Framing effect is a cognitive bias where people's decisions change depending on how options or statements are framed, even when they are logically identical. Studies show that when both choices are framed positively as gains, the majority of people prefer a certain gain over a probable gain. On the other hand, when both choices are framed negatively as losses, people tend to choose an uncertain loss over an inevitable loss. Though the choices across the positive and negative framing conditions are logically equivalent, people in different conditions make different decisions. Gain and loss are defined within the scenario as outcomes, for example, lives lost or saved, patients treated or not treated, monetary gains or losses.
Prospect theory posits that a loss is more significant than the equivalent gain, that a sure gain (certainty effect and pseudocertainty effect) is favored over a probabilistic gain, and that a probabilistic loss is preferred to a definite loss. One of the dangers of framing effects is that people are often provided with options within the context of only one of the two frames.
Valence-framing implicates attitudinal changes in attitudinal conceptualization. Statements oriented negatively ("I oppose") result in greater levels of attitude resistance and certainty as compared to positive statements ("I support") even when both statements are aimed toward the same logical end.
The concept helps to develop an understanding of frame analysis within social movements, and also in the formation of political opinion where spin plays a large role in political opinion polls that are framed to encourage a response beneficial to the organization that has commissioned the poll. It has been suggested that the use of the technique is discrediting political polls themselves. The effect is reduced, or even eliminated, if ample credible information is provided to people.
History
The rational actor model The rational actor model is a theoretical framework used by economists to understand human decision-making at the individual level. It assumes that people act in rational ways that optimize their interests. The model includes several core assumptions: rational actors have stable preferences, access to all relevant information, the capability to analyze all possible options and outcomes, and are unbiased and unemotional. This model has been influential in many social science disciplines, including economics and political science. Psychologists have criticized the rational actor model by arguing that its assumptions do not accurately reflect real-world human decision-making behavior. They point out that the time and cognitive resources available to individuals are insufficient for deliberate analysis of every situation. In practice, decision-making is often affected by emotion, social context, and Heuristic Since then, psychologists have conducted extensive research on the systematic biases and errors that influence human judgment and decision-making.
Social psychology perspective: Prospect Theory Tversky and Kahneman proposed a new theoretical frame to understand decision-making in their 1981 paper, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice." They are major contributors in the domain of the psychology of decision-making. They proposed prospect theory, which, unlike traditional economic theories that assume people make rational choices by calculating risks and benefits, recognizes that people make biased or inconsistent decisions in real life based on how options are presented—or, in other words, framed.
In the same paper, they conducted an experiment to test participants with the classic question, the Asian disease problem: participants were asked to choose between two treatments. The researchers manipulated two independent variables: framing of options (positive vs. negative) and certainty of outcomes (certain vs. risky)
Participants were asked to choose between two treatments for 600 people affected by a deadly disease. Treatment A was predicted to result in 400 deaths, whereas treatment B had a 33% chance that no one would die but a 66% chance that everyone would die. This choice was then presented to participants either with positive framing, i.e. how many people would live, or with negative framing, i.e. how many people would die.
FramingTreatment A ( The certain option)Treatment B (The risky option)majority choicePositive"Saves 200 lives""A 33% chance of saving all 600 people, 66% possibility of saving no one."Treatment ANegative"400 people will die""A 33% chance that no people will die, 66% probability that all 600 will die."Treatment B
Treatment A was chosen by 72% of participants when it was presented with positive framing ("saves 200 lives"). When the question was negatively framed, the result reversed, and 78% of participants chose Treatment B.
In the paper they coauthored later in 1984, Kahneman and Tversky made two addition to their original theory. First, they discussed how people reason about probability. They pointed out that people do not treat probability logically, instead tending to overestimate the likelihood of low-probability events (like winning the lottery) while underestimating events with moderate to high probability. They also introduced the concept of mental accounting—for example, people treat losing a $10 bill differently from losing a $10 movie ticket, even though the monetary loss is the same.
In his later work, Kahneman further developed the theoretical framework of decision-making by introducing the concept of dual systems. In his 2011 book Thinking, Fast and Slow, he described two modes of thinking: one system is automatic, intuitive, and emotional, operating effortlessly and responsible for generating quick judgments and impressions. The other system is logical, deliberate, and effortful, responsible for complex tasks and self-control. People are more vulnerable to framing effects when relying on the intuitive system, as it is more susceptible to contextual cues and surface-level presentation.
Social cognitive psychology perspective: Valence-framing and attitudes Expanding upon research that viewed framing effects as it related to outcomes or issues, Bizer and Petty (2005) find that framing effects are implicated with attitudes as well. The authors illuminate that negatively-valenced attitudes (for example: opposing current policy) as contrasted with positively-valenced attitudes (for example: supporting policy reform) resulted in participants displaying greater resistance to counterattitudinal messages.
In contrast to earlier research such as McGuire's inoculation theory that states that individuals exposed to arguments with weak counterarguments will foster resistance to attitudes, valence-framing offers a perspective on how attitudes are able to be strengthened and made resistant to counterattitudinal challenges in a relatively low-effort manner.
Subsequent research on the valence-framing effect validates Bizer and Petty's initial finding. Bizer, Larsen and Petty (2011) elucidate that negatively-framed attitudes increases the likelihood of engaging in attitude-aligned behaviors as well as increasing certainty toward the attitude object.
Whereas preceding research focused on authenticating the generalizability of the valence-framing effect, there has been little consideration as to the mediators of the valence-framing effect. Bizer, Žeželj and Luguri (2010) find that the level of cognitive processing is a mediator in the valence-framing effect. Specifically, the authors find that valence-framing effects were more pronounced in participants who are able to elaborate on their attitudes (participants that are motivated and not under cognitive load) as opposed to participants who are not able to elaborate on their attitudes (participants who do not view the attitude as particularly relevant, or are under cognitive load).
Valence-framing operates as a cognitive bias as it impacts participant attitude through manipulating word choices ("oppose" vs "support"). Extensive research on biases indicate that biases are mediated or controlled when individuals effortfully process information that is given to them. Contrary to this information, however, valence-framing shares the same conditions necessary for effortful processing: motivation and ability.
Extensionality violation In logic, extensionality requires "two formulas which have the same truth-value under any truth-assignments to be mutually substitutable salva veritate in a sentence that contains one of these formulas." Put simply, objects that have the same external properties are equal. This principle, applied to decision making, suggests that making a decision in a problem should not be affected by how the problem is described. For example, varied descriptions of the same decision problem should not give rise to different decisions, due to the extensionality principle. If judgments are made on the basis of irrelevant information as described, that is called an extensionality violation. Addressing extensionality violations entails cultivating awareness of how different descriptions of a problem may inadvertently influence decisions, and as a result developing strategies to mitigate such deviations. In doing so, decision-makers can aim to uphold the extensionality principle as a guide in navigating the complexity of choice, focusing on decisions that are more in tune to the inherent properties of the problem rather than its descriptions.
Influence: real world application Framing effects have powerful real-world influences. They shape decision-making across a broad range of domains and contexts—for example, in public health, education, politics, law, and economics. Even when options are logically identical, subtle shifts in wording—such as presenting outcomes as gains or losses—can reverse preferences.
In a 2021 study on the framing effect in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers found that the framing effect was larger in this context than under normal circumstances, indicating that individuals were more influenced by how options were presented during the pandemic. There was a positive association between the framing effect and perceived stress and concerns related to coronavirus, indicating that these factors are influential when it comes to decision-making. However, they were not related to risk aversion. More recent research has examined framing in vaccine communication. A 2026 discrete choice experiment involving 907 U.S. adults found that, compared with framing COVID-19 vaccination as a government recommendation, framing vaccination as a means of preserving personal freedom was associated with higher stated vaccine acceptance among respondents with greater vaccine hesitancy, but not among those with lower hesitancy. Framing vaccination as a way to protect others was associated with higher acceptance across hesitancy levels.
This effect has been shown in other contexts: 93% of PhD students registered early when a penalty fee for late registration was emphasized, but only 67% did so when this was presented as a discount for earlier registration. 62% of people disagreed with allowing "public condemnation of democracy", but only 46% of people agreed that it was right to "forbid public condemnation of democracy".Rugg, as cited in More people will support an economic policy if the employment rate is emphasized than when the associated unemployment rate is highlighted. It has been argued that pretrial detention may increase a defendant's willingness to accept a plea bargain, since imprisonment, rather than freedom, will be their baseline, and pleading guilty will be viewed as an event that will cause their earlier release rather than as an event that will put them in prison.
Developmental factors