The Wehrmacht forces for the Ardennes Offensive were the product of a German recruitment effort targeting German males between the ages of 16 and 60, to replace troops lost during the past five months of fighting the Western Allies on the Western Front. Although the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) was keeping the Allied forces contained along the Siegfried Line, the campaign had cost the Wehrmacht nearly 750,000 casualties, mostly irreplaceable. However, the rapid advance of the Allied armies in August and September 1944 after Operation Overlord had created a supply problem for the Allies. By October, the progress of the Western Allies' three army groups had slowed considerably, allowing the Germans to partly rebuild their strength and prepare for the defense of Germany itself. Adolf Hitler decided that the only way to reverse his fortunes would be to launch a counter-offensive on the Western Front, forcing both the United States and Great Britain to an early peace, and allowing the Wehrmacht to shift its forces to the Eastern Front, where it could defeat the much larger Soviet Red Army.
Hitler earmarked three field armies for the offensive: the 7th and the Fifth and Sixth Panzer. These accumulated over 240,000 soldiers, spread over seven panzer divisions, two panzer brigades and thirteen infantry divisions. The bulk of the offensive's armored strength was in the Sixth Panzer Army, which was tasked with the capture of the Belgian port of Antwerp. To its south was the Fifth Panzer Army, outfitted to protect the Sixth's flank while it crossed the Meuse river. The southernmost flank was covered by the Seventh Army, composed of three infantry corps and ordered to protect the Fifth Army's southern flank and tie down American reserves in Luxembourg.
Apart from these three armies the Wehrmacht also designed two special units to aid the offensive. One of these was a battalion-sized airborne formation tasked with dropping behind American lines during the first day of the offensive, allowing a panzer division from the Sixth Panzer Army easy access across the Meuse. The second unit was a panzer brigade, intending to go behind enemy lines dressed in American uniforms to give false orders and spread confusion among American defenders in the Ardennes. Also earmarked for the offensive were around 800 aircraft, deployed by the Luftwaffe (German Air Force), to provide air support to German forces and destroy much of the Allied air power on the ground.
To prepare these forces the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German High Command) increased the call-up age range and recruited from Eastern European countries controlled by German forces, increasing manpower on the Western Front from roughly 400,000 to just over one million soldiers. Hastily organized into new divisions, these infantrymen lacked training and sometimes even weapons. Despite an immense German effort in the face of intense Allied bombing to build the necessary stocks for the offensive, there were shortages of fuel, ammunition, weapons and manpower by the scheduled date of the counterattack. Even the elite Waffen-SS divisions were often deficient in manpower.
Background
By 1 December 1944, the only sector of the front where the Western Allies were not on the offensive was along the Ardennes.Ambrose (1998), p. 272 In late July 1944, Allied forces in fighting in Normandy were able to break out of the Normandy beachhead in Operation Cobra,Ambrose (1997), p. 86 forcing a general eastwards retreat of German forces.Ambrose (1997), p. 87 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front, used the opportunity to encircle the German army in Normandy.Ambrose (1998), p. 225 In an effort to reverse their misfortunes, the Wehrmacht launched Operation Lüttich on 7 August in the vicinity of the town of Mortain.Ambrose (1997), pp. 91–92 Despite efforts to break through the U.S. 30th Infantry Division to cut off Allied forces in Northern France,Hemingway (2003), p. 69 by 13 August it was clear that the offensive had failed.Hemingway (2003), p. 75 Even while battle was raging around Mortain, Allied armies continued the encirclement of the Wehrmacht in Normandy, closing what would be known as the Falaise Pocket on 20 August; the encirclement cost the Germans an estimated 10,000 dead and another 50,000 wounded.Hemingway (2003), pp. 74–75 Although a much larger number of German soldiers were able to escape eastwards, they were forced to leave behind their heavy weapons and equipment.Ambrose (1998), p. 228 Paris was liberated on 25 August 1944, marking the end of Operation Overlord.Ambrose (1997), pp. 105–106
Almost immediately, the Allied drive across the Seine River continued, although the Wehrmacht was able to prevent a complete rout; according to the Germans, the equipment abandoned as they retreated from the Seine was as much of a disaster as the Falaise Pocket.Cooper (1978), p. 512 Field Marshal Walter Model, who had temporarily replaced Gerd von Rundstedt as commander of German troops in France, reported that some panzer divisions only had five to ten operational tanks, while he could not match the Western Allies' mobility with his poorly outfitted infantry divisions.Cooper (1978), pp. 512–513 By early September, as the Allies pushed to the German border, Model calculated that the actual strength of the 74 divisions at his disposal was no more than that of 25.Cooper (1978), p. 513 In an effort to stabilize German lines in the West, von Rundstedt was reappointed as Commander-in-Chief West on 7 September 1944.Cooper (1978), pp. 513–514 Approaching the Belgian border in early September the Allied offensive came to a grinding halt, as its supply lines struggled to keep up with the pace of the advance.Ambrose (1998), p. 229 For example, on 2 September, Lieutenant General George Patton's U.S. Third Army requested of gasoline, and received .Ambrose (1998), p. 236
The Wehrmacht began to reorganize itself along a defensive front known as the Siegfried Line.Ambrose (1998), pp. 229–231 Eisenhower felt that he could relieve the supply problem by using Antwerp to unload supplies in Europe; however, German troops held the Scheldt estuary and consequently Allied shipping could not get through to the Belgian port city.Ambrose (1997), pp. 117–118 In an effort to open the Scheldt estuary, Eisenhower approved Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Operation Market Garden, which was launched on 17 September.Ambrose (1997), pp. 120–121 However, by 21 September the operation had failed to dislodge German defenders from the southern Netherlands and open the seaway to Antwerp; the supply problem was at its worst.Ambrose (1997), pp. 129–131
Using the opportunity to rebuild their strength, the German Army in the West was able to accumulate a strength of around 500 tanks and assault guns by late September, despite prioritization of new equipment for the Eastern Front.McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 219–220 This was in stark contrast to the estimated 100 which had been available before.Yeide (2005), p. 25 German defenses along the Siegfried Line continued to strengthen, and the Wehrmacht was able to establish a defensive depth of an average of , with the strongest defenses built opposite of Patton's Third Army.Yeide (2005), pp. 25–26
Despite Germany's reorganization, their manpower was still incomparable to that of the Western Allies. While Germany's Army Group B was able to increase their armored strength from 100 to 239 vehicles, these were opposed by 2,300 Allied tanks.Cooper (1978), p. 517 Field Marshal Model reported that only 6,500 replacements had been sent to cover the 75,000 casualties suffered during the month of September.Cooper (1978), pp. 517–518 General Eisenhower commanded three army groups, totaling eight field armies with 55 divisions; these provided a two-to-one advantage in artillery guns and a twenty-to-one advantage in tanks, and could count on almost 14,000 combat aircraft, as compared to the Luftwaffe's 573.Ambrose (1997), pp. 132–133
Battles along the Siegfried Line
Patton's Third Army was tasked with the capture of Metz and the Lorraine; his first obstacle was Fort Driant, built in 1902 and improved over the years by both the French and the Germans.Ambrose (1997), p. 136 Expecting only a small garrison, the Third Army launched its attack on 27 September 1944.Ambrose (1997), p. 137 Despite heavy aerial and artillery bombardment, no appreciable damage was done to the giant fortress.Shaffer (2006), p. 34 Several ground attacks carried out between 27 September and 11 October failed in taking the fort, and ultimately General Patton was forced to call off the attack and look for another route to Metz.Shaffer (2006), pp. 34–35 & 77 Fort Driant did not fall until after Patton had successfully taken Metz and the majority of forts around Driant.Shaffer (2006), p. 77 The Third Army's battle around Metz had cost an estimated 47,000 American casualties.Ambrose (1997), p. 165 This was reflected in the fact that, while in August the Third Army had advanced , it advanced only between September and December 1944.Ambrose (1997), pp. 164–165
The 256,300 man strongYiede (2005), p. 30 U.S. First Army, commanded by General Courtney Hodges, was ordered to break through the Siegfried Line around the area of Aachen,Ambrose (1997), p. 142 in order to reach the Rur river.Yeide (2005), p. 33 Although the First Army began to encircle the area around Aachen in early September,Whitlock (2008), p. 37 the Battle of Aachen did not end until 21 October.Whitlock (2008), pp. 44–45 The city cost the Americans roughly 3,000 casualties, but had opened the path to the Rur.Whitlock (2008), p. 45 Despite the casualties taken the ground gained was comparatively worthless, and the fighting for Aachen had not necessarily brought German defeat any closer.Ambrose (1997), pp. 166–167
The Germans, too, had suffered heavy casualties; the 116th Panzer Division, for example, had lost its offensive capabilities after countless attempts to break the U.S. First Army's encirclement of Aachen.Yeide (2005), pp. 96–97 This gave American and British commanders a false sense of security, believing that the Wehrmacht did not have the strength to launch a counteroffensive.Ambrose (1997), p. 167 Given their view on the state of the German armed forces and their need to push to the Rur, the First Army decided to drive German forces out of the Hürtgen Forest—located on the Belgian–German border—in an attempt to take a series of dams which could be used by the Germans to flood the valley below.Ambrose (1998), p. 266
The Battle of Hürtgen Forest began on 19 September, with the assault of the 3rd Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions.Ambrose (1997), pp. 167–168 The battle quickly turned into one of attrition; by mid-October the two Allied divisions had lost nearly 80% of their total combat strength, or roughly 4,500 men, while the Germans had lost close to 3,300.Ambrose (1997), p. 168 On 2 November the U.S. 28th Infantry Division entered the fight, but was not able to make headway and was forced to defend itself against German counterattacks between 5–7 November.Ambrose (1997), pp. 168–169 The 28th Infantry Division lost over 6,100 combat casualties in Hürtgen.Ambrose (1997), p. 170
Unable to pry the Hürtgen from German hands, the Americans sent the 4th Infantry Division into the battle and between 7 November and 3 December this division lost over 7,000 personnel.Ambrose (1997), pp. 170–171 After also throwing the 8th Infantry Division into the attack it was able to take the town of Hürtgen, but was not able to advance much farther given the number of casualties it had sustained.Ambrose (1997), pp. 172–173 In total, American forces suffered 24,000 combat casualties and had failed to reach their original objectives, the dams.Ambrose (1997), p. 177