The Baling Talks were held in northern Malaya on 28 and 29 December 1955 in an attempt to resolve the Malayan Emergency.
The main participants were Tunku Abdul Rahman (representing the Government of the Federation of Malaya), David Marshall (representing the Crown Colony of Singapore), and Chin Peng (representing the Malayan Communist Party). The talks were unsuccessful because the surrender terms were not acceptable to the Malayan Communist Party. After the talks, Chin Peng retired to Thailand and Ah Hai replaced him as acting Secretary-General in Malaya.
Background
The Malayan Emergency refers to a state of emergency declared by the British colonial government of Malaya in 1948 and lasted until 1960. There was an insurrection, and guerrilla war was fought between government forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) during the period. The state of emergency entailed the revocation of many civil rights, the granting of special powers to the police, and other measures. He then mentioned the High Commissioner's announcement in the Legislative Council on 30 November that the British Government no longer considered "the Continuation of the Emergency" as "an obstacle to the Federation's advance to self-government" aimed at the suppression of left wing political movements, especially the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
On 8 September 1955, the Government of the Federation of Malaya issued a declaration of amnesty to the Communists. The Government of Singapore issued an identical offer at the same time. However, few Communists surrendered to the authorities. It was evident that the Communists, having had ample warning of its declaration, conducted intensive anti-amnesty propaganda in their ranks; among the mass organisations, discipline was tightened and defectors were threatened with severe punishment.
Realizing that his struggles had not come to any fruition, Chin Peng proposed a referendum to the ruling British government alongside many Malayan officials in 1955. The meeting was intended to pursue a mutual end to the conflict but the Malayan government representatives, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, dismissed all of Chin Peng's demands. As a result, the conflict heightened and, in response, New Zealand sent NZSAS soldiers, No. 14 Squadron RNZAF and later No. 75 Squadron RNZAF; and other Commonwealth members also sent troops to aid the British.
Events prior to the talks Government proposal
On being elected as the new President of UMNO in 1951, Tunku Abdul Rahman announced to his supporters his determination to achieve very early self-government in Malaya. However, for as long as the Communist threat persisted, the Tunku believed that the British government would not grant self-government to Malaya. The Tunku's interpretation was based on the British Government directive to Sir Gerald Templer, on his appointment as the new High Commissioner for Malaya in 1951, which stated that "Her Majesty's Government would not lay aside the responsibility in Malaya until they are satisfied that Communist Terrorism has been defeated". The termination of the Emergency was the first priority of the Alliance, and it had to attempt every means possible to achieve it.
It was to this end that, in early January 1955, the Tunku made a dramatic call for the granting of an amnesty to the Communists as part of a deal to bring to an end the state of emergency in Malaya. The Tunku's proposal envisaged that, since a more truly national form of government was about to be introduced into the Federation, the Communists could no longer assert that they were fighting against British Imperialism and would be ready to give up the struggle. His proposal contemplated the granting of amnesty and the intensification of the campaign against the Communists if the amnesty was rejected. Dato' Seri Tan Cheng Lock, then-President of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) echoed the Tunku's sentiment, and even went so far as to publicly volunteer to go into the jungle to negotiate with the Communists.
The public response to the Tunku's proposal was favourable for it gave hope that it would lead to an end of militant communism and relieve the country of the heavy financial commitment of waging the emergency campaign. Moreover, it coincided with the amnesty offered to the Mau Mau terrorists in Kenya, which was announced some weeks earlier, which stimulated the public interest in the prospects of a similar amnesty in Malaya.
On 12 January 1955, a meeting of the UMNO-MCA Alliance was held in Malacca to discuss the Tunku's amnesty proposal. The meeting decided to "ask the Federation Government to offer amnesty terms to the Communist terrorists". The Committee decision was that "terrorists accepting the amnesty should be sent back to People's Republic of China or be rehabilitated and allowed to remain good citizens".
The Tunku's proposal was looked at askance by the British authorities. The British did not believe that, under the circumstances in January 1955, the offer of an amnesty would be likely to entice the Communists to surrender en-bloc, than their current policy of encouraging the terrorists to surrender individually, in the understanding that they would be fairly and humanely treated.
There was also the major issue in which any amnesty offer would not be available indefinitely. There was a fear that the ending of the amnesty period would discourage further surrenders, until confidence was again built up in the treatment of surrendered Communists under normal conditions.
In a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the High Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray, noted that:
This would be unfortunate, particularly as we see nothing in the present situation which would support the belief that an offer of amnesty at this juncture would be likely to be successful.
On 11 January 1955, Tunku Abdul Rahman met the Director of Operations, Lt. General Sir Geoffrey Bourne, in connection with the amnesty proposal. The Tunku stated that his objective was not so much that the MCP would accept an offer of amnesty, but to convince the people of Malaya that everything possible was being done. For him, a greater degree of mobilisation will not be possible until after that year's elections. He was aware that any direct negotiation with the Communists was out of the question. He stressed that it would not be acceptable for the Communists Party to be allowed to operate legally.
The proposal was further discussed on 17 January by the Director of Operations Committee, which comprised not only the Director of Operations and his Service Advisers, but a number of political leaders. The Alliance was represented by Tunku Abdul Rahman and H.S. Lee. The Tunku was asked by the Committee to clarify his amnesty proposal and the eight-point arrangements for an amnesty as proposed by the UMNO-MCA Alliance meeting at Malacca. After the discussion, it was appreciated by the Tunku and H.S. Lee that an amnesty will not be an armistice - something to be negotiated separately with the Communists' leaders - but will be a standing offer of pardon for each individual terrorist. It was also agreed that the amnesty question should not become a party matter.
Further publicity about the amnesty was also considered to be undesirable as it would adversely affect conduct of the campaign to encourage the Communists to surrender to the Government. Furthermore, the Communists leaders themselves, in their clandestine news-letter, condemned the Alliance's proposal as a British intrigue, designed to cause dissension in the Malayan Communist Party and to isolate it from public support. The Tunku consented to drop the proposal. Both accordingly welcomed a suggestion that a working party should be set up to examine all the implications of an amnesty. The findings were to be recorded for the information of the Director of Operations Committee. The composition of the working party was to be as follows: the principal Staff Officer to the Director of Operations, Secretary for Defence, a representative of the Attorney-General, Tunku Abdul Rahman, H.S Lee of the Malayan Chinese Association and V.M. Menon of Party Negara. After the meeting, the following press release was issued:
The question of an amnesty was very fully discussed in every respect at the Director of Operations Committee today. It was unanimously agreed that a general amnesty should not be offered, but that the present surrender policy, which embodies a very considerable measure of amnesty should continue, and increased efforts should be exerted to bring it to the notice of the rank and file of the terrorists, so that more may be induced to follow the lead of the 1,500 who have already surrendered. It was also agreed that the matter should be kept constantly under review so that policy could be modified if it should appear at any time that a break up of the terrorist organisation could be hastened by a greater or lesser measure of amnesty.
The rejection by the Federal Government of the Alliance's proposal for an amnesty was strongly supported by the Manchester Guardian, a British newspaper. In its editorial, the newspaper commented that an amnesty was appropriate when rebels had lost the desire to continue the struggle with the Government, and in return for the act of oblivion, were willing to become law-abiding citizens again. However, this was not the case in Malaya. The active members of the MCP would accept the amnesty only if they felt that afterwards they would be in a stronger position in their struggle against the Government. The form of amnesty which was proposed by the Alliance seemed to envisage that the Communists would maintain their party organisation intact and would turn their acts of guerrilla warfare to electioneering in a constitutional way.
The Tunku however was not prepared to give way lightly to the shelving of his proposals and the Alliance restated its view on the question of an amnesty in its Election Manifesto issues in May 1955. The Manifesto contained an undertaking to offer a general amnesty to the Communists in the following terms:
... to end the emergency as soon as possible by offering a general amnesty and, if it fails, to mobilise all our resources and seek all foreign aid to increase the vigour and intensify the fight against the terrorists.
The Communists' counter offer A month before the election, with the country increasingly gripped with political fever, the Malayan Communist Party took the initiative by putting forward a counter-offer to enter into negotiations for the termination of hostilities. The offer was contained in a letter written in Chinese, copies of which were sent to a number of leading personalities and organisations in the Federation of Malaya and in Singapore. The letter was signed by a representative of the Malayan National Liberation Army and dated 1 May, and had been posted in Haadyai in Southern Thailand. None of these letters were sent direct to the High Commissioner or to any of his officers. The letter asked a safe conduct to enable representatives of the Headquarters of the Communists terrorists to come out to negotiate both a ceasefire and the participation of the Communist Party in the future development of the country. The letter also rejected the Alliance's amnesty offer.