status Review Tribunals Held at Guantanamo Between July 2004 and March 2005 , September 4, 2007
In the landmark case Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court found that CSRTs are not an adequate substitute for the constitutional right to challenge one's detention in court, in part because they do not have the power to order detainees released. The Court also found that "there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact."
A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal, listing the alleged facts that led to his detainment. His memo accused him of the following: he traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan, after 11 September 2001, with $1,900, that he planned to give to the Red Crescent charity; he was an "al Qaida travel facilitator", who funded other fighters, and guided them on how to cross the Afghanistan–Iran border; he was on a watch list because he was suspected of helping Saudis acquire false travel documents, for traveling to Afghanistan; he trained at the Libyan camp north of Kabul; he was instructed to assassinate someone, via a fatwa; his leg was wounded during the American aerial bombardment of Afghanistan.
Administrative Review Board Detainees whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to assess the threat a detainee might pose if released or transferred, and whether there were other factors that warranted his continued detention.
2005 Summary of evidence memo The three-page Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his 2005 annual review listed fifteen "primary factors favor[ing] continued detention" and eight "primary factors favor[ing] release or transfer." According to the 2005 memo he did not enter Afghanistan across its western border with Iran but across its eastern border with Pakistan. According to the 2005 memo the instructions he received to assassinate someone were from Sheikh Hamud Al-Uqqla. According to the 2005 memo he met Abu Faisal al Ghamdi, the Herat regional director for the charity al Wafa which American intelligence officials assert had ties to terrorism, and another al Wafa director had his phone number in his pocket litter. The 2005 memo repeated al-Shihri's account of his travel and wounding in Afghanistan—that he traveled there for humanitarian purposes, and was wounded within 17 hours of his arrival. He claimed he had never heard of either al Wafa or al Qaida prior to his arrival in Guantanamo. He denied any knowledge of weapons or participation in hostilities, or any participation in assisting militant recruits to travel to Afghanistan. He stated that Osama bin Laden "did not represent Islam".
2006 Summary of Evidence memo The four page Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his 2006 annual review listed twenty-two "primary factors favor[ing] continued detention" and nine "primary factors favor[ing] release or transfer". According to the 2006 memo, he decided to do charity work in Pakistan after he heard a speech by Shaykh Abdullah al-Jibrin at the Al-Rajeh mosque in Saudi Arabia and saw videos of Afghan refugees. According to the 2006 memo, he had previously traveled to the Pakistan border with Afghanistan to observe the work in a refugee camp near Chaman, Pakistan. The 2006 memo was more specific about his assistance to potential fighters, stating: "The detainee met with a group of extremists in Mashad, Iran following the 11 September 2001 attacks and briefed them on entry procedures into Afghanistan via the Al-Tayyibat crossing."
The 2006 memo was also more specific about where he crossed—near Spin Buldak: "The detainee traveled with an Afghan driver, another Saudi man who worked with the Red Crescent, and a member from the Saudi embassy in Pakistan, in a vehicle taking supplies to a camp in Afghanistan." The camp was about 5 kilometers from the border between Spin Buldak Afghanistan and Quetta, Pakistan. The 2006 memo stated one of his aliases: "was among 100 names taken from Afghanistan-based military training cmap applications located at an Arab office in Kandahar". The 2006 memo quoted the individual who claimed Al-Shihri had "instigated" him to assassinate a writer, based on Al-Uqqla's fatwa. According to this version, Al-Shihri was not wounded; he had successfully fled Afghanistan, through Iran, to Kuwait. The 2006 memo also stated he was taken to a hospital run by the Red Crescent society in Pakistan, and that he was arrested in the hospital.
2007 Summary of evidence memo
The three-page Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his 2007 annual review listed just eleven "primary factors favor[ing] continued detention" and six "primary factors favor[ing] release or transfer". No new allegations were added. On 9 January 2009, the Department of Defense published two heavily redacted memos, from Al-Shihri's Board, to Gordon R. England, the Designated Civilian Official. The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England decision, made on 23 July 2007, was also redacted.
Guantanamo medical records On 16 March 2007, the Department of Defense published records of the captives' height and weights. Al-Shihri's height was reported as 62 inches tall. His weight was recorded 46 times between his arrival on 21 January 2002, when he weighed 138 pounds, and 19 November 2006, when he weighed 171 pounds.
Repatriation On 25 November 2008, the Department of Defense released a list of the dates captives departed from Guantanamo. According to that list he was repatriated to Saudi custody on 9 November 2007, with thirteen other men. The records published from the captives' annual Administrative Reviews show his repatriation was the subject of formal internal review procedures in 2005, 2006 and 2007. But the Board's recommendations from the 2007 review—the only one to be published—were redacted. The conclusion the Designated Civilian Official authorized was also redacted.
At least ten other men in his release group were not repatriated through the formal review procedure.
Peter Taylor writing for the BBC News called the Saudis repatriated on 9 November 2007 with al-Shihri, "batch 10". He wrote that the BBC's research had found this batch to be a problematic cohort, and that al-Shihri and four other men from this batch were named on the Saudi most wanted list.
Post-release After Sa'id's repatriation to Saudi custody he went through a Saudi rehabilitation and reintegration program for former jihadists. This program was partially sponsored by the United States.
Co-founded Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula In January 2009, after Sa'id's release from the Saudi rehabilitation program he appeared in several jihadist videos, including one where he was identified as second in command of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.