Eustoquio Antonio Díaz Vélez (Buenos Aires, November 2, 1782 – id., April 1, 1856) was an Argentine military officer who fought against the British invasions of the Río de la Plata, participated in the May Revolution, in the war of independence and in the Argentine civil wars.
His name was Eustoquio (Eustochio Antonio according to his baptismal certificate) but usually is cited, incorrectly, as Eustaquio.
Birth and family
His parents were Francisco José Díaz Vélez, a wealthy merchant born in Huelva, Spain who was former chapter of Buenos Aires Cabildo, and María Petrona Sánchez Araoz de Lamadrid, a native of Tucumán, Argentina from an important colonial family.
He was the seventh child of a total of twelve. Among his brothers deserve to be named the second child of the marriage, Dr. José Miguel Díaz Vélez, politician who participated in the war of independence and in the Argentine civil wars; and the eighth offspring of that union, Manuel Díaz Vélez, young lieutenant of the Regiment of Mounted Grenadiers who died as a result of injuries suffered in the baptism of fire against the royalists in the Battle of San Lorenzo.
The British invasions
Diaz Velez joined the Regiment of border's Blandengues of Buenos Aires, a local militia, at a young age. He combined his military duties with trade, gathering some wealth.
During the British invasions of the Río de la Plata he assisted Santiago de Liniers and was discharged in the Regiment of Patricians, on October 8, 1806, as assistant graduate second lieutenant, taking part in the Reconquista of Buenos Aires. The following year, during the second British Invasion, distinguished himself in the Defense of Buenos Aires with the Patricians under the command of Cornelio Saavedra, and submitted the English in the "House of the Widow Virreyna (Viceroy)", between 2 and 7 July. He was promoted to captain.
During the Mutiny of Álzaga of January 1, 1809, he fought on the side of Liniers loyalists and was wounded. That earned him a promotion to lieutenant colonel graduated.
The May Revolution
Díaz Vélez had good relations with the conspirators who, before 1810, sought to achieve the independence of his country. He actively supported the May Revolution, participating in the meetings that decided the dismissal of Viceroy Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros, attending the one of May 19, called by Nicolás Rodríguez Peña. On the occasion of the Open cabildo of May 22, Colonel Cornelio Saavedra appointed him as head of the Patricians guards that enabled the assembly meeting that expressed the will of the people.
But as these guards were composed of the body of the patricians who was most touched by the insurrectionary spirit, and as they were under the command of Captain Don Eustaquio Díaz Vélez, who was one of the boldest officers and most developed in the riot, the result was that so far from the entrance clogged it lavishly provided to all who submitted their note with the sign or signal agreed between the patriots, while at the other side was allowed to enter only the personages well known for his official position, opposing difficulties and insurmountable observations to all those who could be taken as strangers or persons of lower position, especially if they were Europeans.
He integrated the resistance focus to the brand-new Government Board of May 24 for being consists with the ex viceroy. That night, he met at Rodriguez Peña home, with Domingo French, Feliciano Antonio Chiclana and other conspirators who managed the resignation of its members and demanded that the cabildo "proceeds with other election in persons that may merit the confidence of the people, course that do not deserve the ones that constitute the present Board, believing that will be the means of calming the agitation and excitement that was renovated between people.... "
Emerged the Primera Junta of Government, it entrusted his first military mission to occupy the square of Colonia del Sacramento, in the Banda Oriental, whose population sympathized with the revolutionary patriots, beating its garrison and carrying large amount of ammunition to Buenos Aires. By this victory the Primera Junta appointed him lieutenant colonel, to be effective.
Upper Peru Campaign
He was part of the Army of the North (Spanish: Ejército del Norte) that the Board of Buenos Aires had sent to military aid the Intendencias of the Upper Peru and participated in the defeated of Cotagaita. Weeks later, on November 7, 1810, he fought in the Battle of Suipacha, first win rioplatenses revolutionary arms, which allowed the rise of the cities of Potosí, Chuquisaca and La Paz, opening the patriots all the Upper Peru. By order of the Board representative, Juan José Castelli, Díaz Vélez complied with the execution in the main square of Potosí of the royalist authorities Vicente Nieto the governor of Chuquisaca, Francisco de Paula Sanz the governor of Potosí, and José de Córdoba and Rojas Major General defeated in Suipacha on December 15, 1810. He was promoted to colonel. He was part of the Army of the North and was part of the troops that were beaten off by the royalists at Cotagaita. He was later promoted to the rank of colonel.
Castelli signed an armistice with the Spanish commander José Manuel de Goyeneche, but subsequent events showed that neither of them intended to abide by it. Díaz Vélez and Juan José Viamonte, commanding their regiments, were sent as advance parties toward the border. When the bulk of the royalist army launched a massive attack in the Battle of Huaqui, on 19 June 1811, both regiments were almost destroyed without being able to receive help or to assist the rest of the army. Despite the defeat the government recognized him with the title of "bravo" ("brave", in English) because of the value shown on the battlefield.
Mr. Díaz Vélez exit without troop running any horse in the front and goes to the rear to the left of the line of battle ...
The battle was a disaster for the United Provinces' army and, lacking any support, groups of soldiers crossed the Altiplano as they could, fleeing to Humahuaca.
Díaz Vélez, in a letter sent to the revolutionary authorities in Buenos Aires regarding the causes and responsibilities Huaqui's defeat, dated August 29, 1811, held that anything they did not get the Jujuy forces forward ever would Perú. He complained of the ignorance and unpatriotic Upper Peruvian peoples and stated that those provinces were possessed of selfishness and servile spirit they had inherited from their elders. Díaz Vélez warned in mid -1811- the difficulty that the "bottom" provinces would have to spread the revolutionary ideas making their way through the Upper Peru.
Antonio González Balcarce was replaced by Colonel Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, governor of Chuquisaca, as commander of the Auxiliary Army. The regular troops of this, in October 1811, had been reduced to the division of Diaz Velez, who devoid of weapons, ammunition and supplies reached Tupiza. Díaz Vélez was assisted by the cavalry of Martin Miguel de Guemes. Pueyrredón, after taking the treasure of Potosi Mint, fearing a loss and wanting to play a political role in the First Triumvirate formed in Buenos Aires, called for his release, although previously he sent the reinforcements he was able to, to Díaz Vélez when he knew of the movements of Colonel Picoaga royalist forces. Díaz Vélez routed royalist Colonel Barreda at the action of Cangrejillos and, on January 12, 1812 he fought, in the gorge located along the river Suipacha, the Battle of Nazareno, against Picoaga. Although the outcome was adverse to the United Provinces' army was key to relieve Spanish pressure against Cochabamba. A few days later, on January 18, 1812 and by Díaz Vélez orders, Güemes recovered Tarija who had been occupied by supporters of the viceroy of Perú, José Fernando de Abascal, who immediately ordered him to rejoin the army taking 300 men from Tarija, 500 rifles and two cannons. Díaz Vélez had to retire to Jujuy at the approach of the main body of Goyeneche troops, that outnumbered the patriots.
The Second helper expedition to Upper Peru began when General Manuel Belgrano took over the Army of the North. Díaz Vélez participated in the organization of the Jujuy Exodus and created a body of cavalry called the "Patriots Determined" composed of volunteers and gauchos from Jujuy, the Puna and Tarija. He was supported by these irregular grenadiers who provided their own weapons and horses to the troop. Commanding the cavalry, he was responsible for the rear of the exodus.
He also had the cooperation of the Upper Peruvian Juana Azurduy de Padilla who passed directly from Jujuy to Tucumán.
When the patriots were engaged by a detachment of 600 royalist troops sent by Brigadier Juan Pío Tristán and began to withdraw, Díaz Vélez responded quickly and face them at the Battle of Las Piedras, on September 3, 1812, stopping the advance of the royal troops and achieving a victory that managed to reverse the demoralization of the troops and enable further exodus south.
His contribution was of vital importance in the preparations of the shock to be fought on September 24, 1812. He was at the meeting where Belgrano was persuaded by Bernabé, Pedro Miguel and Cayetano Aráoz -the most powerful family in the city of San Miguel de Tucumán who were his maternal relatives- to face the royalists.
Partly for these conversations and Díaz Vélez victory in Las Piedras, Belgrano dared to give the Battle of Tucumán, on September 24, 1812, which was the most important victory of the Argentina War of Independence and sealed the fate of the revolution. Díaz Vélez acted as major-general or second in command of the army.
Although Belgrano had been dragged by the disbanding of a section of his troop offstage action, the field was left to the infantry patriot. Díaz Vélez, noting that it was alone and without cavalry troops, cautious and steady as usual, managed to take the park of Brigadier Pío Tristán, with thirty-nine wagons loaded with arms, ammunition, some of the guns and hundreds of prisoners. Then he took the measure of replicating successful the infantry neatly into the town of San Miguel de Tucumán, placing it in the pits and trenches that had opened there. With the help of troops from the reserve and also taking the wounded, became strong in the city. He also reorganized the artillery and bet shooters on ceilings and corners, making San Miguel in an impregnable square. Encased in it, protected by moats, Díaz Vélez waited expectantly as the winner because in large part, by his actions, he decided the victory of the revolution weapons that day.
Pío Tristán, fearing what his troops could expect into the city, chose to threaten a pair of entrances, but ordered the withdrawal before the first enemy shots. His last attempt was using diplomatic channels: under the intimation of surrender within two hours made by the realistic chief threatened to burn down the city, Díaz Vélez vehemently replied, inviting him to dare, as the patriotic troops were victorious and inside were 354 prisoners, 120 women, 18 ox carts, all rifle ammunition and cannon, 8 guns, 32 officers and 3 chaplains taken to the royal army. He added that, if necessary, slit the prisoners throat, among whom were four colonels. Tristán dared not fulfill his threat and recognizing his defeated situation he retired up to Salta.
... [T]he enemy sought a new outrage the following day. ... defeated as it was, without artillery, ammunition and baggage, had the audacity to intimate the surrender of the town, where the infantry with part of the cavalry had retired. ... Major General, D. Eustoquio Díaz Vélez, who commanded it, was one of those men whose existence had always been attached to the homeland ... with its strong response, undid his faint hope and made him a confused and shameful retreat.