The Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China was signed on 29 September 1972 in Beijing. The communique established and normalized diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC), resulted in the severing of official relations between Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. The document produced nine articles in a joint statement, showing compromises on previously ambiguous principles enunciated by both sides. Of these, four points are particularly worthy of attention:

the desire for a peace treaty between Japan and China; the statement that Japan "understands and respects [China's] stance" that Taiwan is part of the PRC; an Asia-Pacific anti-hegemony clause; Japan's reversal of relations with China and Taiwan.

The document ended the "abnormal relations between Japan and China", recognized the People's Republic of China as the "sole government of China", and renounced any claim for war reparations from World War II. In addition, it concluded various administrative agreements between the two countries in trade, fisheries, aviation, and navigation, amongst others. The document firmly maintains its stance under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.

Before the communique

Japan's relations with ROC Taiwan was under Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945, which was relinquished thereafter to the Republic of China following Japan's defeat in World War II. After the Republic of China's retreat to Taiwan, the Japanese government during the Yoshida Cabinet lost hope of establishing substantial relations with the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing, instead considering the prospect of signing a peace treaty and establishing diplomatic normalization with the new Republic of China, which had by now lost the Chinese Civil War and retreated to Taipei, Taiwan. Japan at the time also carried the debt of gratitude to Nationalist China, as Chiang Kai-shek made the announcement of "returning virtue for malice" () and repatriated all the Japanese troops. As a result, on 25 April 1952, according to the Yoshida Letter, "the Japanese government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime in China", and later the Treaty of Taipei was signed. It was signed as Japan was under pressure by the United States to not recognize the newly established People's Republic of China due to their role in the Korean War, instead recognizing the government of ROC led by Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate government of China with this treaty.

Japan's relations with PRC Before normalization from 1952 to 1972, Japan only had diplomatic relations with Taiwan and not China. Although Prime Minister Eisaku Satō was in support of Taiwan, he regarded China as a threat, in keeping with the United States' policy on China.

Despite this, Japan was interested in restoring relations with China due to cultural, security, and economic interests. Japan and China have been neighboring countries for almost two thousand years and share many cultural, historic, and religious heritages. In terms of security interests, Japan wanted to restore its relations with China in order to set the tone for a peaceful diplomatic relationship after years of war.

From 1950 to 1972, trade between Japan and China existed but was relatively limited. At first, trade was restricted due to events such as the Korean War, a Chinese embargo on Japan in 1958, and tensions regarding the recognition of Taiwan. Later, the 1960 "Japan-China Trade Principle" led to the growth in selective trade that became more regularized after diplomatic relations resumed in 1972.

After the economic "Nixon shock" in 1971, Chinese businesses became more attractive for the Japanese economy than they previously had. Eventually, Prime Minister Satō resigned, which led to the election and next cabinet of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Prime Minister Tanaka made the restoration of relations between Japan and China an issue of priority in his agenda, hence his pursuing of the Joint Communique. This was beneficial for China as well, since it could lead to a smooth entry back into the international society and economy and could end the state of war between China and Japan. The February 1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China, leading to the Shanghai Communiqué, also played a role. The surprising Sino-American rapprochement boosted the possibility of a communique between China and Japan.

UN's recognition of PRC

1971 witnessed an erosion of Taiwan's international position and a shift in Japan–ROC–PRC relations. Firstly, the Nixon administration removed travel and trading barriers, as well as proposed a more serious dialogue with Beijing due to Cold War politics and the US–Soviet situation. Secondly, in 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted to admit the PRC into the UN.

From 1945 until 1971, the Republic of China occupied the so-called "China seat" as an original member and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council under the auspices of the US and a moratorium against thenPeople's Republic of China (PRC). However, due to decolonization and the admission of numerous Third World states to the General Assembly, Washington lost its grip on the UN and could no longer sustain the moratorium. Thus, the Chinese representation issue was considered as an "important question" which required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for a resolution to pass.

On October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly led by Albania voted to admit the PRC and to expel the ROC. The 17 UN members during the General Assembly declared that the existence of the PRC was "a reality that could not be changed to suit the myth of a so-called Republic of China, fabricated out of a portion of Chinese territory", and that the ROC were "unlawful authorities" that remained there only because of the permanent presence of the US Armed Forces. PRC, therefore, assumed the ROC's place in the General Assembly as well as its place as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

After the UN General Assembly vote on Peking and Taipei, it was hinted that Japan no longer recognized the Chiang Kai-shek government as the sole legitimate government of China, but only as the government of Taiwan, and that Japan was ready to shift recognition to Peking. In short, Taipei's failure to remain in the UN's Security Council and the General Assembly, along with the Sino-US rapprochement, pushed the Japanese government towards achieving normalization with Peking through establishing the Joint Communique and ultimately severing diplomatic relations with the ROC.

Terms of communique

Initial proposals

Japan On 26–27 September 1972, Japan's Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ōhira and China's Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei met to negotiate a proposal for the declaration.

Japan explained that they should raise the issue of the state of war between China and Japan in Clause 1. Japan explained to China that they could not accept China's interpretation of officially ending the state of war in this joint declaration. This was because China was not bound by the Treaty of Taipei (a peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan), by which Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) government of Chiang Kai-shek had already established the end of World War II. Japan negotiated to emphasize the existence of a peaceful relationship between the two countries and leave the specific timing of the end of the state of war unspecified. Although Japan's standpoint on the Treaty of Taipei did not change, if diplomatic normalization between Japan and China were to be established, Japan was willing to terminate the Treaty of Taipei.

PRC In 1971, a Japanese delegation of politicians from the Komeito party visited Beijing and announced in a joint statement with the China–Japan Friendship Association that there were five preconditions for relations between Japan and China:

there is only one China, and the government of the People's Republic is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people; Taiwan is a province of China and an inalienable part of Chinese territory; the "Japan-Chiang [Peace] Treaty " is illegal and must be abrogated; the United States must withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area; the legitimate rights of the People's Republic in all United Nations organizations must be restored and the representatives of Taiwan expelled.

These principles were approved by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and did not represent anything new to what China had long been asking of Japan. In fact, these proposals date back to 1953. Dissenting members in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), opposition parties, and the left-wing Japan Communist Party (JCP) accepted the first three points without reservation. However, the LDP was hesitant to approve China's proposal, especially since the first two points suggested Japan would have to abolish their peace treaty with Taiwan. Furthermore, in addition, point 4 was beyond Japan's capacity, as they hold no sovereign power over US maritime activity in the region. Lastly, point 5 lost its relevance after China joined the UN in 1971.

Negotiations between Japan and PRC

Outline proposal

The outline proposal in which the Foreign Minister of Japan, Masayoshi Ōhira, and Foreign Minister of China, Ji Pengfei, agreed upon for the Japan–China Joint Declaration can be seen as follows:

The state of war between Japan and the People's Republic of China ends on the date of the declaration. The Government of Japan fully recognizes the Three Principles for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China that was presented by the Government of the People's Republic of China, and also fully recognizes that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole and lawful government of China. Both parties declare that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan conforms to the long-term wishes of their respective citizens and that it is in line with the benefit of the peoples of the world. Both parties agree to treat relations between China and Japan on the basis of the Five Principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression; mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. In accordance with the Five Principles, disputes between China and Japan will be resolved through peaceful dialogue and without the use of force or the threat of force. Both parties declare that neither China nor Japan will seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and will oppose any country or group of countries that seek hegemony in this manner. Both parties agree to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship that is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence after the establishment of diplomatic relations. For the sake of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, the Government of the People's Republic of China abandons its right to demand war reparations from Japan. The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan, prior to the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty, will conclude agreements on commerce, shipping, air traffic, weather, post, fisheries, and science and technology on the basis of need and preexistence in order to promote the human exchange the economic and cultural relations.

Draft of joint declaration

The governments of Japan and China agreed upon a draft Joint declaration as follows: