Italy–Libya relations are the bilateral relations between the State of Libya and the Italian Republic. Italy has an embassy in Tripoli and a general consulate in Benghazi. Libya has an embassy in Rome and two general consulates in Milan and Palermo.

History Between 1911 and 1947, what is now Libya was an Italian colony. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1947.

In 1970, Libya expelled all Italians from Libya and confiscated their possessions.

While Libya was considered a pariah by much of the international community under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, Italy maintained diplomatic relations with Libya and imported a significant quantity of its oil from the country. Relations between Italy and Libya warmed in the first decade of the 21st century, when they entered co-operative arrangements to deal with illegal immigration into Italy. Libya agreed to prevent migrants from sub-Saharan Africa from using the country as a transit route to Italy, in return for foreign aid and Italy's successful attempts to have the European Union lift its trade sanctions on Libya.

When Gaddafi faced a civil war in 2011, Italy imposed a freeze on some Libyan assets linked to him and his family, pursuant to a United Nations-sponsored regime and then bombed the country, violating Libya's No-Fly Zone. After the death of Gaddafi, Italy recognized the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the government of Libya.

On 26 September 2011, Italian energy company Eni announced it had restarted oil production in Libya for the first time since the start of the 2011 Libyan civil war. The quick return of Eni to Libyan oilfields reflected the positive relations between Rome and Tripoli under the NTC.

The Italian embassy in Tripoli is one of the few Western embassies still active in Libya during the post-civil war violence in Libya because Italy is Libya's most important trade partner.

Gaddafi's Revolution The 1969 coup d'état that led to the Gaddafi government also contributed to the reopening of the dispute with Italy over the colonial past. The new military junta exploited Italy as an "external enemy" to reinforce internal consensus through propaganda initiatives such as the seizure of property (including social security contributions) and the expulsion of Italian-Libyans, and the institutionalization of the "Day of Revenge".

Compensation claim for colonial and war damage The nub of political relations remains the Libyan claim for reparations for colonialism. The question has led to several discussions: if the current Libya (never independent before 1951) was internationally recognized as part of the Italian territory, the damage caused by the Italian military operations – in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the Second World War on the North African front – was on Italian territory and not that of another State. Moreover, no European State has ever paid reparation for its colonial past. Equally, Italy could claim compensation from the current Libyan government for the damages resulting from the numerous reprisals of the Libyan rebels during the colonial period. These issues have been set aside and also countered by the need to maintain a relaxed political relationship, for different reasons: the relevance of the oil extraction operations that Eni has been carrying out in Libya since 1956, the possibility of collaborating in the fight against fundamentalism and terrorism, the search for stability in the Mediterranean.

Property confiscated from Italians in Libya

In 1970, after the advent of the Libyan revolution, the more than twenty thousand Italians residing in Libya were expelled from the country and their property was confiscated. The value of the assets lost by the expelled Italians was calculated in 1970 by the Italian government to be 200 billion lire based on real estate property value. Including bank deposits and various entrepreneurial activities, this figure exceeded 400 billion lire (equal to about 3 billion euro or dollars in 2006). Since then, there has never been an ad hoc provision providing compensation for the 1970 confiscation. Those entitled have benefited only from the aid provided by the compensation laws in favour of all Italian citizens who have lost property abroad.

The Confiscation of 1970 was justified by Gaddafi as a partial reparation for the damages resulting from colonization. For its part, the Italian government has never demanded compliance from the Libyans with the violated treaty by using the provided arbitration clause (art. 9) nor has it ever put on the table the value of those assets "returned" to the Libyan people.

In the Dini-Mountasser agreement of July 1998, which was intended to close the dispute, there is no mention of the value of the assets confiscated from Italians. As for visas to enter Libya, after the initial enthusiasm following the visit of then Prime Minister Berlusconi to Gaddafi in 2004 – in which a solution seemed to have been found – to date Italian citizens repatriated in 1970 cannot return to the country except after the age of 65, through an organized trip and with entry documents in both Italian and Arabic. The AIRL association (see external links) represents and defends the rights of returnees, it has been asking for the completion of compensation since 1972.

Credits of Italian companies in Libya

It happens that the question about credits of Italians in Libya is linked to the problem with the advent of Gaddafi and with the expropriation of assets and the expulsion of the Italians, which took place in 1970. In reality, several aspects of the story must be considered. The "credits of Italian companies in Libya" proper, date back to economic activities after 1970: the oldest to the early 1980s, the most recent to the early 2000s. The reason for Libyan insolvency for these entrepreneurs does not lie in the political will to harm the Italians but derives from disputes of an administrative or commercial nature. The variety of cases, being 105 companies, cannot be categorized. The Italian Government, in the spirit of erasing the past born from the Common statement, in 2000 asked the creditors of the various Libyan bodies to make their respective situations known to negotiate them as a block of credits. The sum of the claimed credits reached over 620 million euros and the difficult negotiation began. The Libyans asked that the Italian side calculate the indisputable credits within the 620 million euros; having obtained the answer, they asked to recalculate it with their experts, arriving at totally different conclusions; at Italy's urging, they produced in 2004 a lump-sum refund proposal, naturally lower than 600 million. Purged to creditors, the proposal was refused, and it went back to square one. At a certain point, the Libyans said (confirming a concept already expressed previously) that the creditors could come forward anyway uti singuli, then denying this possibility when the first concrete case occurred.

The diplomatic-military crisis of 1986 In the 1980s, Gaddafi, for anti-Israeli and anti-American purposes, came to support terrorist groups such as the Irish IRA and the Palestinian Black September, and was also accused of having organized attacks in Sicily, Scotland and France. Having become a major enemy of the United States of America, he was progressively marginalized by NATO. Furthermore, on 15 April 1986, Gaddafi was attacked militarily at the behest of US President Ronald Reagan: the bombing fatally wounded Gaddafi's adopted daughter, but left the colonel unharmed. He had been warned of the bombing by Bettino Craxi, the Prime Minister of Italy."Italy helped "save" Gaddafi by warning of US air raid". Monsters and Critics. Rome. 30 October 2008. Archived from the original on 28 February 2011. Retrieved 25 February 2011.

At the time of the American bombing of Tripoli, (which took place on 14 April 1986), the Italian Prime Minister Craxi was deemed excessively prudent and was therefore criticized by the national press for not reacting to the Libyan reprisal (the launch of missiles on Lampedusa).See Repubblica, 27 ottobre 1989, p. 2 Over twenty years later, a very different description of the facts emerged according to which Craxi warned Gaddafi in advance of the imminent US attack on Tripoli, thus allowing him to save himself.given by Abdel-Rahman Shalgam, Libya's foreign minister, on the sidelines of the Italo-Libyan conference at the Farnesina on 30 October 2008, and confirmed in a recent interview by Andreotti, the foreign minister at the time, in Andreotti e il ministro libico confermano "Craxi avvertì Gheddafi del bombardamento Usa" from Repubblica.it, see also Corriere della Sera, which includes references to previous revelations in the same sense by Senator Sdi Cesare Marini.

This is a reconstruction in accordance with the well-known positions of the Italian government, which considered the American retaliation as an improper act which should not have involved Italian soil as the starting point of the attack. This version is also consistent with some reconstructions of the missiles on Lampedusa, notably the one according to which the missiles were an expedient to cover up "the Italian friend" in the eyes of the Americans: this is demonstrated by the poor offensive penetration capacity of the missiles, which would have fallen into the sea without causing any damage. However, this thesis does not explain how Craxi knew about the attack two days earlier, given that it was conducted by ships of the 6th fleet at anchor in the Gulf of Sirte and that at the time it was said that the Italian government – and no other NATO governments, with the exception of the government of Britain – had not been involved in its preparation. On this point, however, a direct testimony has recently come from Craxi's diplomatic adviser at Palazzo Chigi, Ambassador Antonio Badini, according to whom Reagan sent Vernon A. Walters to inform the Italian government of the imminent attack on Gaddafi. As Craxi did not manage to convince the Americans to desist, he decided to save the life of the Libyan leader to avoid an explosion of instability in an Islamic country facing Italy.

The Treaty of Benghazi (2008) On 30 August 2008 Silvio Berlusconi signed a Treaty with Muhammar Gaddafi in Benghazi confessing to and apologizing for the damages suffered by the Libyan people during the period of Italian colonialism. That was the first time in history that a country had apologized and compensated (5 billion dollars plus the medical care for those who were harmed from the remnants of colonialism) for its previous colonization. In turn, Libya agreed to fight against illegal migration.

The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya is composed of three parts: general principles; closing with the past and ending the disputes; and partnership.

The first part begins with an official condemnation of Italy's colonization of Libya. The second part, closing with the past, contains the reparation payment of $5 billion to be paid in annual installments of $250 million over a 20-year period. The third, most important part of the Treaty deals with partnership. While the countries planned to cooperate in the areas of culture, economy, science, non-proliferation and more, the foremost area of cooperation pertains to immigration. Notably, the Libyan coast was to be patrolled by mixed (Libyan and Italian) crews on boats to be provided by Italy. Additionally, Libya's land borders were to be monitored using a satellite detection system provided by both the European Union and the Italian government. The Treaty was seen to have improved bilateral relations by stabilizing the cooperation in a wider range of sectors.