The interception of the Italian liner was a training exercise and military aviation achievement of the United States Army Air Corps prior to World War II. The tracking and location of an ocean-going vessel by B-17 Flying Fortresses on 12 May 1938 was a major event in the development of a doctrine that led to a United States Air Force independent of the Army.Shiner, (1997, p. 133. The mission was ostensibly a training exercise for coastal defense of the United States, but was conceived by planners to be a well-publicized demonstration of the capabilities of "heavy bombers (as) long range instruments of power".
The flight was conducted during coastal defense maneuvers held by the Air Corps without the participation of the United States Navy, and apparently without understanding of their purpose by the Army Chief of Staff.Correll, "Rendezvous with the Rex", p. 55. Both had continuing disagreements with the leaders of the Air Corps over roles and missions, with the Navy disputing its maritime mission and the Army seeking to limit its role to that of supporting ground forces.Shiner (1997), p. 116.
With a characteristic flair for creating publicity,Shiner (1997), p. 147.Underwood (1991), p. 4. the Air Corps' General Headquarters Air Force (its combat organization) not only successfully made the interception at sea, but exploited both live radio news coverage and dramatic photographs. Although the publicity resulted in a short-term setback for Air Corps ambitions, within a year both U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and future Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall became new proponents of long-range air power.Underwood (1991), pp. 6, 117, 146.Head (1995), p. 209.Roosevelt was especially impressed by the range of the B-17. (Underwood 146)
Background Ostfriesland In July 1921, promoting the concept of an independent Air Force, General Billy Mitchell staged a series of aerial bombing exercises that resulted in the sinking of the former German battleship Ostfriesland by the U.S. Air Service. Incurring the enmity of the Navy, which considered the achievement nothing more than a publicity stunt, Mitchell continued to discredit the battleship as the main weapon for projection of power by sinking several more obsolete ships in the next two years.The others were the obsolete U.S. pre-dreadnought battleships Alabama in September 1921, and Virginia and New Jersey in September 1923. However, the Air Service was limited by Army policy to being an auxiliary of the ground forces and was unable to obtain a role that would use long distance bombers.Correll, "Billy Mitchell and the Battleships ", pp. 65-68
The "Shasta Disaster" When the Air Service was renamed the Air Corps in 1926, the joint Army-Navy Board was in the process of reconsidering service responsibilities in coastal defense. Both Chief of Air Corps Major General Mason Patrick and Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics, resisted any restrictions on range or missions for their respective services' aircraft. The resulting joint action statement was vague regarding Air Corps actions over water but "left the door open" for the Navy's interpretation of its own authority, which was that the shore-based coastal patrol mission was its prerogative. Efforts by the War Department to clarify the issue were rebuffed by the Navy to the extent that the secretary of war warned President Herbert Hoover in 1930 that the situation was endangering national defense.Greer (1985), p. 68
On 7 January 1931, Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur and Navy CNO Admiral William V. Pratt, reached an agreement modifying the joint action statement by assigning the coastal defense role for land-based aircraft to the Air Corps.Greer (1985), p. 69Tate (1998), p. 78. This came at a time when the Air Corps was seeking a mission to justify the development of all-metal monoplane bombers, and theorists at the Air Corps Tactical School were advocating the use of long-range heavy bombers. In August of that year, to garner publicity and generate favorable public opinion, Lieutenant Colonel Frank M. Andrews, on the staff of outgoing Chief of the Air Corps, Major General James Fechet, proposed to bomb another ship during joint maneuvers with the Navy off the coast of North Carolina. Before the mission Colonel Roy Kirtland, the base commander at Langley Field, cautioned reporters that the operation was to be only a bombing exercise using small bombs, and that "nothing spectacular" should be expected.Maurer (1987), p. 228.
The United States Shipping Board made available a World War I cargo ship, the 4,865 gross ton , that had been tied up in the James River for a decade. An Army minelayer towed the hulk to sea off Currituck Beach Light. The next morning, 11 August, Major Harbert A. Dargue led nine B-3A and B-5 bombers of the 2nd Bombardment Group, little different from the Martin NBS-1s that had destroyed the Ostfriesland,Tate (1998), p. 158. to locate and attack the Mount Shasta, but a combination of bad weather and failed communications resulted in the planes being unable to locate the ship. Further, the failure was witnessed by several dozen reporters, movie newsreel crews, a broadcast team from NBC radio, and observers from both the Army and Navy, some aboard airplanes that did find the ship. The Navy responded immediately with scornful public mocking of the effort. When a second attempt three days later scored only a few hits with inadequately small 300- and 600-pound bombs, and failed to sink the Mount Shasta, a pair of United States Coast Guard ocean-going tugboats used small guns to sink it.Green "The Shasta Disaster"
Despite its earlier disclaimer and subsequent explanations, the Air Corps was highly embarrassed by the incident, referred to as "the bombing flop" within the service. Navy Captain Dudley Knox dubbed it "the Shasta Disaster", and the New York Evening Post commented that "the Navy evened up an old score". Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of The New York Times and a Naval Academy graduate, averred that it was "illustrative of the inefficiency of land-based pilots over water".Huston (2002), p. 26 As a result, Andrews and six subordinates were replaced by incoming Chief of the Air Corps, Major General Benjamin Foulois, and the secretary of war recommended that the Air Corps' budget be slashed. Andrews and Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. Arnold (executive officer of the Air Materiel Division at Wright Field), however, expressed concerns about the apparent lack of capability and possible failures in Air Corps training demonstrated by the fiasco.
Two months later a second opportunity presented itself. Another old ship, the Haines, sank in shallow water while being towed off Plum Tree Island in Chesapeake Bay and became a hazard to navigation. The 2nd Bombardment Group redeemed itself by completely destroying the derelict from the air, even though their only visible target was a ten-foot-square float marker. This accomplishment, however, went entirely unpublicized.Maurer (1987), p. 229.
Regardless of the MacArthur–Pratt agreement, the Navy had gone ahead with development of land-based patrol aircraft and expansion of its naval air stations, and in 1933 formally repudiated the agreement after Pratt retired.Maurer (1987), p. 289. On 11 September 1935, the joint board, at the behest of the Navy and the concurrence of MacArthur, issued a revised joint action statement that reasserted the limited role of all Air Corps missions, including coastal defense, as auxiliary to the "mobile Army".Cate (1945), p. 15. However, long-range bomber advocates interpreted its language to mean that the Air Corps could conduct long-range reconnaissance, attack approaching fleets, reinforce distant bases, and attack enemy air bases, all in furtherance of its mission to prevent an air attack on America.Cate (1945), p. 16.
Joint Air Exercise No. 4
On 4 March 1937, the 2nd Bombardment Group, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Olds, received the first of the newly developed B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers,Underwood (1991), p. 87. with 12 delivered during the spring and summer of 1937. Designated the YB-17 because of its service-test status, the Flying Fortress was the first multi-engine long-range bomber acquired by the Air Corps, despite resistance from the Army General Staff over its necessity, and the centerpiece of the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQ Air Force).Shiner (1997), p. 144, 149.Cate (1945), p. 17.
The B-17s made their first significant operational contribution during Joint Air Exercise No. 4, an Army–Navy summer maneuver conducted at sea, west of San Francisco, California.Head (1995), p. 192 and 195. Authorized by a directive of President Roosevelt issued 10 July 1937, the exercise used the target ship Utah to represent a hostile fleet of two battleships, an aircraft carrier, and nine destroyers. A patrol wing of 30 Navy planes commanded by Rear Admiral Ernest J. King was assigned to locate the fleet, after which a force of 41 Air Corps bombers (including seven B-17s operating from March Field) would attack it. War Department orders limited the Air Corps aircraft to operating no more than offshore, even though the directive had specified an exercise area out to .Maurer (1987), p. 409.
The exercise began at noon on 12 August 1937 and was scheduled to end in 24 hours. After several hours of searching through a foggy undercast that extended offshore, Navy planes found the Utah from the coast and tracked it heading northwest. Air Corps bombers were sent to attack the ship but searched well into the evening without locating it. Admiral King then found an error in the Navy's position reports, which he later attributed to "clerical error".Maurer (1987), p. 405.Underwood (1991), p. 92, however, states that the Navy "deceived" the Air Corps. The Utah had actually been west of the search area provided to the Air Corps. Furthermore, the ship disappeared into the extensive low fog during the night, breaking the contact by the Navy's scout planes. The poor weather also prevented an early morning search for the Utah.
Brigadier General Delos Emmons, commander of the GHQ Air Force's 1st Wing, dispatched bombers at 09:00 on 13 August to search an area of entirely covered by low clouds.Tate (1998), p. 168. Olds surmised that the Utah had feinted towards San Francisco, then reversed course to attack the industrial Los Angeles area. Accompanied by Major General Frank Andrews (commanding the GHQ Air Force), he flew in the lead B-17 above the clouds, patrolling an area offshore. A Navy patrol aircraft located the Utah at 11:00 steaming southeast off the coast. The 2nd BG bombers responded to the position report and located the Utah shortly before the noon termination of the exercise. From an altitude of 400 feet they attacked the former battleship with Navy-supplied water bombs.Copp, A Few Great Captains, p. 396.
When the Navy protested the low-altitude attack, claiming that evasive action could have avoided the attack, both B-17s and B-18s repeated the mission the next day. They found the Utah and bombed it, with the B-17s bombing from 18,000 feet.Underwood (1991), p. 91.Head (1995), p. 195. The Air Corps produced photographs and bombing data that showed it achieved a higher percentage of hits and near-misses than earlier Navy tests,Underwood (1991), p. 92. and the Navy subsequently had the exercise classified "Secret".LeMay and Kantor (1965), p. 151. The joint report sent to the president by the secretaries of the Navy and War omitted the information showing the success both in navigation and bombing.Underwood (1991), p. 93. Despite the secrecy restriction, the success of the B-17s was leaked to radio commentator Boake Carter, who disclosed it to the public.Copp, A Few Great Captains, p. 398.