The Maurice Debate was a debate in the British House of Commons which took place on 9 May 1918, during the First World War. A senior British Army officer, Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, alleged that the War Cabinet had misled Parliament about troop strengths on the Western Front. The leader of the Liberal Party, H. H. Asquith, took up the allegations and attacked Prime Minister David Lloyd George, also a Liberal. The debate ripped apart the Liberal Party. While Asquith's attack was ineffective, Lloyd George vigorously defended his position, treating the debate like a vote of confidence. He won over the House with a powerful, if misleading, speech, rebutting all of Maurice's allegations. The debate did not cause the profound split in the Liberal Party, but did make it more visible and harder to heal. The main results were to strengthen Lloyd George, weaken Asquith, end public criticism of overall strategy, and strengthen civilian control of the military.John Gooch, "The Maurice Debate 1918," Journal of Contemporary History (1968) 3#4 pp. 211–228 in JSTOR
Background to the affair Prime Minister David Lloyd George and those close to him had long grown exasperated by the unreliable statistics produced by the Army about both British and German strength. Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey had written in his diary (20 December 1917) "The War office figures and statements are utterly unreliable, and their facts are twisted to support their arguments. If they want men they make out that they can hardly hold the line … If they want to do an offensive they make out that the enemy is exhausted and demoralised, and that they have lots of men".Grigg 2002, pp. 506–7
General Sir William Robertson was removed as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS – professional head of the Army) in February 1918 after months of argument with the government about manpower and deployment of resources between fronts, and was suspected of engaging in political intrigues to return to power.John Grigg, Lloyd George: War leader, 1916–1918 (2002) p. 503.
Shortly after Robertson's removal, the German Spring Offensive of 21 March 1918 came close to inflicting catastrophic defeat on Hubert Gough's Fifth Army. With the British forces still hard-pressed in April, the causes of the near debacle became a matter of political controversy. Lloyd George felt that Field Marshal Haig had squandered British manpower to little useful effect in his offensives of 1916–17, whilst the British military and their political and press allies felt, not without reason, that the Government had left the BEF starved of men (John Grigg argues that he had been justified in doing so, as Haig had been intending to resume the offensive at the start of 1918). Lloyd George quoted official War Office figures in a speech in the House of Commons on 9 April 1918, stating that the BEF had been stronger on 1 January 1918 than a year previously (the eve of the German offensive in March might have been a better comparison than January, in John Grigg's view). Lloyd George also said that there had been only one "white" division in Mesopotamia and three in Egypt and Palestine, the rest of the divisions in those theatres being Indian divisions containing only a small proportion of British troops.Grigg 2002, pp. 491, 506–7
Maj-Gen Maurice, a long-standing protégé of Robertson's, was now in his final weeks as Director of Military Operations (DMO). He paid a visit to Haig's GHQ in France (where he was offered, but apparently declined, a staff position) and recorded (15 April) that officers at Haig's staff were dissatisfied with Lloyd George's speech of 9 April.Grigg 2002, p. 491
On 18 April a Liberal backbencher asked whether Lloyd George's figures included non-combatants (e.g. labourers, many of them Indian, Chinese or black South Africans, who built roads and railways and helped to move heavy equipment). Ian Macpherson, Under-Secretary at the War Office, replied using figures from the Adjutant-General's Department, sent by Colonel Walter Kirke, Deputy DMO (Maurice was still technically DMO until 20 April).Grigg 2002, pp. 491–2
On 22 April a weekly summary from the same department informed the War Office that the Germans had had a rifle superiority of 330,000 at the start of the year. Lloyd George was furious at this contradiction of his own 9 April figures and the 18 April figures used by Macpherson. He wrote an angry letter to Milner (Secretary of State for War), calling the figures "extraordinarily slipshod". The German superiority was then pared back to 262,000 by including troops in Italy in the British total.Grigg 2002, pp. 491–2, 502–3, 506–7
Then on 23 April came questions in the House to the Conservative Leader Bonar Law (the Conservatives were supporting Lloyd George's coalition government) about how Gough's Army had been thinly stretched after taking over a section of French line earlier in 1918. Law replied somewhat disingenuously (see below) that Haig and Philippe Pétain (French Commander-in-Chief) had agreed the extension of the British sector to Barisis between themselves, rather than being leant on by the Supreme War Council at Versailles. The Morning Post was calling openly for the fall of the government at this stage.
Maurice's letter Maurice had a meeting with Robertson on 29 April. From the context (letters from Robertson 29 and 30 April) it is clear that Robertson suggested writing to Henry Wilson, Robertson's successor as CIGS, and then, if necessary to the press. Robertson initially suggested he speak to Liberal leader and former prime minister Asquith, but Maurice did not do so (in Grigg's view Asquith probably would have advised against going to the press), and Robertson changed his mind later the same day.Grigg 2002, p492
Robertson encouraged Maurice to write the letter, but did not back him openly, causing Lloyd George's biographer John Grigg to conclude, "Robertson is the person who comes worst out of the affair." There is, however, little evidence to confirm Lloyd George's suspicions of a wider plot involving senior military and political figures, to bring down the government.Roy Jenkins, Asquith; Papermac 1994 edition, p. 469
Maurice wrote to Wilson on 30 April.French 1995, pp. 234–5 Wilson did not reply to Maurice's letter. There is no evidence of Wilson's views, or whether he launched any inquiry of his own about the different figures being produced.Grigg 2002, pp. 492, 502–3 However, Hankey later told Liddell Hart in 1932 that he had a friendly conversation with Maurice on the eve of his press letter, telling him that Lloyd George thought highly of him and suggesting a number of suitable jobs for him; Grigg speculates that the conversation might have been at Wilson's behest after Maurice's letter to Wilson, and that the staff post in France (which he had declined on 15 April) might have been one of the mooted jobs.Grigg 2002, pp. 503–5
Maurice composed his letter to the press on 2 May but did not yet send it. Robertson wrote to him on 4 May, writing that not too much credence should be given to imminent predictions of Lloyd George's downfall, that Maurice should take especial care to get his facts exactly right, and adding: "You are contemplating a great thing – to your undying credit".Grigg 2002, p493
Maurice wrote to Asquith (6 May) saying he had decided against seeing him as it would be forcing Asquith to take responsibility for the letter, and Maurice wanted to take all responsibility himself.Grigg 2002, p. 494
Maurice's allegations Maurice's letter appeared in The Times on 7 May.The Times, 7 May 1918 p7David Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party in the Twentieth Century; Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 p. 72 The letter also appeared in The Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle and The Daily News.Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Sir Frederick Barton Maurice in Dictionary of National Biography, OUP 2004–08 The Daily Telegraph refused to print it.Grigg 2002, p. 489
In his letter, Maurice wrote that ministers in the coalition government of Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Unionist Party leader Bonar Law, had given false information to Parliament about the strength of British troops on the Western Front to cover up the fact that the number of British troops there had been reduced following Lloyd George's decision (against military advice) to send additional forces to Palestine.Liberal Democrat History Group website, 2009: http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/item_single.php?item_id=55&item=history In his letter he accused both Bonar Law and Lloyd George of misleading the House.The Times, 7 May 1918 p. 7 As Thomas Jones put it, Maurice challenged: statements ... made by Lloyd George in the House of Commons on 9 April: first, that notwithstanding the heavy casualties in 1917, the army in France was considerably stronger on 1 January 1918 than on 1 January 1917, and second, that in Egypt and Palestine there was a very small proportion of British as compared with Indian troops; and by Bonar Law on 23 April that the extension of the British Front which took place before the battle of 21 March was an arrangement made solely by the military authorities.
The government's statements indicated that the British forces on the Western Front were adequate, and therefore implied that the near-defeat inflicted by Germany in March was the responsibility of General Headquarters.Roy Jenkins, Asquith; Papermac 1994 edition, p. 473
Maurice wrote that his letter was "not the result of a military conspiracy" and had been "seen by no soldier" (a dubious claim, as he had in fact conspired with Robertson). He said that he was as "sincere a democrat as the Prime Minister" but that "My duty as a citizen must override my duty as a soldier".
Reaction to the letter Wilson mentioned to the War Cabinet on the morning of Maurice's letter that he had “heard from Maurice” but did not mention the contents of Maurice's letter, nor that he had apparently not replied to it. To add further to the statistical confusion, the War Office now supplied yet another set of figures (7-8 May). These now showed that the BEF had been inferior to the German forces opposite by "only" 100,000 combatants. To Lloyd George's irritation, these figures treated artillerymen, machine gunners and tank crews as non-combatants.Grigg 2002, p502-3, 506-7
Asquith tabled a private notice question and Bonar Law, on behalf of the government, offered to establish a Court of Honour consisting of two judges to look into the matter. Asquith would have been free to choose the judges, but he thought the proposal insulting to the independence of Parliament and declined the offer on the evening of 7 May. Instead Asquith demanded a Select committee to inquire into the allegations and pressed for a Parliamentary debate.
On 8 May 1918 Howell Arthur Gwynne, editor of The Morning Post, wrote to Asquith admitting that he was a long-standing political enemy of his, but that it was in the national interest that he be restored as Prime Minister in Lloyd George's place.Grigg 2002, p494
The letter provoked serious concern in the press both on the substantive issue of the right levels of manpower on the Western Front and their adequate support and because of the allegation that MPs had been misled.The Times, 8 May 1918 p10 However, on 8 May the Times editorial likened the letter's innuendos, such as that it “had been seen by no soldier” whereas Maurice had in fact conspired with Robertson, to the very sort of “disingenuous Parliamentary answer” which Maurice professed to deplore. Grigg argues that Maurice claimed to be acting for the sake of Army morale, yet his actions were likely to worsen it by sowing discord, and that it is more plausible that he was hoping to bring down the government.Grigg 2002, p503-5