French International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops were ambushed by Afghan Taliban insurgents, with heavy casualties, in the Uzbin Valley outside the village of Spēṟ Kunday in the Surobi District of Kabul province in eastern Afghanistan on 18 August 2008.
In the ambush and subsequent counter-attack operations involving reinforcements, 10 French soldiers were killed, as well as the Afghan interpreter; 21 French soldiers and 2 to 4 Afghan soldiers were wounded, and 20 to 40 civilians also lost their lives. The casualties for the French army were the highest single-day loss since the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, which killed 58 French soldiers.
Reports in France as well as a NATO one about the incident summarised that the surviving members of the initial coalition forces were "lucky to escape," arguing that they were not adequately supplied and equipped for the ambush and lacked preparation, while facing a planned attack by a well-prepared enemy. However, this version was denied by the French government and the NATO report was dismissed by NATO as a "mere field report" written by a soldier embedded in the patrol and featuring errors.
Later reports by the British newspaper The Times claimed that when the French group took over duties from the Italians, the relative calm of the region until that point had only been obtained by bribery, something the French were unaware of and which led to the assumption that the zone was largely secured already. But these claims were never confirmed, with the Italian Prime Minister calling them "totally baseless accusations". The French military likewise denied the accusations leveled against the Italians.
Situation in Surobi The sector of Surobi was under Italian control between 2006 and 2007. At the time, Italian troops crossed the 35th parallel only once, as the region beyond was considered to be dangerous. Then and until August 2008, responsibility for the Surobi district switched to 140 Italian troops who had undertaken development projects for the local population, as part of ISAF's "comprehensive approach" strategy. The district was considered a successful example of establishing security and was considered a quiet region despite the known presence of militants loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in remote areas. The Italian government understands its mandate to be a stabilization mission, without armed operations.
In August, French troops took over from the Italian force, as part of French president Nicolas Sarkozy's initiative to increase France's commitment to the war in Afghanistan.Gall, Carlotta. New York Times, Taliban escalate fighting with assault on US base, 19 August 2008 There had been a fear of militants attacking the three dams that operate in the region.LongWarJournal, Taliban kill 10 French troops in Kabul province ambush, 19 August 2008 In October 2009, The Times published an article stating that the relative calm in the region during the previous Italian occupation and since then had been obtained by Italian secret services bribing local Taliban groups into inaction. The French then ventured into areas with an over-optimistic threat assessment and insufficient equipment. A Taliban commander, Mohammed Ismayel, confirmed the existence of a deal with the Italians, though without corroborating the existence of any financial transactions, and explained that the more aggressive attitude of the French troops had caused the guerrillas to attack them. Silvio Berlusconi denied that any bribes were ever paid and rejected the claims as "totally baseless accusations". The French army explicitly denied the claims.
In contrast to the purely humanitarian operations carried out by the Italians, the French engaged in armed patrols to cut off guerrilla groups from their rear bases in Pakistan. On 15 August, a French patrol was dispatched to Spēṟ Kunday, but without exploring the surrounding passes. Local villagers warned them not to stay, due to the presence of the Taliban, but the French announced their intention to return. Thus, the guerrillas became aware of the French plans to reoccupy the area.
Ambush
Order of battle
On 18 August, an ISAF column left FOB Tora in Surobi to assess guerrilla activity in the Uzbin valley. It was composed of some 100 troops in 20 vehicles, mostly French, accompanied by elements of the Afghan National Army and some U.S. Special Forces in charge of coordinating air support. The patrol was organized in Carmin 2 ("Carmine 2"), a platoon of the 8th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment (four VAB armoured personnel carriers, 31 men) Rouge 4 ("Red 4"), a platoon of the Régiment de marche du Tchad a platoon of the Afghan National Army (15 men on 2 pickup trucks) 1st Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps a platoon of the Afghan National Guard (15 men on 2 pickup trucks) a US Special Forces ODA (12 men), composed of a Close Air support team and its escort (3 Humvees). Rapid Reaction Force USMC Embedded Training Team 6-3 (18 US Marines and 3 US Navy Corpsmen) with elements of 1st Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps, ANA
Their mission was to explore the field and make contact with local populations to reinforce control of the region. Uzbin Valley is the most populated valley of the sector, with 30,000 inhabitants. The patrol was aware that there were enemy combatants in the valley.
Two hours before the patrol reached the mountain pass, Omar Khattab was alerted and phoned local militant commanders Zabihullah Mujahed and Khalid Farooqi for support, as he began making plans for the attack. This advance warning raised suspicions that Afghan translators, who had deserted at Camp Tora, had leaked information, either voluntarily or under coercion; this was later denied both by the French Army and by the guerrillas, who claimed that they had lookouts and guarded weapon caches in the sector.
One hundred forty fighters took positions around the pass. According to official French statements, the group was composed mainly of non-Afghan elements. This was denied by the rebel leaders, who nevertheless acknowledge that weapons and funds were provided from abroad.
The ambush was mostly improvised by local leaders of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, later reinforced by Taliban forces, given the size of the operation, and villagers affiliated with either of these organizations. The ambush was part of a larger plan to surround Kabul, as it occurred on a road to Jalalabad, on which 70% of NATO supplies transit. Orders were given by the headquarters of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, in Pakistan, in liaison with the Taliban.
The Taliban leaders who carried out the operation deny that Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was involved, and claim that the ambush was prepared in a mere two hours by three Afghan Taliban units.
Battle and attempt to surround French troops
The column was led by Carmin 2 section. Ten kilometres away from their base, at an altitude of 1750 metres on their mountain pass, and around 13:30, the leading platoon reached the end of the roadway. The paratroopers were forced to dismount and advance on foot along a small path. Under Adjutant Gaëtan Evrard, they advanced with part of Carmin 2; Corporal Rodolphe Penon, a medic of the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment; and a translator (24 men overall) to inspect a pass situated East of Uzbin Valley, leading to the heights of Sper Kunday. The four VABs and their crew (8 men) remained at the bottom of the pass in support position. Rouge 4 stayed further behind. The Afghan National Army section was delayed by a mechanical failure and later reached the village. The Afghan National Guard section was guarding a checkpoint on the road in the valley.
When the first elements of Carmin 2 were approximately 50 metres from the peak at around 15:30, the group of fifty waiting militants launched their attack, quickly killing the squadron's deputy leader, the radio operator and the Afghan interpreter with Dragunov, AK-47 and RPG-7 fire. Penon was struck by a bullet in the leg while tending the wounded, and killed by a second bullet as Marsouin Noël Livrelli attempted to come to his rescue.
Now disorganised, the paratroopers scrambled to find cover in the mountain brush, as fifty more militants rushed towards their position in a pincer movement from the southern ridge and the village. In addition, several "well-trained snipers" amongst the militants were present, as were heavy mortars, and presented unexpected problems for the Coalition forces. Rocket-propelled grenades damaged three Afghan National Police vehicles. The men of Carmin 2 dispersed over more than 200 meters to shelter themselves and found themselves pinned down. 600 metres below, the VABs started supporting Carmin 2 with suppressing fire from their 12.7mm machine guns.
At the same time, Taliban units stormed a ridge North of the village on the rear of Carmin 2, threatening the VABs. Taliban tactics have been described as using modern Western techniques, with a perfectly prepared ambush which pinned French troops in a C-shaped pincer.
From their support position one kilometre from the village, Rouge 4 rushed to help, reaching the heights of Sper Kunday in eight minutes. However, they were unable to make their junction with Carmin 2 and had to support it from a distance, with machine gun fire and 4 Milan missiles. It was then engaged by Taliban snipers and prevented from deploying its mortars as Carmin 2 requested. The Taliban then maneuvered so as to climb down towards the village and surround the patrol, which had to fight to maintain its junction to the valley.
An empty VAB was hit by an RPG, causing some damage but no casualties. Meanwhile, after the death of the interpreter and wounding of four other Afghans, the Afghan National Army forces quickly fled the scene, while the American and French troops remained.
Carmin 2 requested reinforcements at 15:52, and air support at 16:10. Two F-15 fighters that were on alert were guided by the US special forces team, arriving a few minutes later. Anticipating NATO use of air power, the Taliban moved close to French positions, preventing the F-15s from firing to avoid friendly fire casualties. Ten minutes later, A-10 Thunderbolts arrived, but were initially unable to differentiate friendly from enemy forces. One of the A-10's descended into the valley dispensing flares at about 100 feet in an attempt to pause the fighting and identify the exact locations of the pinned-down French troops. The beleaguered paratroopers were able to use hand signals to communicate with the craft. The A-10s established comms with Carmin. After locating friendly forces, Carmin passed coordinates and both A-10s engaged the coordinates with their 30mm GAU-8.
Meanwhile, the men of Carmin 2 were duelling with the Taliban with hand grenades and sniper fire, and began to run out of ammunition.
About thirty minutes after the air support arrived, the French VAB-mounted M2 machine guns ran out of ammunition, and attempts at a counter-attack had to be abandoned.
Reinforcements
The Swift Reaction Force called from Tora reached the battle at 17:05, 80 minutes into the fight. It was composed of Rouge 3, a section of the Régiment de marche du Tchad Carmin 3, a section of the 8e Régiment de parachutistes d'infanterie de marine a support section with mortars, 20 mm gun VABs and Milan missiles
These reinforcements were engaged by Taliban before even reaching the village, but nevertheless managed to provide suppressive fire for Carmin 2 and Rouge 4, and supply the VABs of Carmin 2 with ammunition.
Meanwhile, the Taliban were joined by several dozen men.