This article presents the historiography of the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, as presented by historians in Poland and Ukraine after World War II.
Beginning in March 1943, and lasting until early 1945, a violent ethnic cleansing operation against Poles – conducted primarily by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) – occurred in the regions of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia (now in Western Ukraine). According to political scientist Nathaniel Copsey, research into this event was quite partisan until 2009 (with some exceptions), and dominated by Polish researchers, some of whom lived there at the time or are descended from those who did. The most thorough is the work of Ewa and Władysław Siemaszko, the result of years of research conducted with the goal of demonstrating that the Poles were victims of genocide. Nonetheless, the 45 years of state censorship resulted in an excessive supply of works described as "heavy in narrative", "light in analysis" and "inherently – though perhaps unconsciously – biased against Ukrainians."Nathaniel Copsey. (2009). Public opinion and the making of foreign policy in the 'New Europe': a comparative study of Poland and Ukraine Ashgate Publishing, pp88-89 Copsey writes that "it is very hard to find a neutral account of this period"
Polish historiography
Communist Poland The Polish historiography of the Volyn tragedy during the dictatorship of the communist party can be broken down into three periods:Роман Грицьків, Польська Історіографія Українсько-Польського збройного конфлікту часів Другої Світової війни [in:] Українсько-Польський конфлікт під час другої світової війни, Book 2, Lviv, 2003, pp. 148
End 1950–1960s First half of the 1970s Second half of the 1980s
In the early People's Republic of Poland, the question of the Polish–Ukrainian conflict was never a subject of independent studies. Ukrainian historian Roman Hrytskiv believes that Polish Communists avoided this subject as it could raise questions regarding the Polish population in Western Ukraine.Грицьків, pp. 148-149
Paweł Machcewicz from the Polish Institute of National Remembrance suggests two reasons why, up until the collapse of communism, censorship blocked the subject of the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia perpetrated by the OUN-UPA:
Ukrainians were considered a friendly Soviet nation (a member of the USSR) and any mention of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict would be seen as anti-Soviet. The previously Polish territories of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were incorporated into the Soviet Union; therefore any reference to those lost lands would be treated as anti-Soviet revisionism.Pawel Machcewicz, The Institute of National Remembrance and Coming to Terms with a Difficult Past: World War II and the Communist Dictatorship, Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, p.6
As the subject matter of the anti-Polish action in Volhynia and Eastern Galica was prohibited, in Polish popular remembrance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the site of the mass killings was transferred to Bieszczady and Eastern Lubelszczyzna; and thus communists were able to portray Operation Vistula as the only effective way of liquidating the UPA network.Rafał Wnuk, Recent Polish historiography on Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II and its aftermaths, IPN The theme of UPA "terrorism" was occasionally brought up in order to affirm the actions of the "people's government". According to Hrytskiv, Polish studies branded all Ukrainian nationalist organizations as anti-Polish, criminal and collaborationist.Грицьків, pp. 149
New studies were initiated in the early 1970s based on factual information. Under the influence of the Soviet historiography, Polish historians continued to expound the mistaken Soviet concept of Ukrainian bourgeoise nationalists, viewed in their own specific manner.Грицьків, pp. 150 This category includes the works of Ryszard Torzecki,Torzecki R. "Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy 1933-1945" - Warszawa, 1972 who explained the reason for the conflict as Hitlerite politics based on the tenet of divide and conquer, the chauvinism of Ukrainian nationalists, and Ukrainian-Polish disagreements in the interbellum, which were used by the Nazis in their interests. Similar concepts were formulated by A. Szczesiak and W. Szota in a publicationSzczesniak A. B., Szota. W. Z. "Droga do nikąd. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i jej likwidacja w Polsce" - Warszawa, 1973 that was soon removed from sale and libraries. Officially the book was dedicated to the activities of the Ukrainian nationalists in the interbellum but it also explained that the conflict had its origins in the late 19th century, and that the Volyn tragedy was a continuation of the terror campaigns of 1918–1939. This work investigated in detail the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations from 1942–45 to stop the conflict and to unite to fight a common foe – the USSR. This study brought about a re-evaluation of the UPA within the USSR itself.
The next significant study was published in the mid-1980s by Edward Prus – Heroes under the sign of the Trident (1985),Prus E. "Herosi spod znaku tryzuba: Konowalec - Bandera - Szuchewicz" - Warszawa, 1985 which employed a journalistic and propagandistic style.Грицьків, pp. 153 Prus was the first to introduce the terms and concepts such as the Ukrainian "slaughter" of Poles.Грицьків, pp. 154 He compares the anti-Polish actions in Volyn and Galicia without the use of academic citations. According to Hryckiw, Prus's work has no scientific merit. In his opinion, the use of a journalistic style, falsification, and manipulation reflect the state of Polish historiography in the last years of the communist Poland.
Independent Poland
1989 marked the end of the Polish totalitarian state and a new era in Polish historiography. In the light of Polish independence the subject of Ukrainian–Polish relations became a growing concern. The first study to be published was Tadeusz Olszański's 1989 articleŁukaszów Jan (Olszański T. A.) Walki polsko-ukraińskie 1943-1947 //Zeszyty Historyczne 1989 - 90 - pp. 159-199 which shattered previous understandings of the OUN. He ascribes the reason for the Volyn tragedy to the inadequate policies of the Polish government in the interbellum and the destruction of moral society during the Soviet and German occupations. Olszański notes that in pre-war Poland, a Ukrainian nationalist movement could develop relatively freely even in the most radical forms, including the use of terror, and that the Polish state wasn't able to solve the problems concerning coexistence of Poles and Ukrainians, which resulted in popularization of nationalist and communist movements among the Ukrainians.
Olszański introduces the term "de-polonisation". Olszański suggests that the OUN expected a return to the situation as it was from 1918, when Poles and Ukrainians fought over disputed territories, and that the Ukrainian leadership wanted an absence of Polish population and Polish military activity. De-polonization action started in March 1943. Contrary to what Ukrainian émigré authors claim, the fact of Ukrainian initiative and the unprovoked character of the action is confirmed by the German documents. In the article from 1991, he divides "Volhynian terror" into the following stages:
Up to December 1942 – murders of individual Poles and Polish families From the beginning of 1943 – growth in attacks against Poles, which reached critical point in March 1943, the first point at which one can speak of mass terror July – August 1943 – apogee of terror; Ukrainians also assault Polish self-defence forces; spread of terror to Eastern Galician districts From September 1943 – attacks decline and Polish–Ukrainian confrontations gradually become more military in nature.Tadeusz A. Olszański, Konflikt polsko-ukrainski 1943-1947, Niezależne czasopismo kulturoznawcze "JI", No.20/2001
Olszański underlines the influence of numerous provocations by the NKVD and Soviet partisans in the occupied zones in directing conflict against the UPA.Грицьків, pp. 155 Retaliatory actions by Polish forces and the negative view of the Polish underground to Ukrainian independence were also factors. In the second period Olszański states that the Polish underground and the communists initiated a number of anti-Ukrainian terrorist actions. Ukrainian responses were restrained as at this time negotiations were being undertaken for a united Ukrainian–Polish front against Moscow. This was the first step to an understanding with the Poles, which in 1945 was affirmed by the tactical understanding between the UIA and AK. In the words of Olszawski, this was the end of conflict between these national movements, who would now wage a joint battle against the communist regime in Poland.Грицьків, pp. 156
The UPA was unable to conduct the action alone. It mobilized Ukrainian peasants on a large scale, who were later given Polish properties. Vast numbers of peasants participating in anti-Polish attacks, together with UPA units or individually, were also motivated by numerous Banderist agitators and by communist agents from the north of Volhynia. Olszański sees the role of Soviets in the events as insufficiently explained. He points that field organizations of the OUN were penetrated by communist agents and in some instances Soviet units disguised as UPA murdered Poles to gain support of local Polish population.
According to Olszański, the responsibility for the terror lies mostly on the OUN-B leadership, which decided to perform the large-scale anti-Polish action.
Olszański expressed view that the goal of the action was to expel Poles and not to exterminate them. Ten years later, in the post script to his previous article, he admitted that he was wrong: "More and more documents prove not only that the de-polonization action was a planned military operation and that the order from OUN-UPA leadership existed (though still not found), but also that the purpose of this operation was physical extermination (murder) of at least most of the Polish population of these lands, and not only – as I erroneously believed – expulsion. Thus it was the crime of genocide."
Zbigniew Kowalewski's study (1993)Ковалевсяький З. Поляське питання у повоєнній стратегії УПА - Україна. Наука і Кулятура - 1993. - Вип. 26-27 - с. 200-235 (First published in 1990) stated that the role of the auxiliary police and its collaboration with Soviet Polish diversionist-partisan groups provoked the Ukrainians to use force. These actions were not just those of the OUN and UPA, but also Soviet partisans, auxiliary police and other independent groups. Kowalewski introduces the thesis that the reason why OUN changed its strategy regarding the Poles in 1944–45 was in order to form a unified Polish-Ukrainian front against the USSR. This would explain the waves of OUN propaganda that were spread in the Polish population regarding the formation of a unified front and the cessation of retributive actions. The Ukrainian and some sections of the Polish population understood that without an independent Poland there could not be an independent Ukraine.