The New Georgia counterattack was a counterattack on 17–18 July 1943 by mainly Imperial Japanese Army troops against United States Army forces during the New Georgia campaign in the Solomon Islands. The U.S. and its allies were attempting to capture an airfield constructed by the Japanese at Munda Point on New Georgia with which to support further advances towards the main Japanese base around Rabaul as part of Operation Cartwheel.
The Japanese attack saw one infantry regiment from the Southeast Detachment carry out a frontal assault against the center and left of the U.S. front line, while another carried out a flanking attack on their left aimed at enveloping the U.S. forces and cutting them off from their supply line. While the frontal assault was checked, the flanking attack succeeded in breaking into the rear of the U.S. beachhead. Many casualties were inflicted among the logistics, support and medical troops in the area, and the 43rd Infantry Division's command post came under attack before heavy defensive artillery fire and local defensive fighting forced the Japanese attackers back. Ultimately, the Japanese attack was unsuccessful, having been badly coordinated, and after a brief lull in the fighting, the U.S. forces launched a two-week long corps-level offensive that captured the airfield on 4–5 August 1943.
Background Strategic situation In the wake of the Guadalcanal campaign, concluded in early 1943, the Allies formulated plans to advance through the Central Solomons towards Bougainville, in conjunction with further operations in New Guinea. These plans formed part of the effort to reduce the main Japanese base around Rabaul, which was designated Operation Cartwheel. Capture of the airfield at Munda would facilitate further assaults on Vila, Kolombangara and Bougainville.Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 73Rentz, Marines in the Central Solomons, p. 52 For the Japanese, New Georgia formed a key part of the defenses protecting the southern approaches to Rabaul. Accordingly, they sought to defend the area strongly, and moved reinforcements by barge along the Shortlands–Vila–Munda supply line.Stille, The Solomons 1943–44, backcoverMorison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 180
The Allied campaign plan for securing New Georgia, designated Operation Toenails by U.S. planners, involved several landings by elements of Major General Oscar Griswold's XIV Corps to secure staging areas and an airfield in the southern part of New Georgia at Wickham Anchorage, Viru Harbor and Rendova. Once captured, these would then be garrisoned to support the movement of troops and supplies from Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands to Rendova, which would be built up as base for further operations in New Georgia focused on securing the airfield at Munda.
The Americans landed reconnaissance elements around Zanana on New Georgia on 30 June; this marked the start of the New Georgia campaign. These were followed by main force elements from Major General John H. Hester's 43rd Infantry Division on 2 July 1943, crossing from Rendova where they had landed on 30 June. After establishing a beachhead, the American troops made limited gains in their drive toward Munda Point and advanced slowly against strong opposition.Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 92–94 & 120. From the outset, the Japanese forces around Zanana, consisting largely of troops from the 229th Infantry Regiment and 8th Combined Special Naval Landing Force, fought to delay the U.S. advance while reinforcements were dispatched.Shaw & Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, pp. 98–99 Over the course of several weeks, they delayed the U.S. troops' westward advance on Munda, and defeated an attempt to outflank their defenses.Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 106–115Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 177
In order to renew the offensive, the U.S corps commander, Griswold, was sent to New Georgia to assess the situation. He reported back to Admiral William Halsey on Noumea that the situation was dire and requested reinforcements in the form of at least another division to break the stalemate.Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 198 Griswold took over command of the troops in the field from Hester on 15 July and began preparations for a corps-level offensive. The build up would take about 10 days, and amidst this situation, the Japanese began preparations for a counterattack.Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 199
Japanese reinforcements
Japanese reinforcements arrived at New Georgia during July. The initial reinforcements comprised approximately 3,000 troops from the 13th and 229th Infantry Regiments, as well as a number of support units. These soldiers were stationed in the Shortland Islands.Shaw & Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, p. 98 The first attempt to transport soldiers to New Georgia began on 4 July, when four destroyers departed Buin in Bougainville. The Japanese ships broke off the attempt to land troops when they encountered a U.S. Navy bombardment force off Rice Anchorage in the early hours of 5 July, though they sank the destroyer .O'Hara, The U.S. Navy Against the Axis, pp. 170–173
The Japanese had more success in landing troops the next day. A larger force of destroyers was dispatched, and landed about 1,600 troops and 90 tons of supplies. The Japanese destroyers were intercepted by an American force of cruisers and destroyers, and in the Battle of Kula Gulf, which was fought during the early hours of 6 July, an American cruiser and two Japanese destroyers were sunk.O'Hara, The U.S. Navy Against the Axis, pp. 173–180 Three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers landed 1,200 soldiers unopposed on Kolombangara on the night of 9/10 July.O'Hara, The U.S. Navy Against the Axis, p. 180 On the night of 12/13 July, a further 1,200 Japanese soldiers were landed at Vila, though the Imperial Japanese Navy lost a light cruiser and the U.S. Navy a destroyer in the Battle of Kolombangara.O'Hara, The U.S. Navy Against the Axis, pp. 180–186
The troops landed at Kolombangara were subsequently moved to New Georgia by barge.Shaw & Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, p. 100 Other Japanese units were moved to New Georgia piecemeal on barges during July.Shaw & Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, p. 99 Overall, the units that arrived in the Munda Point area between early and mid-July were the 3rd Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 230th Infantry Regiment, the 13th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Independent Mountain Regiment and anti-aircraft, anti-tank, engineer and signals units. In addition, the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Infantry Regiment was transferred from Bougainville to Bairoko on the north coast of New Georgia.Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II, p. 67 These reinforcements enabled the Japanese to maintain their strength on New Georgia and prepare a counterattack, despite the American advances.
Opposing forces
Around 30,000 U.S. troops were committed to actions around Munda throughout July and August, while the Japanese allocated around 8,000 troops.Rentz, Marines in the Central Solomons, p. 93 The U.S. troops were under the command of Griswold, commander of XIV Corps,Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 127 and the Japanese force was commanded by Major General Minoru Sasaki of the Southeast Detachment.Stille, The Solomons 1943–44, pp. 32 & 54 For the counterattack, Sasaki's main fighting elements totaled around five infantry battalions.Hammel, Munda Trail, pp. 146–147 These were drawn from the 229th Infantry Regiment, under Colonel Genjiro Hirata, and the 13th Infantry Regiment, under Colonel Tomonari Satoshi.Rentz, Marines in the Central Solomons, pp. 81–83 The U.S. troops allocated consisted mainly of three infantry regiments from Hester's 43rd Infantry Division; to reinvigorate the advance on Munda, Griswold had requested reinforcements from the 37th and 25th Infantry Divisions, commanded by Major Generals Robert S. Beightler and J. Lawton Collins respectively. Ultimately, though, these divisions would not complete their movement to the battle area until after the Japanese counterattack.Stille, The Solomons 1943–44, p. 54Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 137 & 144Hammel, Munda Trail, p. 128
Battle
Due to the decision by U.S. commanders to land at Zanana in early July, rather than further west along the coast, the American lines of communication became stretched and vulnerable as the advance towards Munda continued. Meanwhile, the inexperienced American troops were disorganized and suffering from poor morale and bad leadership, having become bogged down by harsh terrain and bad weather, which had quickly turned the jungle tracks into mud.Nalty, War in the Pacific: Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay, p. 121 Sasaki launched his counterattack at the moment that the U.S. advance halted to reorganize.Shaw & Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, pp. 104–105 The objective of the Japanese operation was to destroy the American forces on New Georgia by attacking their exposed flank and rear areas. It was intended that the attack would be coordinated with naval operations to cut off the American troops on New Georgia and air attacks on Allied logistical bases on the island elsewhere.Shaw & Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, pp. 99, 104
Sensing an advantage, Sasaki ordered the 13th Infantry Regiment to penetrate the U.S. right flank around the upper reaches of the Barike River and attack their rear elements, while elements of the 229th which were already occupying defensive positions along the front attacked the left flank.Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 135–136 A total of six companies from two battalions of the 13th Infantry Regiment were committed to this effort, while the regiment's 2nd Battalion remained around Bairoko. These troops began moving from their assembly area in a plantation north of Munda on 14 July.
While Tomonari's troops began their march, those of Hirata's 229th in the center of the line undertook a series of patrols and minor attacks to keep the U.S. forces off balance. Hampered by the terrain just as the U.S. troops had been, it took three days for Tomonari's troops to complete their preliminary move.Rentz, Marines in the Central Solomons, pp. 82–83Shaw and Kane, Isolation of Rabaul p. 100 From the Barike, the Japanese began probing the Allied right flank, which was only lightly held by isolated outposts, before moving towards an assembly area for the main assault. Track improvement had not been completed in this area and, as a result, the U.S. outposts could not be reinforced quickly. Sasaki planned for Tomonari's forces to infiltrate this area and sever the supply lines from Zanana while Hirata's 229th Infantry Regiment advanced from Munda to assault the center and right of the U.S. line. In doing so, the Japanese hoped to complete an envelopment of the U.S. regiments holding the front. The element of surprise was lost, however, when U.S. patrols detected the infiltration. In the afternoon of 17 July, elements of the U.S. 43rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop unsuccessfully attempted an ambush but were overwhelmed in the attempt.Shaw & Kane Isolation of Rabaul, p. 104